Agenda of Disability Strategic Advisory Panel

Disability Strategic Advisory Panel

16 June 2014

Item 7 - Building (Earthquake-Prone Buildings) Amendment Bill 2013

File No.: CP2014/12712

Purpose

1. To consider a response to a submission point in the Auckland Council’s submission on the Building (Earthquake-Prone Buildings) Amendment Bill 2013.

Executive summary

2. Subsequent to the Panel’s 17 March 2014 meeting, the Panel provided to council staff its proposed input to an Auckland Council submission on the Building (Earthquake-Prone Buildings) Amendment Bill 2013.

3. At the 19 May 2014 meeting, the Panel requested a response to two questions relating to the Auckland Council submission: Was the DSAP appendix attached to Council’s submission to the Local Government and Environment Committee in respect of the Building (Earthquake-Prone Buildings) Amendment Bill 2013 or just to the staff report? What evidence is there to support the claim in paragraph 40 of the submission that “the additional cost of upgrade on top of a seismic upgrade will add substantially towards the total cost of strengthening the building”?

4. Patrick Cummuskey, Special Projects Policy Advisor, has provided the following response: The commentary from the DSAP that was provided to us was considered in the same manner as commentary from other internal and external sources that we had contacted to help us form our submission. It was not attached to the submission we made.

5. In regard to the claim made in paragraph 40, the basis for it was a judgement call given the fact that most buildings requiring some form of seismic upgrade in Auckland will have works targeted at building elements such as parapets, chimneys and facades. As such any additional upgrading work with regard to fire safety or accessibility is unlikely to reasonably leap-frog off those targeted elements. It should be borne in mind that the intent of this Bill is not in fact to undermine the existing requirement to address upgrading of fire safety and accessibility when works are being carried out, but rather to reiterate the existing principles already in practice through Section 112, in this case for the purpose of encouraging owners of earthquake prone buildings to at least address that vulnerability.

6. The intent of the Bill, and indeed of Auckland Council Building Control, is to continue to exercise a pragmatic approach with regard to any alteration to buildings, whether it be due to normal redevelopment drivers or through the updated management of earthquake-prone buildings. This stance has been what we have spoken to in all discussions internally and externally to date, and will be our stance when we speak before the select committee on the Bill, and in any subsequent discussions.

7. For reference purposes, here is the text of s112 of the Building Act 2004 and the proposed text of the Amendment Bill that relates to this section. Note that the new text is merely a seismic-strengthening specific version of section 112 (2).

112 Alterations to existing buildings

(1) A building consent authority must not grant a building consent for the alteration of an existing building, or part of an existing building, unless the building consent authority is satisfied that, after the alteration,—

(a) the building will comply, as nearly as is reasonably practicable, with the provisions of the building code that relate to—

(i) means of escape from fire; and

(ii) access and facilities for persons with disabilities (if this is a requirement in terms of section 118); and

(b) the building will,—

(i) if it complied with the other provisions of the building code immediately before the building work began, continue to comply with those provisions; or

(ii) if it did not comply with the other provisions of the building code immediately before the building work began, continue to comply at least to the same extent as it did then comply.

(2) Despite subsection (1), a territorial authority may, by written notice to the owner of a building, allow the alteration of an existing building, or part of an existing building, without the building complying with provisions of the building code specified by the territorial authority if the territorial authority is satisfied that,—

(a) if the building were required to comply with the relevant provisions of the building code, the alteration would not take place; and

(b) the alteration will result in improvements to attributes of the building that relate to—

(i) means of escape from fire; or

(ii) access and facilities for persons with disabilities; and

(c) the improvements referred to in paragraph (b) outweigh any detriment that is likely to arise as a result of the building not complying with the relevant provisions of the building code.

133AXTerritorial authority may grant building consent for earthquake-prone building despite section 112(1)

Despite section 112(1), a territorial authority may grant a building consent for the alteration of a building if the territorial authority is satisfied that—

(a) the alteration is for the purpose of ensuring that the building is no longer earthquake prone; and

(b) after the alteration, the building will continue to comply with provisions of the building code to at least the same extent as before the alteration; and

“(i) the alteration meets criteria prescribed under section 401C(c) (if any); and

“(ii) ensuring that the building is no longer earthquake-prone outweighs any detriment that is likely to arise as a result of the building not complying as nearly as is reasonably practicable with the provisions of the building code that relate to—

(A) means of escape from fire; and

(B) access and facilities for persons with disabilities (if this is a requirement in terms of section 118).

Recommendation/s

That the Disability Strategic Advisory Panel:

a) receive the response to a submission point in the Auckland Council’s submission on the Building (Earthquake-Prone Buildings) Amendment Bill 2013.

Attachments

There are no attachments for this report.

Signatories

Author	Kevin Wright - Manager: Transport Strategy – Lead Officer Support DSAP
Authoriser	Kevin Wright - Manager: Transport Strategy – Lead Officer Support DSAP

Auckland Council CCO Review, Current State Assessment (Council Perspective)

February 2014
Introduction

The Auckland Council is undertaking a review of its council controlled organisations (CCOs) to determine whether there is a need to change the scope of activities and functions within any CCO, the structures that they operate within, or any of the accountability mechanisms.

The purpose of this current state assessment is to reflect on how well the CCO model is perceived to be working, what has gone well over the last three years, what issues have arisen, and to identify issues and opportunities that the review needs to consider. The assessment is based on feedback provided at meetings with most councillors and with senior staff across the Auckland Council.

Local boards and the IMSB were also invited to provide comment. As the timeframes were very tight local boards and the IMSB were informed that any feedback received by 15 February would be reflected in the assessment, but that feedback received through March and April could be incorporated into the review at a later stage. Three local board members had provided feedback at the time of this report being prepared.

In addition to this report, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) has been commissioned to prepare a parallel report that considers issues and opportunities from a CCO perspective.

The current state assessment has helped to inform the terms of reference for the review. Work on revising the draft terms of reference has proceeded alongside the preparation of this report.

This report is structured under five headings:

· Strategy, policy, and CCO objectives. This considers how CCO objectives are set and what issues have arisen with strategy development and objective setting.

· Delivery. This section highlights what progress has been made over the last three years as well as areas where progress has been slower.

· Accountability. This covers the formal accountability framework as well as communication and engagement over issues.

· Integration. This section outlines that there was considerable feedback that it is important for the council and CCOs to be seen as one council group, as well as reflections on some of the mechanisms for achieving this.

· Other issues.

A large amount of feedback was collected for this assessment, much of it more detailed that what is appropriate for this report. The report focuses on high-level themes and specific examples that illustrate the high-level themes. As the review progresses, the additional information collected will inform individual workstreams.

In any assessment of this nature the detailed feedback is inevitably more about issues and what is not working than what is working well. There was considerable feedback that although there have been teething problems there have also been many successes. The level of collaboration has also increased significantly over the past three years.

Executive Summary

The majority of the feedback was that the CCO model is largely delivering well for Auckland, and that significant progress has been made over the last three years. Many people commented that three years is not long to establish a new way of operating and that the level of collaboration and trust between the council and its CCOs has developed considerably over that time. Feedback indicates that some councillors are looking to the CCO review to fine-tune what is already working well. Others are expecting that it will address issues that have distracted from the progress that has been made or impacted on delivery.

Strategy Policy and CCO Objectives

· There are different views about the relative roles of the council and its CCOs in developing mid-level strategy – i.e., the translation of the Auckland Plan into policies and strategic plans.

· There is also a lack of consistency in current practice about how involved CCOs are in developing mid-level strategy. ATEED, Waterfront Auckland, and Auckland Transport have strategy development functions which has at times created tension with Auckland Council strategy functions especially at the interface.

· Most feedback was that Auckland Council should drive strategy and policy for its CCOs, but that CCOs have an important role to play in providing strategic advice.

· The general view is that CCOs are strongly geared towards achieving their core objectives and priorities. Councillors are also looking for CCOs to contribute to the council’s wider policy objectives.

· There was some acknowledgement that the council may need to provide more clarity about its public policy priorities for CCOs and that currently there may be too many expectations with limited guidance over priorities.

Delivery

· The overall view was that CCOs have been a large part of the major progress that has been made by the Council over the last three years. There have been many delivery highlights such as development of the Auckland waterfront area, ATEED and RFA’ s success in delivering major events, and the Council and Auckland Transport getting government commitment to the City Rail Link (CRL).

· Where delivery has been slower the view was that other factors such as a difficult economic climate have been responsible. Feedback was that three years is not very long to assess the delivery of transformational outcomes which by definition require long timeframes to achieve.

Accountability

· The majority of feedback indicated that the formal accountability framework between the council and its CCOs needs to be simplified and streamlined, with more rigorous debate when priorities are being communicated through the letter of expectation. Most people consider that reporting needs to be more focused on key deliverables and financial performance.

· Informal accountability and communication is seen as just as important as the formal accountability framework.

· There was strong feedback that when issues or problems arise in relation to a CCO’s activities, the public and media hold elected members accountable and not CCO boards of directors.

· However, most feedback was that the “no surprises” policy works most of the time.

Integration

· A large amount of feedback related to the council and its CCOs operating more effectively as a group rather than as a council with 7 independent subsidiaries.

· There were a number of reasons for this including that cooperation and integration is needed to ensure that overlaps are well managed; that customers and ratepayers get seamless delivery from the council group; and that efficiencies are maximised.

· There is recognition that a strong culture of collaboration within council and its CCOs will go a long way towards achieving what it required but that other mechanisms such as cross agency working groups, greater use of shared services, and a more standardised approach to corporate strategy, may be required.

Other Issues

· There was a range of other feedback over issues that the CCO review is expected to consider. For example, a number of councillors have questioned whether the current number and configuration of CCOs is optimal. Issues relating to local boards, how CCOs contribute to outcomes for Maori, and public input to CCO decision-making were also raised.

Strategy, Policy, and CCO Objectives

Introduction

The role of Auckland Council Controlled Organisations is to meet the objectives set by the shareholder, Auckland Council. In the case of Watercare and Auckland Transport these entities have additional statutory objectives, responsibilities and obligations.

CCO objectives, other than those with a statutory basis, should derive directly from council strategy and policy. Two issues have been identified in relation to strategy development and CCO objectives. Firstly, that there is a lack of consistency over how involved CCOs are in the development of council strategy. Secondly there can be tension between CCOs focussing on their core objectives, and the importance that the council places on CCOs contributing to wider group objectives.

Strategy development – role clarity

At the highest level the Auckland Plan sets out council strategy which drives shareholder objectives for CCOs. Business or implementation planning is the responsibility of CCOs. However, there is a gap between high-level strategy and implementation planning and significant variation across CCOs in the extent to which CCOs are involved in developing or contributing to more detailed strategy and policy. Some specific issues that have been highlighted include:

· Auckland Council and Auckland Transport both have transport strategy functions. On paper they have distinct roles – for example Auckland Council Transport Strategy Unit leads strategic advice on the Auckland Plan, provides modelling advice using the regional land use and regional transport models, and prepares submissions on legislative change. Auckland Transport has legislative responsibility for preparing the Regional Land Transport Plan, including prioritising the transport programme. However, a some tensions have been identified such as:

Auckland Council Transport Unit takes a broad view of transport strategy including how transport relates to land use, social outcomes, environmental outcomes etc. Auckland Transport’s perspective is the delivery of an efficient transport system, which is a narrower focus (see next section on core objectives versus group objectives).

Auckland Transport has signalled an intention to undertake its own passenger transport patronage modelling in the future, alongside NZTA. This could result in Auckland Transport and Auckland Council developing diverging views on long-term patronage targets.

Auckland Transport’s prioritisation is influenced by projects which receive NZTA subsidies. While this maximises external funding, it can mean that Auckland Transport’s priorities are not fully aligned with the Auckland Plan.

· ATEED and Auckland Council both have roles in strategy development as well as in implementation. For example, ATEED developed the Major Events Strategy while the council is responsible for the Events Policy which is the umbrella policy.

The main issues relate to economic development rather than major events or tourism. The council adopted an Economic Development Strategy (EDS) as part of the Auckland Plan, while ATEED is developing the Growth and Competitiveness Framework. There has been some concern that ATEED should be delivering on economic development outcomes rather than preparing more strategies.

· There is no central repository of strategy developed for RFA. In the absence of council strategy, RFA produced the draft Stadium Strategy aimed at rationalising the use of its stadiums to achieve efficiencies. What was not perhaps anticipated by RFA was the high level of community and political interest in the future of these venues. The council has taken over the responsibility for public consultation on the Stadium Strategy and so has partially stepped in to the strategy space.

Through the review the council will need to develop greater clarity about its role in strategy development and in how to manage the interface between the council role and CCO role. While feedback was that council must drive strategy at the level of the Auckland Plan, there were different views about CCO involvement in more detailed strategy development – i.e. the translation of the Auckland Plan into the next tier of strategy such as strategic action plans.

Some councillors view CCOs as delivery agents only, while other could see merit in CCOs having active involvement in developing strategy. Some councillors commented that a level of tension between the council and its CCOs is to be expected and is not necessarily a problem. There was also feedback that highlighted the importance of those involved in implementation also being involved in strategy development.

There was feedback from councillors that CCOs have an important role to play in providing strategic advice and that they are seeking more opportunities to have strategic conversations with CCOs at workshops and/or in relation to specific projects. Workshops with Watercare and Waterfront Auckland were mentioned as particularly successful examples.

At a staff level there was a view that the Auckland Council must retain control of public strategy and policy because it will always take a broader view than CCOs. There was also a view that the council should retain strategic capability to enable staff to provide contestable advice. If CCOs control too much of the “strategy chain” it is difficult for the council to challenge the advice that they are receiving from CCOs.

Core objectives versus group objectives

A benefit of the CCO model is that it allows a strong and sustained focus on the CCO’s core business objectives. The general view is that CCOs are strongly geared towards achieving their core objectives and priorities. Councillors are also looking for CCOs to contribute to the council’s wider public policy objectives and priorities. However, tensions can arise as CCOs seek to balance competing objectives and priorities. Feedback included:

· For ACPL, RFA, Waterfront Auckland, and ATEED the main issue raised was that they often prioritise economic or commercial objectives over other public objectives. For example, Council’s attempts to have ACPL and Waterfront Auckland play a role in affordable housing have had limited success to date. While there is a strong councillor support for ATEED and its delivery of major events, there is also some concern that there is now too much emphasis on events that will make an economic contribution rather than a less tangible contribution to Auckland’s identity and pride. RFA’s Stadium Strategy is seen by some as another example of commercial objectives taking priority over community considerations.

· Watercare understandably places a very high priority on health and safety and protection of its assets. The land within water catchment areas is a significant element of the city’s recreational capacity and will become more so as the city grows. These areas also have high conservation values. There are issues around public access to these areas due to perceived risk to public safety and also constraints on the control of plant pests, which are impacting on the effective management of these areas and compromising achievement of recreational and conservation outcomes.

· Auckland Transport’s primary legislative purpose is to create an efficient and effective transport system. But transport has a critical role to play in relation to the council’s place-making and other wider objectives. For example, road design that is efficient and effective from a transport perspective may have a negative impact on pedestrians, or on the local community. The Auckland Plan directs Auckland Transport to achieve the appropriate balance between movement and place functions, and where there is a conflict to give greater emphasis to the place function than in the past.

There have been a number of instances of disagreement between the council and Auckland Transport, for example in relation to election signage bylaws, and the East West Link. These issues could be seen as Auckland Transport giving greater priority to its core objectives than to other public policy considerations.

As the review proceeds the council will need to consider whether it has provided sufficient clarity about its objectives and priorities for its CCOs. There was acknowledgement that the council may need to provide more clarity about its policy priorities and that currently there may be too many expectations with limited guidance about priorities. This risks diluting the focus and effectiveness of CCOs. It was also noted that some expectations may require tradeoffs or have a financial cost. One councillor noted that CCOs need to get better at highlighting the trade-offs to councillors and encouraging them to make policy decisions or decisions about prioritisation.

Delivery

CCOs deliver core public services on behalf of the Auckland Council; therefore the question of how well they are perceived as delivering is an important part of the current state assessment.

Delivery highlights

The overall view was that CCOs have been a large part of the major progress Council has made in the last three years. Feedback highlighted many successes with CCO delivery including:

· Waterfront Auckland has delivered high quality public infrastructure to the Auckland Waterfront which is transforming the public’s use of this area.

· Auckland Transport and Auckland Council have secured government commitment to the CRL, which is a critical transformational project.

· Watercare is recognised nationally and internationally as an operationally excellent service provider, meeting high performance standards for water and wastewater, particularly in the metropolitan area. It has a great record in terms of delivering its projected capital expenditure programme, and kept price increases below council’s rates increases.

· Ports of Auckland, under the governance of ACIL, has achieved impressive productivity growth over the last three years, dividends have exceeded forecast, and are projected to rise in the future.

· Many of the businesses within the RFA portfolio are performing well with growing visitor numbers including the Auckland Zoo and Art Gallery.

· ACPL has identified and obtained approval to sell $100 million of property assets.

· RFA and ATEED are making a significant contribution to the world’s most liveable city through the increased number and variety of events on offer in Auckland. ATEED’s success in delivering major events was frequently mentioned. Strong growth in visitor numbers to Auckland was also noted.

While some councillors were strongly of the view that CCO model has contributed to these successes others commented that major projects, such as waterfront development, were already planned by legacy councils. There was also some feedback that the CCOs have some very good staff but the council could achieve the same results if the staff worked directly for council.

Some results not yet visible

Despite these successes there a number of areas where results have not yet been apparent. Examples raised included:

· Waterfront Auckland has been building public infrastructure but is only now starting to attract private sector investment.

· ATEED has made less progress in delivering on its economic development objectives in comparison with tourism and major events results.

· Auckland Transport has made significant investment in passenger transport infrastructure and operational improvements, but this has not yet translated to patronage growth and is unlikely to until 2015.

· POAL is still in negotiations with the Maritime Union of New Zealand over a collective agreement, although it does have an agreement with a new union.

· RFA has not achieved any significant rationalisation of its facilities, nor has it made significant progress in integrating its “partially integrated” entities. These were both part of its establishment objectives.

The majority of councillors did not blame the CCO model for slow delivery in these areas but acknowledged other factors including:

· Weak economic conditions – which have undoubtedly been a factor in relation to Waterfront Auckland’s ability to attract private investment.

· Insufficient funding. For example the council needs to consider what it can reasonably achieve in relation to ATEED’s economic development function with investment of $10 million a year in an economy worth $66 billion (regional GDP). This is an LTP matter but one which may be guided by the CCO review.

· Three years is not long enough to assess the delivery of transformational outcomes which by definition require long timeframes. For example slow patronage growth for passenger transport is not a major concern as it is understood that there is a lag between investment and patronage growth.

· Difficult outcomes to achieve under any structure. For example RFA owns or has an interest in a range of facilities, some of which may not have been built if a regional approach had been taken at the time of investment. One councillor noted that RFA has a very difficult job and that this is of some concern. The council decision to delay consultation on the Stadium Strategy until after the Unitary Plan consultation was also noted.

Councillor views on ACIL and the failure of POAL to negotiate a collective agreement with MUNZ varied. Some councillors were very concerned about their inability to have direct oversight of the industrial dispute process, and blamed the CCO model for this. Others shared the concern to an extent but considered that it is necessary to maintain an arms-length arrangement between POAL and the council.

Council Delivery

Of some concern was whether the CCO model will allow the Council to deliver on the major initiatives that it is responsible for, but which require the cooperation of CCOs. This is discussed under the Integration section.

Accountability

When activities are undertake by a CCO the council has less oversight and control than it does of its own departments. Loss of some control is inevitable even with a robust accountability framework in place. Nevertheless many councillors consider that the accountability framework could be improved and would like the review to address this. There was as much emphasis on informal accountability – including improved communication, as the formal accountability mechanisms used by council and its CCOs.

Informal Accountability

Almost all councillors highlighted that when issues or problems arise in relation to a CCO, the public and media hold elected members accountable (including local board members), not CCO boards of directors. While boards are accountable to their shareholder this is not the same as coming under intense public scrutiny over specific issues. Many examples were provided including a lack of communication regarding Auckland Transport no longer being funded to mow berms in the old Auckland City Council area; and the decision by the Auckland Zoo to move the Japanese Gardens.

One councillor commented that the small things shouldn’t be so instrumental in judging the performance of CCOs, but that this is the reality because CCO activity like any council activity affects people’s everyday lives. Another said that the 90% that is working well is lost because of the 10% that goes badly.

In some cases these issues arise because boards have not included public factors or undertaken consultation prior to decision-making. In other cases there is simply a lack of communication with the public, with councillors and/or with local boards. Despite this, most councillors thought that the “no surprises policy” where CCOs are expected to warn elected members of issues of public interest, is working most of the time. Some councillors noted that it’s often difficult for CCOs to find the time or forum to brief elected members at short notice because of the heavy workloads of elected members. Some also commented that certain issues are impossible to predict as sensitive. There was also a view that the problem is not confined to CCOs and that sometimes decisions made by council departments cause similar problems.

Some councillors focused on organisational complexity as a barrier to effective communication. With the governing body, a large number of council committees, 21 local boards, the IMSB, the Mayor’s Office, and seven CCOs, it is often difficult for CCOs to know how, and with who to communicate.

Auckland Transport’s elected member liaison positions were cited as an example that is working very well for many councillors. Auckland Transport was also seen by many councillors to communicate well with local boards although there was a concern that local board liaison staff are not always in a position to resolve the issues raised.

Formal Accountability

Most councillors do not believe that the formal accountability mechanisms and processes are working as well as they could. A number of issues were raised including:

· There are too many accountability mechanisms and they are not being used effectively.

· Councillors would like more opportunity have rigorous debate over the letter of expectation and draft SOI and some commented that they would like more information on how this process works.

· Quarterly reporting briefings are too long and detailed and need more emphasis on financial performance. Current reporting is seen as an opportunity for CCOs to promote what they have achieved rather than engage in meaningful dialogue with councillors over performance and non-performance.

· Getting answers to questions is difficult and having to question CCOs in a public forum is not ideal because some councillors are reluctant to press for answers or raise their concerns.

· The CCO Governance and Monitoring committee is no longer a committee of the whole (unlike the previous Accountability and Performance Committee) and so some councillors do not have visibility of CCO performance.

There was a consistent view that the accountability framework needs to be simplified and streamlined with more rigorous debate when priorities are being communicated through the letter of expectation and more detail over deliverables especially where ratepayer funding is provided.

Most councillors favoured short and simple reporting with more focus on financials and reporting against key projects and performance measures. Some thought that quarterly reporting was too frequent and that six monthly reporting would meet their needs as long as the standard of reporting was high.

There was also considerable feedback about the Council committee structure including that it adds another layer of complexity to an already complex model, and that it potentially duplicates existing governance and accountability structures.

Integration

A large amount of feedback related to the council and its CCOs operating more effectively as a group. Most people believe that CCOs acting independently whether it be through branding; using their own corporate processes and systems or commissioning their own professional or legal advice rather than using that provided by the council, is not in the best interests of the group. There was also a concern from some that the changes in regional governance have replaced geographic silos with functional silos. Council staff commented on the lack of trust between council and CCO staff and reluctance to share information. Many acknowledged that it works both ways.

There were a few councillors who did not share these concerns and felt that CCOs need to remain independent to operate effectively. One councillor commented that it is important to have tension to get good debate and was not convinced that council needed be seen as one family.

Overall the smaller CCOs are seen as more collaborative partly because they make greater use of shared services and their size makes it easier to connect with the right people. Watercare is seen as the most independent of the CCOs, using its statutory provisions and the fact that it generates its own revenue to distance itself from the group. Auckland Transport is seen as large and difficult to navigate with a technical/engineering rather than public service bent, especially at levels below senior management.

However, despite the challenges there is acknowledgement that there has been significant improvement in many areas over the last three years with much greater levels of collaboration. Some senior staff members commented that there would be teething problems with any new structure, and that the problems were not confined to working with CCOs.

One Council Group

There are a variety of reasons why the CCOs operating as part of one council group rather than independent subsidiaries is seen as important by most people.

· CCOs have overlapping responsibilities with each other and with the council. Cooperation is needed to ensure that overlaps are managed properly and that agencies are taking an integrated approach to delivering the council’s key strategic priorities.

For example, although Auckland Transport was the key agency with respect to Quay Street, Waterfront Auckland, RFA and ATEED all had an interest in the project as did the Waitemata Local Board and the Council’s City Transformation team. These overlaps are being addressed by the newly formed City Centre Integration Group (CCIG).

Another example is that all CCOs with the exception of ACIL are very important to the council’s ability to achieve the urban form and housing outcomes envisaged by the Auckland Plan and reflected in the proposed Unitary Plan. This is particularly relevant for Auckland Transport and Watercare because they provide the infrastructure needed to support development. ACPL also has the potential to play an important role in facilitating high quality medium density development in appropriate locations.

· Auckland Council customers and ratepayers want one point of contact with the Council and its CCOs. For example, people want to be able to pay their water bill and rates bill at the same time, and ring one phone number regardless of whether their issue relates to Auckland Transport, Auckland Council or Watercare.

· It is important to offer consistent standards to public facing services and activities. Creation of bylaws is one example. Auckland Transport and Auckland Council both have bylaw making powers including where parallel bylaws are required inside and outside of the roading corridor. Auckland Council’s approach to making bylaws is community focused with local boards playing an important role developing bylaws for their areas. On the other hand Auckland Transport has taken a technical road safety approach to developing bylaws.

· There was a strong view that ratepayers need to understand that their rates are funding activities of the CCOs (with the exception of Watercare). For example, a councillor commented that the Big Gay Out was a fantastic event but that the sponsorship message referenced ATEED and not Auckland Council. For the same reasons, the council has required CCOs to act consistently with its brand navigation group guidelines (BNG). Progress and issues in achieving compliance with these guidelines has been reported to the council on a number of occasions (for example, Accountability and Performance Committee 5 September 2012 and 12 June 2013).

· There was consistent feedback that CCOs applying their own corporate strategies and using their own systems and processes has the potential to create problems and can be inefficient. Many examples were cited and the following are a small subset:

Although risk management is a core function of a board of directors, there is a strong view that the council needs greater visibility of CCO risks. This is partly because CCO risks are reputational risks to the council, and partly because financial risks also affect council. At the December Risk and Audit Committee meeting the committee asked management to consider how the Audit and Risk committee can have greater oversight of CCO risks.

All CCOs except for Auckland Transport and Watercare use the council’s remuneration framework under the shared services agreement, but often find reasons to go outside the band when setting remuneration. A number of senior staff also commented that a more integrated approach to HR would allow the council to offer greater opportunities for career development within the group, for example by encouraging secondments and remuneration consistency.

Communication teams are well integrated at an operational level with a daily meeting between staff across the group. However in terms of presenting a coherent message there are opportunities to better coordinate or leverage group communications. For example, from an events perspective, the public is interested in what is on offer rather than who is promoting various events.

There is a cost associated with duplication of corporate structures across CCOs. To an extent this is unavoidable and may be made up for by greater efficiency within the CCO, however there is a general view that there are still opportunities to save money.

Mechanisms for achieving better integration

People had different views about what is needed to achieve better integration, and about the effectiveness of mechanisms currently being used.

· Cross agency groups - The City Centre Integration Group, the Housing Project Office (HPO), and the Integrated Consents Management Process are three examples of cross-agency initiatives to achieve coordinated responses and better outcomes. As well as council and CCO representation these groups may include central government or other stakeholders. The HPO is the most formalised of these groups with staff seconded from Watercare and Auckland Transport. The manager of the HPO reports to the steering group which includes chief executives of the Auckland Council, Auckland Transport, Watercare, other senior council staff including a senior advisor from the Mayor’s Office. The Project Director reports directly to the stetting group rather than to the council Executive Leadership Team (ELT).

Staff had varying views about the effectiveness of these mechanisms. Senior managers involved in these processes were optimistic and believed they would work, given sufficient time. These structures provided not only greater cooperation and coordination but a mechanism for escalating problems rather than the Auckland Council Chief Executive having to be brought in to resolve every conflict between CCOs or between the council and a CCO.

Other staff felt that there was evidence of greater collaboration at senior management level but this had not yet filtered down into the organisations. Some staff saw more opportunities for cross agency groups, particularly place-based groups, but were also wary of creating multiple steering groups.

· There are a number of possibilities for achieving greater integration around corporate policies and processes. There was a lot of feedback about the need for group corporate strategies or policies that the council and all CCOs would comply with. These would draw on best practice across council and the CCOs.

There was also a view that there are more opportunities to extend shared services and gain efficiencies and consistent standards across the group. An underlying issue is that CCOs tend to consider shared services purely as a commercial arrangement rather than what is best for the group. For example Auckland Transport has indicated that they would like to operate their call centre in- house rather than under Auckland Council shared services, however this would work against the council providing an integrated customer service experience and consistent standards.

· There were many comments that what is needed is a strong culture of collaboration across the Auckland Council group, and an attitude that “we are all in this together.” These comments were often aimed at the council as well as at CCOs. Some people commented that where things work well it comes down to personal relationships but when someone leaves problems can arise because attitude is specific to individuals rather than part of organisational culture.

· In some circumstances people felt that structural change, or changes to roles and responsibilities may be necessary to achieve a more coordinated approach.

Other Issues

There was a range of other feedback not fully reflected in the discussion above.

Number and configuration of CCOs

A number of councillors commented that the CCO review needs to decide the optimal number of CCOs, and there was a general view that seven may be too many. Many councillors felt that there was duplication in the current structures although one councillor commented that what is often perceived as duplication is just overlapping responsibilities and these will always exist in any structure. Some areas that councillors would like investigated, to ensure current arrangements are optimal are:

· Overlaps between RFA, ATEED and Auckland Council in the delivery and marketing of events.

· Overlaps between ACPL, and Waterfront Auckland and Auckland Council in urban development. The idea of investigating an urban renewal agency was also raised.

· ACIL directors are seen as having some skills that could be useful to ATEED.

· The allocation of economic development delivery responsibilities between Auckland Council and ATEED.

· Whether Auckland Transport’s mandate is too broad and some of its public facing functions should be brought in house, recognising that this would require legislative change. Legislative change so that Auckland Transport could delegate place-making functions to local boards was also raised.

· The merits of a three waters approach to water services delivery.

· Ownership of facilities owned by RFA but located on the waterfront.

· Entities governing by and associated with RFA which report to their own boards.

Maori Responsiveness

Although the IMSB has not yet had the opportunity to provide its input, there have been issues raised by others about CCO’s contribution to the Maori Responsiveness Framework. The main issue has been CCOs not being able to report their expenditure on projects that contribute to Maori outcomes. There was also a resolution from the 7 August 2013 CCO Strategy Review Subcommittee asking for general improvements in CCO Maori contribution reporting.

Local boards

Local board feedback on the current state will also be considered as the review progresses. Local boards have an interest in the extent to which CCOs can contribute to their priorities, in projects being undertaken in their areas, and in being kept up to date on wider regional projects. Local board members are also often the first to deal with public enquiries or complaints about issues relating to CCOs. The interaction between CCOs and local boards has been a source of some tension since amalgamation although there have been considerable improvements over the three-year period. A report to the 12 December 2012 Accountability and Performance Committee provided an overview of the relationship between local boards and CCOs and associated issues, and a follow up report on 13 September 2013 to the Strategy and Finance Committee outlined local board feedback on proposals to address issues.

Public input to CCO decisions

An issue raised by some councillors was the need for more public input to some CCO decisions. The need for a council-wide public engagement strategy that includes CCOs was mentioned.

CCO Governance

Several councillors have raised issues about the appointment of directors to CCOs. One suggestion was to appoint some board members to more than one board to encourage cross pollination of ideas and a group perspective. Note that this is currently not permitted under the council’s Board Appointment and Remuneration Policy but the policy could be amended.

Some councillors have also asked that the advantages and disadvantages of having members of the Governing Body sitting on Auckland Transport should be investigated. This would include reviewing the remuneration for councillors on the Auckland Transport Board.

CCO funding

There has been some discussion about whether funding arrangements for CCOs are too flexible or not flexible enough. Some councillors felt that CCOs should be given more freedom to determine their priorities, while some felt that more tightly specified funding contracts should be considered.

Disability Strategic Advisory Panel

16 June 2014

Table of Contents

What this document covers. 4

Auckland Council Fees Framework. 4

Assessment process. 4

Daily rates. 5

Hourly rates. 5

Annual fee. 5

General absence. 6

Time spent in travelling to and from meetings. 6

Deputy chair. 6

Independent Planning Commissioners. 6

Expenses Policy. 6

Principles. 6

Mileage allowance. 7

Public transport and taxis. 7

Parking. 7

Meals. 7

Other costs. 7

APPENDIX A - Assessment criteria.. 8

Skills, knowledge and experience required of members. 8

Function, level and scope of authority. 8

Complexity of issues. 9

Public interest and profile. 9

Fee levels. 10

APPENDIX B – Determination of fees. 11

Ethnic Peoples, Pacific Peoples, Senior, Disability Advisory Panels. 11

Youth Advisory Panel 12

Other panels. 12

Additional work. 13

This document sets out the policy on payment of fees and expenses to appointed members.

This policy is administered by Auckland Council’s Democracy Services Department. For queries on the policy please contact:

Michelle Smith

Business Support Manager

Democracy Services

DDI: +64 9 373 6220

MOB: +64 27 207 0893

michelle.smith@aucklandcouncil.govt.nz

This policy may be reviewed annually and is current until superseded.

What this document covers

Auckland Council Fees Framework

1. The Auckland Council Fees Framework is used for setting the fees of appointed members of committees, advisory panels or boards, which have been established by:

· the Mayor

· the Governing Body

· a committee of the Governing Body

· a Local Board

· a committee of a Local Board.

2. The Framework does not apply:

· if payment is set by the Remuneration Authority, or by legislation

· if payment is made from some other source (for example if a professional consultant is paid by his or her employer to attend)

· to any appointments made by the Governing Body or a Local Board to an outside organisation

· if the Governing Body has formally resolved a different form of payment

· if payments are made on a contractual basis (for example the members of the Code of Conduct Independent Review Panel submit invoices).

Expenses policy

3. The Expenses Policy sets out the criteria and type of expense that will be reimbursed and applies to all appointed members, unless personal expense is compensated in some other way.

Auckland Council Fees Framework

4. The Auckland Council Fees Framework is aligned to the Cabinet Fees Framework, which is used by many Government bodies whose fees are not determined by the Remuneration Authority. The Auckland Council Fees Framework ensures consistency between fees paid to appointees to Auckland Council bodies and fees paid by Government to those on entities in which the Crown has an interest.

5. Most appointments that are made by the Governing Body or Local Boards will be to bodies which can be described as “Group 4 - all other committees and other bodies” within the Cabinet Fees Framework. The assessment criteria for Group 4 have been adapted for use by Auckland Council. Fees paid under the Auckland Council Fees Framework will be adjusted in line with changes to fees paid under the Cabinet Fees Framework. The Cabinet Fees Framework was last reviewed in December 2012.

Assessment process

6. The body (committee, panel) will be scored on the following factors:

· skills, knowledge and experience required of members

· function, level and scope of authority

· complexity of issues

· public interest and profile.

7. The assessment criteria are based on the Cabinet Fees Framework but modified for Auckland Council. The assessment criteria to be used for scoring are attached as Appendix A.

8. The resulting total score is used to identify a remuneration band within the Cabinet Fees Framework. The Governing Body or Local Board decides the remuneration to be paid from within that band.

Daily rates

9. The remuneration bands are expressed as daily rates.

10. A daily rate is a good basis for calculating fees to be paid for attending meetings of groups such as panels. This is because the length of a meeting tends to be consistent from month to month. A “meeting fee”, based on the daily rate, is set and applied to all meetings.

11. Where a fee is based on a daily rate, it is expected that a working day is about 8 hours, and the daily fee is calculated on this basis. Work for longer than 8 hours in one day does not attract an extra payment.

12. The daily fee applies to all work, including that performed outside of meetings (e.g. preparation, representing the body at other forums, or administrative work) that is required for the body to carry out its role. All work that is required to be performed for the body by the member should be paid at the approved daily rate.

13. Where a total of 6 hours is worked in one day, a daily fee may be paid. It is accepted that it may not be possible for a member having worked 6 hours in one day on body business to return to other paid work. Where a member spends time, for example one evening, preparing for a meeting the next day, if the preparation and meeting time combined were between 6 and 8 hours, then one daily fee would be paid for the combined preparation and meeting time.

14. Work other than preparation for meetings must be approved and minuted by the body before it is undertaken. Individual members should not be in a position where they could be considered to be setting their own work programmes without the endorsement of the body. The ability of the body to approve additional meetings or work is subject to agreement by the council.

Hourly rates

15. Hourly pro-rata rates are calculated by dividing the daily rate by 8 and multiplying by the number of hours worked.

16. An hourly rate is a good basis for calculating fees paid to independent planning commissioners. An hourly rate requires the submission of a statement of hours worked before each payment.

Annual fee

17. An annual fee is calculated by multiplying the daily rate by the number of days that will be worked during the year.

18. An annual fee is a good basis for calculating fees paid where a meeting fee does not properly cover all work. Chairpersons of panels receive a higher meeting fee than ordinary members. The higher fee recognises the additional responsibilities of chairpersons. However, it may be deemed more appropriate to pay a chairperson an annual fee in particular circumstances.

19. The annual fee needs to be adjusted in the following ways if there is significant absence:

· where absence is for a continuous period of more than two months, the annual fee should be pro-rated (e.g. an absence of two months would result in payment of 10/12 of the annual fee)

· where absence is not necessarily continuous but is frequent over the period of a year, the annual fee should also be pro-rated if the total of monthly meetings missed exceeds three.

General absence

20. Where a member fails to attend a significant number of meetings, or otherwise perform their duties as a member, the chair needs to raise the issue of expectations about performance with the member and if necessary with the Manager Democracy Services. Consideration should be given at the time of reappointment of members to the issue of continued absences from body business.

Time spent in travelling to and from meetings

21. The time spent travelling to and from meetings is not paid. However, reimbursement for the costs of travel is through a mileage allowance payable under the Expenses Policy.

Deputy chair

22. Where a body appoints a deputy chair who shares the business workload with the chair between meetings, an additional fee of 25% of a member’s fee will be paid.

23. Where a body does not appoint a deputy chair, then in any instance where a member chairs a meeting that member will receive the daily rate of the chair for that meeting.

Independent Planning Commissioners

24. In 2012 a survey of fees paid to independent planning commissioners was carried out by Strategic Pay Ltd across 26 councils. Strategic Pay assessed commissioners as belonging to Group 2 – “Statutory Tribunals and Authorities” within the Cabinet Fees Framework. Based on the findings of that survey, fees were established of:

· $170 per hour for chairpersons of hearings panels and sole commissioners

· $150 per hour for commissioners who are members of a hearings panel.

25. These current fees will continue, but will be aligned to any increases in the Cabinet Fees Framework, such that fees will increase by the same percentage as those within the Group 2 category (“Statutory Tribunals and Authorities”) of the Cabinet Fees Framework.

Expenses Policy

Principles

26. The principles on which reimbursement of expenses will be approved are:

· Payments will be for actual and reasonable expenses; this requires receipts to be produced and expenditure to be modest

· For members of groups such as panels, work conducted other than attending the normal monthly meetings, must be properly approved and minuted prior to the work being carried out.

Mileage allowance

27. A mileage allowance is payable for any travel that is required to perform the member’s role as an appointed member. This includes travel between home and meetings.

28. The rate for members who are not self-employed, is the IRD rate for employers reimbursing employees, currently being 77 c/km.

29. A self-employed person may opt to not be paid the mileage allowance in order to claim the cost of mileage in the person’s annual return to the IRD.

Public transport and taxis

30. Members are expected to use either their personal vehicle or the cheapest form of public transport for undertaking Council business.

31. A member who uses buses or trains in order to undertake Council business, including travel between home and meetings, may claim for reimbursement by submitting receipts.

32. A member wishing to use a taxi to undertake Council business must obtain prior approval from the Council staff support for that meeting, who will issue a taxi voucher or approve the member lodging a claim for the expense.

Parking

33. Members will be reimbursed for personal costs of parking in order to undertake Council business. The method of reimbursement will be arranged by Democracy Services.

Meals

34. All meals associated with meetings of groups and hearings panels, will be provided by Democracy Services and will not be a personal cost to members. A member intending to claim for the cost of a meal should receive prior approval from the Council staff support for that meeting.

Other costs

35. All other personal expenditure arising from undertaking Council business will be reimbursed in accordance with the principles.

APPENDIX A - Assessment criteria

Skills, knowledge and experience required of members

Skills, knowledge and experience will vary between members on a particular body. The score below should reflect the level of skill required by the majority of members, and should not be based on any particular individual. This factor has a higher weighting than others, to reflect that it is the application of the skills, knowledge and experience in carrying out their responsibilities that is a major contributor to the successful operation of the committee or body.

	Definition	Score
Pre–eminent	Outstanding and authoritative knowledge, recognised nationally and internationally for expertise in a particular field.	12
Distinguished	Deep and broad knowledge in a specific area or as a leader. Widely respected as a subject matter expert or authority in their field.	10
Substantive	Substantial range of knowledge and experience in a field or professional discipline sometimes associated with senior level functional or technical leadership, executive management or governance roles. May include widely respected people with broad community support.	8
Technical	A number of years experience in a technical, professional field or in a leadership role is a pre-requisite.	6
Specialised experience	No specific experience is required but members would have broad general knowledge and may represent a body of opinion.	4

Function, level and scope of authority

	Definition	Score
Strategic decisions	Sets policy or work programme for a major area of economic activity or policy area of importance to the Council’s strategic priorities.	6
Policy decisions	Sets policy or work programme and/or exercises regulatory/disciplinary powers.	5
Expert advice	Provides expert counsel and advice to the Mayor, Governing Body or local boards on technical or policy issues that are of strategic importance. At this level the body would be expected to be proactive in identifying emerging issues and contributing to policy direction.	4
Professionally targeted	Exercises regulatory/disciplinary powers at the individual/professional level. This will include the power to impose sanctions.	3
Technical	Provides a broad range of advice on technical and/or policy issues.	2
Ad hoc	Provides ad hoc advice on minor matters. Generally a limited focus at a single output level.	1

Complexity of issues

	Definition	Score
Innovative	The development of new concepts is required to find innovative and pathfinding solutions. There will be little or no external guidance (NZ or internationally) to aid resolution of these issues.	5
Constructive	The development of new policy or advice is required where the issues are complex, multidimensional and involve substantial research, consideration of possible alternatives and their consequences. The body may commission research or utilise the findings to inform their policy development or advice.	4
Evaluative	Issues will include circumstances, facts and concepts different to those that have been experienced in the past. Analytical thinking and evaluative judgement will be required to identify realistic alternatives and apply/recommend a solution.	3
Judgement	Solutions will be found from application of professional or personal judgement and generally guided by previous decisions. Circumstances may be different from those previously experienced but there will be a sufficient frame of reference to make a considered decision/recommendation.	2
Operational	Issues to be resolved are generally within existing policy and prior decisions. Decisions can generally be made quickly and with reasonable certainty.	1

Public interest and profile

	Definition	Score
Widespread	Widespread public interest in outcomes would be expected. Members will attract strong media interest. Potential risk to personal and/or the body’s reputation is high.	5
Strong	Strong public and stakeholder interest and importance would be associated with these issues. Media interest would also be expected, but potential risk to personal or the body’s reputation is unlikely.	4
Moderate	Moderate but widespread public interest is likely. Reputational risk is minimal.	3
Limited	Public interest is likely to be limited, but the issues would be of interest to other members of the particular profession or sector.	2
Little	There is likely to be little or no wider public interest in the decisions.	1

Fee levels

Total score	Level	Fees range - Chair	Fees range - members
24 – 28	1	$500 - $1,062	$375 - $800
20 – 23	2	$360 - $818	$270 - $518
15 – 19	3	$260 - $530	$190 - $364
10 – 14	4	$230 - $336	$175 - $252
9 or less	5	$190 - $245	$140 - $190

Notes

Fees are daily rates.

Fees are as set out in the Cabinet Office Circular CO (12)6, dated 19 December 2012, for Group 4 bodies.

APPENDIX B – Determination of fees

Ethnic Peoples, Pacific Peoples, Senior, Disability Advisory Panels

Skills, Knowledge & Experience	The panels include widely respected community leaders in their various communities of interest.	8
Function, Level & Scope	The panels provide advice on a range of policy matters that are relevant to the communities they represent.	2 – 4
Complexity of Issues	Analytical thinking and evaluative judgement are required to consider alternatives and make recommendations.	3
Public Interest and Profile	There is widespread public interest in their work and reputational risk is moderate to high.	3 – 4
TOTAL		16 - 19

Equivalent daily rates

Remuneration level	Chair	Member
3	$260 - $530	$190 - $364

Fees for these panels will be based on the maximum daily rates for this level ($530 for chair and $364 for member). The daily rate constitutes 8 hours. A meeting fee is calculated by applying the equivalent hourly rate to the average length of a meeting, including preparation time.

Meeting fees

Meeting fee

Proposed

Previous term

Member

(based on 5.5 hours per meeting including preparation)

$250

$235

Chair

(based on 8 hours per meeting including preparation)

$530

$235 per meeting or $7,000 pa^{^[1]}

Where meetings are regular and can be forecast, it may be possible to convert the meeting fee into an annual fee. Whether panel members are paid a meeting fee or annual fee will be assessed by the Manager Democracy Services, taking into account the frequency of meetings and likely regularity of attendances.

Where a deputy chair is appointed to share the workload of the chairperson throughout the term, he or she will receive a payment that is 25% higher than that of a member.

Youth Advisory Panel

This panel consists of members from the youth community. The purpose of the panel is to not only advise the Council of youth issues but to provide a learning experience for the members.

Skills, Knowledge & Experience	No specific experience is required but members would have broad general knowledge and may represent a body of opinion.	4
Function, Level & Scope	Provide advice on a range of policy matters that are relevant to the communities they represent.	2
Complexity of Issues	Analytical thinking and evaluative judgement are required to consider alternatives and make recommendations.	2 - 3
Public Interest and Profile	Public interest is likely to be limited, but the issues would be of interest to other members of the youth community	2
TOTAL		10 - 11

Equivalent daily rates

Remuneration level	Chair	Member
4	$230 - $336	$175 - $252

Fees will be based on the maximum daily rates for this level ($336 for chair and $252 for member). The daily rate constitutes 8 hours. A meeting fee is calculated by applying the equivalent hourly rate to the average length of a meeting, including preparation time.

Meeting fees

Meeting fee

Proposed

Previous term

Member

(based on 5.5 hours per meeting including preparation)

$173

Nil

Chair

(based on 8 hours per meeting including preparation)

$336

Nil

Where a deputy chair is appointed to share the workload of the chairperson throughout the term, he or she will receive a payment that is 25% higher than that of a member.

Other panels

Panels are established from time to time for various purposes. The Manager Democracy Services will determine fees to be paid that are consistent with this Framework.

Additional work

Where work is undertaken with prior approval and a meeting fee is not appropriate in the circumstances, the Manager Democracy Services may determine payment on an hourly rate based on the daily rate, subject to the terms of reference for the panel as agreed with the Council (refer paragraph 14 above).

[1] Panel chairs received the members’ meeting fee except for the chairpersons of the former Ethnic and Pacific Peoples Advisory Panels who received annual fees of $7,000.

Chairperson	Dr Huhana Hickey
Deputy Chairperson	Colleen Brown, MNZM, JP
Members	Sandra Budd
	David Hughes
	Tania Kingi
	Clive Lansink
	Don McKenzie, CNZM, OBE
	Dr Terry O'Neill
	Ezekiel Robson
	Susan Sherrard
Liaison Councillor	Sharon Stewart, QSM

No.	Title	Page
a View	Auckland Council's Current State Analysis of CCOs	17
b View	Proposed DSAP input to CCO review	33

No.	Title	Page
a View	Report: Finance and Performance Committee - 22 May 2014 - Fees Framework and Expenses Policy for Appointed Members	43
b View	Attachment 1: Fees Framework and Expenses Policy for Appointed Members	47
c View	Attachment 2: Code of Conduct for Members Appointed to Advisory Panels	61

No.	Title	Page
a	Fees Framework and Expenses Policy for Appointed Members
b	Code of Conduct for Members Appointed to Advisory Panels

No.	Title	Page
a View	DSAP Work Programme	67

Author	Mike Giddey - Democracy Advisor
Authoriser	Kevin Wright - Manager: Transport Strategy – Lead Officer Support DSAP

Author	Bruce Thomas – Principal Advisor Panels
Authoriser	Kevin Wright - Manager: Transport Strategy – Lead Officer Support DSAP

Meeting	Proposed	Previous term
Member	$173	Nil
Chairperson	$336	Nil