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Ōtara-Papatoetoe
Local Board
15 August 2017
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Governance Framework Review recommendations
File No.: CP2017/15943
Purpose
1. This
report seeks local board feedback on the draft positions of the Governance
Framework Review’s Political Working Party.
Executive summary
2. The governance
framework review (GFR) was initiated to assess how well the Auckland governance
model (governing body/local boards) is meeting the aims of the 2010 reforms. The review was reported in late 2016 and a political working party (PWP) made up of local
board and governing body members was established to consider the review’s
findings and recommendations.
3. The working party
has considered the report’s recommendations in three broad workstreams:
· policy and decision-making roles
· local boards funding and finance
· governance and representation.
4. This report sets out
the interim positions of the political working party on those three workstreams
and seeks local board feedback on those positions. The working party will
report back to the governing body on 28 September 2017 with recommendations for
decisions, including local boards’ views.
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Recommendation/s
That the Ōtara-Papatoetoe
Local Board:
a) Provide
feedback on the following draft positions and recommendations of the
Political Working Party:
Regional policy and
decision-making
i. Agree that
council should implement new mechanisms that ensure effective local board
input to regional policy decisions, via a framework that sets out, at a
minimum:
· A process for involving local boards
in the development of regional work programmes at the beginning of each term
and in an annual refresh;
· Earlier and more joint engagement
between local boards and the governing body in regional decision-making
processes
· Requirements for analysis of local
impacts and local interest of regional decisions and options, and reporting
of this to local boards and the governing body
· Specified criteria for categorising
the potential local impact and local board interest of regional decisions
· Processes and methods for tailoring
local board engagement in line with the local impact and local interest of
regional decisions e.g. high categorisation requiring more specific local
engagement and analysis, low categorisation requiring more cluster joint
local board workshop sessions and less in depth analysis.
· Specified methods for engagement and
communication with local boards at all stages of the decision-making process.
ii. Direct that
local boards will be consulted on the details of these mechanisms prior to
implementation.
iii. Note that the
Quality Advice programme is continuing to be implemented in order to improve
the quality of advice to elected members for decision-making, in line with
the recommendations of the Governance Framework Review.
iv. Agree not to
implement any formal policies or procedures that control when and how local
boards may procure external or contestable advice, but note that, in
principle, the Auckland Council organisation should be the first provider of
advice to local boards.
v. Agree not to
implement any policy or procedure that would limit local boards’
ability to advocate to the governing body on regional issues.
Local decisions
that may have regional impacts (development of a ‘call-in’ right)
vi. Note that an
explicit call-in right is not possible under the Local Government (Auckland
Council) Act
vii. Agree not to
implement any mechanism that would have the effect of ‘calling
in’ or allocating decision-making to the governing body for otherwise
local activities or decisions that have regional implications.
viii. Direct officers
that, whenever a local board is to make a decision that has potential impacts
beyond the immediate local board area e.g. a sub-regional impact or an impact
on regional networks, advice on those potential impacts is to be provided to
the local board as a matter of course (for example through a regional impact
statement).
Allocations and
delegations
ix. Agree that the
governing body delegates, subject to the necessary statutory tests being met,
the following Reserves Act 1977 decision-making functions for local reserves
to local boards:
· declaration
· classification
· reclassification
· application for revocation of reserve
status (limited to when there is a desire by a local board to manage open
space under the LGA)
x. Note that
officers’ advice on decision-making for exchanges of reserve land was
that it should remain with the governing body, with the relevant local board
consulted on these decisions
xi. Note that the
working party did not reach consensus on this issue, and will consider the
feedback of local boards before making a recommendation
xii. Agree that the
Minister of Conservation’s supervisory powers remain delegated to
staff, but where there is likely to be significant public interest, an
independent commissioner should be engaged.
The role of
Auckland Transport and local boards
xiii. Note the
critical interface between the local place-shaping role of local boards and
Auckland Transport’s jurisdiction over the road corridor and transport
networks.
xiv. Note that the
Governance Manual for Substantive CCOs requires Auckland Transport, amongst
other things, to:
· develop, with local boards, a shared
understanding of local board views and CCO priorities to inform the following
year’s business planning, including through an annual interactive
workshop ‘where local boards communicate their local board priorities
and the CCOs communicate how their current year work programme will
contribute to local board priorities’.
· develop by 31 July each year an annual
local board engagement plan, which includes a schedule ‘clearly
indicat[ing] for each board, the projects and/or activities that it expects
to report on, and the projects and activities that it expects to consult on,
for the following year. This should be updated annually or more frequently if
required.’
· report against their local board
engagement plan in their quarterly performance reports to the CCO Governance
and Monitoring Committee.
xv. Direct Auckland
Transport to meet all requirements for local board engagement as set out in
the Governance Manual for Substantive CCOs.
xvi. Direct Auckland
Council officers to monitor Auckland Transport’s compliance with the
requirements for local board engagement, as set out in the Governance Manual
for Substantive CCOs, and to report this monitoring to the governing body at
least annually.
xvii. Note that the
Mayor’s 2017 letter of expectation to Auckland Transport stipulated
that council expects there to be:
· better and earlier engagement and
communication between Auckland Transport and local boards;
· active consideration by Auckland
Transport of which of its decision-making powers it could delegate to local
boards (within the constraints created by the regulatory environment, safety
considerations, the needs of regional networks and the role played by NZTA in
decision-making).
xviii. Note that the
following activity statement has been included in Auckland Transport’s
2017-2020 Statement of Intent:
· ‘Participation in the governance review which
is aimed at changing behaviours and processes across relevant Council family
activities, including Auckland Transport, to enable local boards to give
effect to their governance role, particularly around local
place-shaping.’
xix. Note that the
Governance Framework Review has investigated the potential delegation of a
range of Auckland Transport powers and the working party recommends that
additional work be undertaken to identify delegation opportunities
xx. Direct Auckland
Transport, in working with local boards, to:
· Ensure that local boards have a strong
governance role in determining the ‘look and feel’ of town
centres and streetscapes, in line with their allocation of non-regulatory
decision-making
· Improve co-ordination between local
place-shaping projects, such as town centre upgrades, and its renewals
programmes
· Provide more opportunities for local board
direction on the prioritisation of minor traffic safety projects, with the
exception of those which Auckland Transport considers are of critical safety
importance
· Be more responsive to local
place-shaping initiatives in non-transport parts of the road corridor,
including reducing or removing barriers to community place-making initiatives
e.g. looking at ways to reduce the costs of developing traffic management
plans for community events
· Take direction from local boards on
how and where to implement community-focused programmes
xxi. Direct Auckland
Transport to report to the governing body annually on how it is meeting the
directions given under recommendation xx.
xxii. Note that the
Quality Advice programme has been working with Auckland Transport to improve
the quality of advice to local boards and will shortly begin regular six
monthly surveys of local board members’ satisfaction with Auckland
Transport advice, engagement and reporting to local boards.
xxiii. Note that the
Local Board Transport Capital Fund is valued by local boards but that the
level of funding means that some boards are not able to progress meaningful
projects, and that improved local transport outcomes may be achieved if the
size of the fund was significantly increased.
xxiv. Direct officers
to report to the relevant governing body committee, through the Long Term
Plan process, on options for significantly increasing the Local Board
Transport Capital Fund and the method of allocation of the fund.
xxv. Direct Auckland
Transport to implement a more systematic work programme approach to assist
local boards to identify potential projects and make decisions.
xxvi. Direct Auckland
Transport to actively engage with governing body members (ward councillors)
on transport projects and issues within their ward areas.
Waiheke Local Board
pilot
xxvii. Agree that the
governing body should endorse the Waiheke Local Board pilot project as set
out in the Waiheke Local Board pilot project plan.
xxviii. Note that the
Waiheke Local Board will maintain oversight of local implementation of the
pilot.
Local boards
funding and finance
xxix. Agree that the enhanced status quo model be
progressed now, giving as much additional decision making to local boards as
possible within that framework.
xxx. Agree that the additional work to support the Enhanced
status quo model be undertaken – framework for service levels and local
flexibility, options for addressing historical uneven funding, improving the
information and advice that is provided to local boards.
xxxi. Agree that further work on the implications of the local
decision making model also be undertaken for further consideration -
modelling of rates implication following the revaluation, costs to the
organisation of supporting more local decision making etc.
The optimum number
of local boards
xxxii. Agree that
council should undertake no further work on changing the number of local
boards until at least after the governance framework review has been
completed and implemented, and the outcomes of reorganisation proposals that
are underway for North Rodney and Waiheke Island are known.
Methods of electing
governing body members
xxxiii. Agree that a change to the
current system of electing governing body members from existing wards is not
warranted purely to address alignment between governing body members and
local boards
xxxiv. Note that the
statutory review of representation arrangements for Auckland Council must be
completed by September 2018.
xxxv. Note that the
Local Government Act Amendment Bill No. 2, which proposes a simplified
process for local government-led reorganisation processes, is currently
before Parliament.
xxxvi. Agree that
council should continue to advocate to central government for legislative
amendments that would allow changes to the number of governing body members
in line with population changes, and simplification of the process for
changes to numbers and boundaries of local boards.
b) Provide
feedback on whether decision-making for exchanges of reserve land should sit
with the governing body or local boards
c) Provide
feedback on its preferred naming conventions for governing body members and
local board members
d) Provide
feedback on options for the continuation of a joint local board/governing
body political working party focusing on matters of governance impacting on
both governance arms.
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Comments
Background
5. In
early 2016, Auckland Council instigated a review of the Council’s
governance framework as set out in the Local Government (Auckland Council) Act
2009, focussing on the complementary governance relationship between local
boards and a governing body. The review did not consider Auckland Council’s
CCO governance framework or the role of the Independent Māori Statutory
Board (IMSB).
6. The
primary purpose of the review was to assess how the Auckland governance model
is meeting the aim of the Auckland governance reforms by delivering strong
regional decision-making, complemented by decisions that meet diverse local
needs and interests. After nearly six years since Auckland Council was
established, it was an appropriate point to look at this.
7. The
intention was to complete the review prior to the 2016 local government
election and to provide advice to the incoming council about any recommended
changes. The review was carried out by an independent consultant.
8. The
review focused on improvements to the governance framework, not fundamental
reform. It was based on extensive interviews with elected members, staff,
council-controlled organisations (CCOs) and external stakeholders, as well as
review and research of foundation documents and other material.
9. A
report summarising the findings of the review was issued in draft form to
elected members in late August 2016 and discussed with elected members at
workshops. The feedback received on the draft from elected members was largely
supportive of the findings. The report was finalised in November 2016, and incorporated
some minor changes based on the feedback of the elected members.
10. In
December 2016 the governing body established a political working party of
governing body members and local board members to consider the GFR report and oversee the development of a work programme to
explore the implications of its findings then make final recommendations to the
Governing Body. The political
working party has been considering issues and options via a series of working
papers and presentations during the first half of 2017. It will report to the
Governing Body in September.
Key findings of the Governance Framework Review
11. The
review concluded that there were a number of positive aspects of the governance
model from both a regional and local perspective. This includes the ability for
the Auckland region to ‘speak with one voice’ to important
stakeholders, such as central government, regarding regional strategic planning
and infrastructure development, and enabling local decision-making that provides
a local community focus in a way that did not exist under the previous
arrangements. However, it also identified a number of areas for improvement,
which fall under four key themes:
· Organisational structures and culture have not adapted to
the complexity of the model:
The review found that
the organisation has had challenges in responding to the unique and complex
governance arrangements in Auckland, and that this has impacted on the quality
of advice and support for elected members.
· Complementary decision-making, but key aspects of overlap:
The review touched on
a number of decision-making functions where there is overlap between the
Governing body and Local Boards, or a lack of clarity about respective roles of
the two governance arms.
· Lack of alignment of accountabilities with
responsibilities:
The review found that
the system of decision-making creates incentives for governing body members to
act locally despite regional benefits and that local boards are incentivised to
advocate for local service improvements, without having to make trade-offs
required to achieve these.
· Local boards are not sufficiently empowered:
The review identified
that there are some practices that are constraining local boards from carrying
out their role, including the inflexibility of funding arrangements and
difficulties in feeding local input into regional decision-making. It also
noted particular local frustrations in relation to transport decision-making.
Approach of the political working party and structure of
this report
12. The
working party has been considering the thirty six recommendations of the GFR.
They are grouped in to the following workstreams:
· policy and decision-making roles
· local boards funding and finance
· governance and representation
13. These
first three workstreams are nearing completion. A fourth workstream,
organisational support, is in its early stages and will consider improvements
to the way the organisation supports the Auckland governance model, including
any changes that arise from this review.
14. This
report briefly sets out the issues presented to the political working party in
the first three workstreams, the recommendations, and the draft position the
PWP has reached. Local board feedback on these directions is sought. A more
in-depth discussion of the analysis, rationale and options development for each
issue is available in relevant discussion documents appended to this report.
15. A
high level summary of all GFR report recommendations and how they were
progressed (or not) is attached as Appendix A. Several recommendations were not
progressed for various reasons and these are noted in the table.
16. In
considering the GFR report recommendations, options were developed and assessed
against the following criteria endorsed by the political working party and
approved by the governing body:
· consistency with the statutory purpose of local
government
· provision for decision making at the appropriate
level, as set out in Section 17 of the Local Government (Auckland Council) Act 2009
and consistency with the subsidiarity principle
· contribution to improving role clarity between
the two arms of governance, both internally and for the public
· provision for increased empowerment of local
boards, especially in their place shaping role
· ensuring appropriate accountability and
incentives for political decisions
· contribution to improved community engagement
with, and better services for Aucklanders
· administrative feasibility, including efficiency
and practicality of implementation.
Workstream 1: Policy and decision-making roles
17. This
workstream covers the following topics:
· Regional policy and decision-making processes
· Tension between local and regional priorities
(development of a ‘call-in’ right)
· Allocations and delegations
· The role of local boards and Auckland Transport
in local place-shaping
· A pilot for devolving greater powers to Waiheke
Local Board.
Regional
policy and decision-making processes
18. The
GFR found that:
· There is no agreed strategic framework for
regional policy development that adequately addresses governing body and local
board statutory roles[1]
· The timing of regional decision-making is not
well-planned across the organisation. Local boards in particular do not have
good visibility of the timing of regional decisions
· Considerable time and resource commitments are
required to seek local board input on regional decisions
· Local boards do not receive quality advice to
inform their input, and advice to the governing body and local boards often
lacks analysis of local impacts.
19. To
address these issues, the GFR recommended that council should:
· Bring both arms of governance together early in
the policy development process to clarify respective roles
· Increase the use of joint briefings and
workshops where relevant
· Develop a methodology that clearly identifies
local boards’ role in regional decisions
· Develop tools to enable local board input
earlier into regional policy development
· Develop a clear policy on the commissioning of
contestable advice, including a conflict resolution process
· Continue to embed the programme for improving
the quality of policy advice
· Consider limiting the ability of local boards to
advocate on regional policy issues (particularly investment), once due
consideration has been given.
20. Two
options were assessed for implementing better policy development processes that
would ensure effective local board input to regional policy decisions:
· Option 1 that involves implementing a framework with mechanisms to
ensure effective local board input to regional policy decisions, and specifies
methodologies and ways of working to address these procedural deficiencies
identified by GFR
· Option 2 that involves the same framework plus politically adopted
principles, in order to provide greater political direction and set public and
political expectations.
21. Both
options were considered to lead to better policy development, more empowerment
of local boards, and to better fulfil statutory obligations. Option 2 was
recommended on the grounds that it was more likely to result in greater
political accountability. Option 1 was favoured by the PWP.
22. The
following recommendations were also made to the PWP:
· The Quality Advice programme should continue as
an organisational priority
· Council should not implement a policy or process
on the commissioning of contestable advice, nor a formal conflict resolution
process, as neither are considered to be needed or proportional to the scale of
the problem
· Council should not implement a policy to limit
the ability of local boards to advocate on regional policy issues, as it would
not be in line with local boards’ statutory role to advocate on behalf of
their communities.
23. The
PWP’s position is that:
· A framework that implements mechanisms to ensure
effective local board input to regional policy decisions would be useful, and
local boards will need to be consulted on this prior to its implementation;
· Council should not implement a policy or process
on the commissioning of contestable advice, nor a formal conflict resolution
process, nor a policy to limit the ability of local boards to advocate on
regional policy issues. It was considered that such policies or procedures are
unnecessary and would be out of proportion to the scale of any problems.
24. In
line with this position, recommendations i-v have been drafted. Local board
feedback is sought on these.
25. More
details on the analysis, options considered and rationale is available in the
working paper ‘Regional decision-making and policy processes’
(Appendix B).
Next steps
26. A
framework setting out mechanisms to ensure effective local board input into
regional decisions will be developed in line with the high level direction in
the discussion document and the recommendations above. It will be workshopped
with local boards in the implementation phase of GFR.
27. How
organisational advice is provided, and by who, is a key question that needs to
be considered; resource constraint issues, specifically around the ability of
the organisation to service local board requests for advice on regional issues
or to develop local policy, were a common theme encountered during this
workstream. This is particularly important given that implementation of this
framework may require more in depth and involved work to provide advice to
local boards. This will be considered through the Organisational Support
workstream.
Local
decisions that may have regional impacts (development of a
‘call-in’ right)
28. The
GFR concluded that the current governance model ‘provides limited
incentives for local boards to consider local assets in a regional context, or
contemplate divestment or re-prioritisation of assets or facilities in their
local board areas. This leads to situations where conflict between local
decision-making and regional decision-making arises.’
29. The
report cited the hypothetical example of a local sports field which has been
identified as having capacity to be developed and contribute to the regional
strategy to grow regional capacity in the sports field network, but the local
board does not support this development because of the possible impacts on
local residents of increased noise, traffic and light. The local board has the
ability to decide against the development on the basis of those concerns, with
the regional impact of that decision being a resultant shortfall in sports
field capacity.
30. To
address this issue, the GFR recommended that council should develop a process
which would allow the governing body to ‘call-in’ decisions about
local assets where there is an important regional priority.
31. Analysis
showed that these situations occur very rarely, but when they do they usually
have potentially significant or serious implications.
32. Legal
analysis showed that an explicit ‘call-in’ right is not possible
under LGACA or the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA) but could be achieved
through other mechanisms such as amendments to the allocation table. A
range of options to address the problem were developed:
· Option 1: Enhanced status quo (with a focus on council staff
ensuring that advice to local boards covers possible regional implications of a
decision where they exist)
· Option 2: Establishing a process to bring both arms of governance
together to attempt to reach a solution that appropriately provides for
regional and local priorities
· Option 3: Amending the allocation of decision-making to allocate to
the governing body decision-making over an asset that is currently local in a
situation where there is a regional or sub-regional need or impact
· Option 4: Amending the allocation of decision-making as per Option
3, and also delegating the decision to a joint committee of governing body and
local board members.
33. Option
3 was recommended to the PWP, noting that specific criteria would need to be
developed to ensure that it would apply only in certain situations.
34. More
details on the analysis, options considered and rationale is available in the
discussion document ‘Allocations and delegations’ Part 1: Local
decisions that may have regional impact (Appendix C).
35. The
PWP’s draft position is that no call-in right, nor any mechanism that
would have a similar effect by removing local decision-making, should be
implemented; local decision-making that has been allocated to local boards
should remain un-fettered on the basis that local boards can make decisions in
the context of regional implications if appropriate advice is provided. To that
end, a mechanism should be implemented to ensure that local boards are clearly
advised of any potential regional or sub-regional implications of a decision
that they are asked to make.
36. Recommendations
vi – viii summarise these positions. Local board feedback on these is
sought.
Next
steps
37. If
this direction is adopted, a regional impact statement will be included in
reports to local boards where the decision required has the potential to have
an impact beyond the immediate local board area.
Allocations
and delegations
38. The
GFR found that most elected members ‘felt that the split of
decision-making allocation was reasonably well understood and sensible’,
but there were several areas where the allocation (and/or delegations) was
challenged. The GFR recommended that council review the delegated
responsibilities to local boards for swimming pool fencing exemptions, setting
time and season rules for dog access, the role of local boards in resource
consent applications, and in various Reserves Act 1977 decisions.
39. Three
of the issues identified in the GFR report either have already been addressed
or will shortly be addressed:
· Delegations for granting swimming pool fencing
exemptions have been superseded by legislative change that aligns the granting
of these exemptions with other safety and building regulation powers in the
Building Act 2004, which are delegated to staff;
· Delegations on setting time and season rules for
dog access will be reviewed through the review of the Dog Management Bylaw,
initiated by the Governing Body in March 2017. An issues and options paper is
expected in November 2017 and the review will be completed before 2019;
· The role of local boards in resource consent
applications was considered by a political working party in 2016. It made
recommendations for refining triggers for providing information about resource
consent applications to local boards and adopting a standard practice for local
boards to speak to local views and preferences in hearings. These
recommendations were adopted by the Hearings Committee in September 2016.
40. Work
therefore focused on issues regarding the role of local boards in
decision-making under the Reserves Act 1977.
41. Currently,
local boards are allocated non-regulatory decision-making for ‘the use of
and activities within local parks’, and ‘reserve management plans
for local parks’. However, the council’s Reserves Act regulatory
decisions are the responsibility of the governing body. The GFR report
concluded that ‘where a local park has reserve status under the Reserves
Act, it can impact or limit the decision-making authority of local boards in
relation to that park’. The GFR recommended that there ‘is a case
for local boards having consistent decision-making rights across all local
parks’, regardless of which legislative regime they are managed under.
42. Various
options were developed for the following Reserves Act powers:
· declaring land to be a reserve, which brings it
into the regime set out by the Reserves Act
· classifying or reclassifying a reserve, which
has an impact on how the reserve can be used
· requesting the revocation of reserve status from
the Minister of Conservation
· exchanging, acquiring and disposing of reserve
land.
43. These
options were generally:
· status quo (decision-making continues to lie
with the governing body)
· delegate decision-making for local reserves to
local boards
· delegate decision-making for local reserves to
local boards, subject to development of a regional policy to provide some
consistency across the region.
44. The
role of local boards with regard to the Minister of Conversation’s
delegated supervisory powers, which are a process check that requires council
to ensure that Reserves Act processes have been followed correctly, was also
considered.
45. The
positions recommended to the PWP were as follows:
· The council’s substantive decision-making
powers to classify and reclassify reserves should be delegated to local boards,
on the basis that it would provide for local decision-making and
accountability. There would likely be negligible effects on regional networks
or issues with regional consistency.
· The decision-making power to declare a reserve
and to request revocation of reserve status should be delegated to local
boards, subject to regional policy or guidelines to provide some consistency
about the land status of open space. This would balance local decision-making
and accountability with regional consistency and network impacts.
· The Minister of Conservation’s delegated
‘supervisory’ powers should remain delegated to staff, but where a
decision is likely to be contentious or there may be multiple objections, staff
should consider employing an independent commissioner to carry out this
function. This was on the basis that the supervisory decision is a technical
check that the correct process has been followed, and it should be exercised by
a different decision-maker than the maker of the substantive decision.
46. In
deciding whether to delegate these decisions, the governing body will need to
consider the requirement set out in Clause 36C(3) of Part 1A of Schedule 7 of
the LGA to “weigh the benefits of reflecting local circumstances and
preferences against the importance and benefits of using a single approach in
the district”. This test will need to be carried out individually for each
specific power that is proposed to be delegated.
47. The
PWP also considered the roles of local boards in reserve exchanges. Two options
were developed:
· Status quo: decision-making on reserve exchanges
remains with the governing body, in line with decision-making for acquisition
and disposal of non-reserve property
· Decision-making is delegated to local boards.
48. It
was recommended that the status quo remains, as this would retain a consistent
approach to the acquisition and disposal of all assets and avoids introducing
further complexity, time and cost to RMA plan change and consent decisions
(which are currently governing body decisions).
49. The
PWP agreed that decisions on declaration, classification, reclassification and
application to revoke reserve status for local reserves should be delegated to
local boards. It also agreed that the Minister of Conservation’s
supervisory powers should remain delegated to staff, but that an independent
commissioner should be engaged to exercise this function where the decision
sought is likely to be of significant public interest. This would provide an
additional layer of independent assurance that the decision-making process has
been appropriate.
50. The
PWP discussed the decision-making for exchanges of reserve land and did not
reach a consensus position on which option should be progressed. It agreed to consider
the feedback of local boards on this issue before making a recommendation.
51. The
PWP’s positions have been summarised in recommendations ix - xi. Local
board feedback is sought on these.
52. More
details on the analysis, options considered and rationale is available in the
discussion documents ‘Allocations and delegations’ Part 2: Reserves
Act decision-making roles (Appendix C) and ‘Reserve Act land
exchanges’ (Appendix D).
Next
steps
53. The
governing body will be presented with the necessary recommendations and legal
tests to enable it to make delegations at its September meeting if this
position is confirmed.
The
role of local boards and Auckland Transport in local place-shaping
54. The
GFR report found there is frustration among some local board members with
respect to transport decision-making and the local board role of place-shaping
within and beside the road corridor. It noted common concerns among local board
members that:
· there is a lack of timely, high-quality
information about local transport activity
· the community holds local board members
accountable for local transport decisions, but they have very little influence
over them
· Auckland Transport could be delegating some
transport responsibilities to boards, particularly in relation to local
transport and place-making in town centres.
55. There
are mixed views amongst board members on the quality and purpose of
consultation: while some local board members feel there is genuine consultation
and engagement from Auckland Transport, others feel that it can be late or lack
authenticity. There also appear to be different expectations of respective
roles in consulting the public, and concerns about a lack of timely, high-quality
information, and the quality of advice on the local board Transport Capital
Fund.
56. To
address these issues, various options were developed for decision-making roles,
funding for local transport initiatives, and engagement between Auckland
Transport and local boards.
Decision-making
roles
57. A
range of decision-making functions were assessed for potential delegation to
local boards. This included, for example, decision-making over major and minor
capital investment, non-road parts of the road corridor for a variety of uses,
event permitting and traffic management planning, signage and banners,
regulatory controls over parking, traffic and transit lanes, traffic calming,
physical infrastructure (including town centre infrastructure as well as kerb and
channelling or swales for stormwater), and community education programmes.
58. Delegation
of decision-making functions to local boards generally did not perform well on
evaluation criteria. Analysis showed that while local boards do and should have
a role in place-making, of which the road corridor and town centres are a
significant part, it is practically difficult to split up formal
decision-making for parts of the transport network.
59. In
addition, Auckland Transport remains liable for the impacts of decisions even
if they are delegated. Therefore, the functions that could be delegated tend to
be quite low-level and operational in nature; the administrative and
transactional costs of numerous operational decisions being made by local
boards would be high.
60. For
these reasons, advice to the PWP was that the place-making role of local boards
would be better given effect to through other options assessed:
· earlier and more consistent engagement by
Auckland Transport which acknowledges the local governance and place-shaping
roles of local boards, and is in line with the expectations set out in the
Governance Manual for Substantive CCOs.
· an increase in the local board Transport Capital
Fund, which would likely result in greater delivery of local transport
projects and local transport outcomes.
· a direction for Auckland Transport to undertake
various other actions that will empower local boards’ place shaping in
the transport corridor.
Funding
61. The
options for changes to the local board Transport Capital Fund were:
· Option 1: Status quo – the fund remains at approximately $11
million with the current method of allocation.
· Option 2: A recommendation to increase the size of the fund from
the current inflation-adjusted value of $11 million to $20 million, as well as
improvements to provide local boards with better advice and a more systematic
work programme approach to managing projects. Process improvements and better
advice to local boards may improve outcomes from the fund.
· Option 3: A full review of the purpose and operation of the fund.
When the fund was first established in 2012, a review was committed to during
the development of the 2015-25 LTP but this never took place. No subsequent
policy analysis has been undertaken to determine whether the fund is currently
operating optimally.
62. The
PWP took the position that the local board transport capital fund should be
increased significantly, and that an appropriate final quantum for the fund
should be determined through the long-term plan process alongside other budget
priorities. The method of allocating this fund across local boards should also
be considered through the long-term plan process.
It also considered that
Auckland Transport should provide local boards with a more systematic work
programme approach to identifying options for projects and local transport
outcomes through the fund.
Auckland Transport
– local board consultation and engagement
63. Various
options for improvements to Auckland Transport – local board consultation
and engagement were explored, including improvements to local board engagement
plans and more consistent reporting and monitoring of local board engagement.
64. Analysis
showed that improving Auckland Transport-local board
engagement, both at a strategic level and on a project by project basis, would
be the best and most appropriate way to empower local boards that takes into
account local boards’ local governance role and Auckland
Transport’s statutory responsibilities.
65. This would likely be best achieved if the existing requirements for
local board engagement as set out in the Governance Manual for Substantive CCOs
are consistently met and monitored.
These requirements specify expectations for, amongst other things, local board
engagement plans incorporating schedules of board-specific priorities and
projects, annual workshops between Auckland Transport and local boards for
direction-setting, and regular reporting against local board engagement.
66. Various
functions of Auckland Transport were assessed for potential local board
empowerment. It was proposed that Auckland Transport:
· Ensure that local boards have a strong
governance role in determining the ‘look and feel’ of town centres
and streetscapes, in line with their allocation of non-regulatory
decision-making
· Improve co-ordination between local
place-shaping projects, such as town centre upgrades, and its renewals
programmes
· Provide more opportunities for local board
direction on the prioritisation of minor traffic safety projects, with the
exception of those which Auckland Transport considers are of critical safety
importance
· Be more responsive to local place-shaping
initiatives in non-transport parts of the road corridor, including reducing or
removing barriers to community place-making initiatives e.g. looking at ways to
reduce the costs of developing traffic management plans for community events
· Take direction from local boards on how and
where to implement community-focused programmes.
67. It
was also proposed that these directions be actively monitored and reported
annually to the governing body.
68. The
PWP supported these positions on improving the relationship by requiring
Auckland Transport to be more consistent on meeting its obligations, and
through more consistent monitoring of how it is doing so. It also supported
directing Auckland Transport to empower local boards further as described
above.
69. The
PWP also considered that potential delegations to local boards should not be
ruled out, and should be investigated further. It also noted that not all ward
councillors are regularly engaged or informed of transport projects and issues
within their ward areas, and that this should be done as a matter of course.
70. Recommendations
xii – xxv reflect these positions. Local board feedback is sought on
these.
71. More
details on the analysis, options considered and rationale is available in the
working papers ‘Local boards and Auckland Transport’ (Appendix E)
and ‘Confirmation of draft transport recommendations’ (Appendix F).
Waiheke
Local Board pilot
72. The
GFR identified that there are some practices that are constraining local boards
from carrying out their role, including the inflexibility of funding
arrangements and difficulties in feeding local input into regional decision-making.
It considered whether it would be feasible for some local boards to have
greater decision-making powers depending on the extent of the regional impact
of specific local decisions. It suggested that this could be piloted on Waiheke
Island given:
· the more clearly defined community of interest
on the island (relative to most other local board areas);
· the separation of the island from wider Auckland
services such as roading, stormwater or public transport;
· the desires of the local board for greater
decision-making autonomy, and a feeling that the regionalisation of services
across Auckland has failed to reflect the unique nature of the island.
73. The
Waiheke Local Board has consistently sought greater autonomy, arguing that this
would deliver better outcomes for the community and better reflect the
principles of subsidiarity and the policy intent of the Auckland amalgamation.
74. A
range of functions and decisions that the GFR suggested could be devolved to
local boards are currently under the purview of the governing body or Auckland
Transport. These include area planning, community development and safety,
developing local visitor infrastructure, management of the stormwater network,
some transport decision-making and catchment management.
75. Other
matters the GFR proposed for devolution are in fact already allocated to local
boards or provided for under statute, but boards have not had access to the
resources to support them – such as local area planning or proposing
bylaws – or they have not been assessed as a priority in an environment
where large regional projects have tended to dominate (such as the Unitary
Plan).
76. In
response, a proposed three year pilot project for Waiheke has been developed in
conjunction with the local board. The activities proposed are broader than the
technical allocation or delegation of decision-making, and include operational
issues, policy and planning, funding, compliance and enforcement and
relationships with CCOs. The pilot will include:
· A programme of locally-initiated policy,
planning and bylaw work that includes responses to visitor growth demands, a
strategic plan for Matiatia, and development of a proposal for a community
swimming pool, will be undertaken.
· Addressing a number of operational issues that
frustrate the local board. For example there are a number of longstanding
compliance and encroachment issues on the island that have not been resolved and
have become almost intractable, resulting in ongoing negative environmental and
social impacts. This may be addressed through better locally-based operational
leadership from council.
· Developing some key local transport strategic
approaches, such as a 10 year transport plan and Waiheke and Hauraki Gulf
Islands design guidelines.
77. The
pilot has been developed with intervention logic and an evaluation methodology
built-in from the beginning. This will enable a sound evaluation of the pilot
to be undertaken, particularly to assess success and the applicability of the
findings to the rest of Auckland.
78. The
Waiheke Local Board will oversee governance of the pilot project. It is
proposed that the pilot be implemented from 1 October 2017.
79. The
PWP endorsed the pilot project and recommends that it be endorsed by the
governing body. Recommendations xxvi – xxvii reflect this position. Local
board feedback is sought on these.
80. Further
details on the analysis, rationale and key projects is available in the working
papers ‘Waiheke Local Board pilot project’ (Appendix G) and the
project outline (Appendix H).
Next
steps
81. An
implementation plan and an evaluation plan will be developed and reported to
the Waiheke Local Board for its consideration prior to the implementation date
(currently proposed to be 1 October 2017).
Workstream 2: Local boards funding and finance
82. The
GFR identified the following key issues that have been considered within the
context of the Funding and Finance workstream:
· Local
boards do not have to balance the trade-offs of financial decisions in the same
way as the governing body needs to e.g. local boards can advocate for both
additional investment in their own area and lower rates.
· Inflexibility of the
current funding policies to empower local board decision making. In particular
local boards feel they have little or no control over the 90 per cent of their
budget which is for “Asset Based Services” (ABS).
· Inflexibility of the
current procurement processes and definition of when local boards or groups of
local boards can undertake procurement of major contracts.
83. The
workstream looked at a range of alternative models for financial decision
making around local activities:
· Status Quo (predominantly governing body and some local board
decision making)
· Entirely Local (unconstrained local board decision making)
· Local within parameters (local board decision making but within
parameters set by the governing body)
· Entirely Regional (all governing body with local boards as
advocates)
· Joint governing body/local board (joint committees)
· Multi Board (joint decision making of two or more local boards).
84. The
early discussion paper attached to this agenda at Appendix I describes these
options in more detail.
85. After
initial discussion with the PWP the options were narrowed down to two, for
further exploration. The attached papers (Appendix J and Appendix K) describe
the approach to the two models in some detail. However, in summary:
Option 1: Enhanced status quo
This option is based on the governing body continuing to set
the overall budget availability and allocating the budget between local boards
(the allocation is currently based on legacy service levels). The budgets will
be funded from general rates and decisions made by the governing body on the
level of rates, efficiency savings and levels of service would be reflected
through, as necessary, to the local board budgets. Within these parameters some
additional flexibility for local decision making is proposed.
Option 2: Local decision making within
parameters
In this option additional decision making is enabled for
local boards through all or some of the costs of local activities and services
being funded through a local rate. This enables the local board to have much
increased flexibility in determining levels of service in different activities
and to directly engage with their community on the costs and benefits of
providing those services. The key issues identified with this option are the
impact of redistributing the costs of local services on different communities
and the additional costs of supporting local decision making.
86. A
number of key themes emerge from evaluating the two models of decision making
and these form the main issues for consideration when determining the way
forward:
i) Legal
context – The Local Government (Auckland Council) Act 2009 sets out
expectations for the two arms of governance. There is a clear expectation that
local boards will reflect the priorities and preferences of their communities
“in respect of the level and nature of local activities to be provided
by Auckland Council…” To do this local boards need the ability
to make decisions about service levels and appropriate funding.
ii) Capital
expenditure – Both models of decision making have assumed that
decisions on major capital expenditure will be reserved to the governing body.
Control of debt and the council’s credit rating are key regional issues.
There is also recognition that the governing body is best placed to make decisions
on investment in new assets that are essentially part of a community
infrastructure network.
iii) Organisational
efficiency vs local decision making – Greater decision making by
local boards will require a greater level of staff support and will require the
organisation to gear its governance advice in a different way. This will have
an impact on the resources of the organisation.
iv) Regional
standards vs local preferences – There are different views on whether
it is better to have one standard of service across the whole Auckland region
for local activities, or whether each local board should be able to prioritise
and customise those services according to the needs and preferences of their
community.
v) Legacy
funding base – The current funding of local boards for ABS is largely
based on the historical funding model from the legacy councils. As each board
has inherited different numbers of assets, different levels of service and
different method of delivery, the existing funding base in very uneven. This
creates a number of difficulties for the Enhanced Status Quo model.
vi) Local
assets as a network – Giving local boards more decision making over
the level of renewal and/or services delivered from local assets will, in many
cases, impact on communities outside of the local area. To address this issue
the proposal includes requirement for local boards to consult outside of their
own area in certain situations.
vii) Funding –
The key factors with the general rates based approach are:
· Overall
funding and therefore to a large extent, levels of service, for local
activities are determined by the governing body
· It
is difficult to address the historical funding inequities
· All ratepayers pay the same (based on
property value)
The key factors with a local rate are:
· The
rate will reflect the level of service delivered in that area
· The
local board can set their own budgets to reflect local community priorities
· The
redistribution of rates may impact more in communities least able to afford it.
viii) Data
and policy gaps – Regardless of which approach is decided upon for
the future, the project has highlighted the need to improve the quality of
information and policy support to local boards.
87. In
summary the two proposed models of financial decision making have the following
characteristics:
Enhanced status quo –
· Limited additional financial decision making – may not give
full effect to legislative intent of local boards with local decision making
and accountability
· Maintains the efficiencies of more centralised organisational
support and procurement at scale
· Governing body determines budgets and therefore levels of service -
tends towards regional standards
· Unlikely to address legacy inequities of funding in the short term
· General rate funded therefore no redistribution effect, but also
does not address perceived inequity of boards funding higher levels of service
in other areas
Local decision making within parameters
–
· Gives more decision making and accountability to local boards
– may be more in line with legislative intent
· Will be less efficient as additional resources will be required to
support local decision making
· Levels of service will tend to be more varied across the region
· Enables local boards to address funding inequities
· Redistribution of rates will impact on some communities who can
least afford it.
88. While
there are two clear choices of decision making model, there does not have to be
a final decision at this point. The “Local decision making within
parameters” option requires a change to the Local Board Funding Policy
which in turn needs public consultation. There also needs to be more
preparatory work before any implementation of a change, and in fact, some of
that work would be necessary to implement the “Enhanced status quo”
model. Five alternative recommendations were put forward to the PWP:
· Status
quo – no change
· Enhanced
status quo – progress further work prior to implementation on
organisational impacts, framework for service levels and local flexibility, options
for addressing historical uneven funding issues, improving financial data etc.
· Local
decision making within parameters – consult on the change with the LTP
2018-28 and progress pre-implementation work (as above plus work on detailed
parameters and rating models). The earliest implementation for this approach
would be 2019/20.
· Consult
on both options with the LTP 2018-28 and then decide. In the meantime progress
at least the work for enhanced status quo. The earliest implementation for this
approach would be 2019/20.
· Agree
in principle to local decision making but subject to further work (as outlined
above). Should there then be a wish to proceed to consult with the 2019/20
Annual Plan.
89. The PWP
reached agreement on a variation of these alternative recommendations i.e.:
· That
the Enhanced status quo model be progressed now, giving as much additional
decision making to local boards as possible within that framework.
· That
the additional work to support this model be undertaken – framework for
service levels and local flexibility, options for addressing historical uneven
funding, improving the information and advice that is provided to local boards.
· That
further work on the implications of the Local decision making model also be
undertaken for further consideration - modelling of rates implication following
the revaluation, costs to the organisation of supporting more local decision
making etc.
90. These
positions are summarised in recommendations xxviii – xxx. Local board
feedback is sought on these.
Workstream 3: Governance and representation
91. This
workstream covers:
· The optimum number of local boards
· Methods of electing governing body members
· Naming conventions for elected members
The
optimum number of local boards
92. The
GFR found that having twenty-one local boards contributed to a complex
governance structure and logistical inefficiencies; servicing 21 local boards
is costly and creates a large administrative burden. It recommended that the
council form a view on the optimum number of local boards, noting that
‘getting the right number of local boards is about striking a balance
between getting genuine local engagement, while maintaining a decision-making
structure that is able to be effectively serviced’.
93. Changing
the number of local boards requires a reorganisation proposal, a statutory
process that is currently a lengthy and likely costly exercise. Determining the
optimum number of local boards, to inform such a proposal, is in itself a
significant undertaking.
94. There
are several other processes ongoing that make a reorganisation proposal now not
optimal, regardless of the merits of changing the number of boards:
· Legislative changes to simplify the
reorganisation process are being considered by Parliament, but the timeframe
for their enactment is not known.
· The Local Government Commission is considering
reorganisation proposals for North Rodney and Waiheke Island, which could
result in change to Auckland’s governance structure (for example through
the creation of another local board). The Local Government Commission is set to
announce its preferred option by the end of the 2017 calendar year.
· Auckland Council must complete a formal
representation review by September 2018.
· The Governance Framework Review is intended to
provide greater local board empowerment and to address some of the shortcomings
that may be a key driver for reducing the number of local boards.
95. Within
this context, three potential high level scenarios for change were developed
and presented to the PWP:
· a reduction to fourteen local boards, largely
based on amalgamation of existing local board areas and subdivisions;
· a reduction to nine local boards, largely based
on amalgamation of existing local board areas and subdivisions;
· an increase in the number of local boards.
96. These
scenarios were designed to give the PWP an idea of what issues would need to be
considered and the level of further work that would need to be undertaken if
council is to consider changing the number of local boards. They were not
presented as specific options for change.
97. Two
options for how to proceed were presented to the PWP:
· Option 1 (recommended): no further work to be undertaken until after
other GFR changes to empower local boards have been implemented and evaluated,
and the other processes noted above (enactment of legislation simplifying
reorganisation proposal processes, completion of the North Rodney and Waiheke
Island reorganisation proposals, implementation of the Governance Framework Review,
and representation review) have concluded.
· Option 2: continue this work and refine high level scenarios into
specific options for changing the number of local boards. This would require
significantly more detailed work to identify communities of interest, proposed
boundaries and numbers of elected members.
98. Option
1 was recommended on the basis that the outcomes of those other current
processes had the potential to significantly affect the outcome of any work
that would be undertaken now. They may also empower local boards and remove a
key driver for reducing the number of local boards identified by the GFR
report.
99. The
PWP agreed with Option 1, expressing a clear view that no further work on
changing the number of local boards should be undertaken until at least after
the GFR has been completed and implemented, and the outcome of reorganisation
proposals that are underway for North Rodney and Waiheke Island are known. The
rationale for this is that the 2010 reforms are still ‘bedding in’,
with the GFR likely contributing to better delivery of the intentions of the
reforms; it was thus considered too early for council to consider initiating
any change to the number of local boards.
100. In
line with this position, recommendation xxxi has been drafted. Local board
feedback is sought on this position and recommendation.
101. More
details on the analysis, options considered and rationale is available in the
working paper ‘Number of local boards’ (Appendix L).
Next
steps
102. If
this recommendation is accepted by the governing body, staff will not do any
further work on this issue until directed otherwise.
Methods
of electing governing body members
103. The
GFR identified that there is an in-built tension between governing body members’
regional strategic responsibilities and their local electoral accountabilities
to their ward constituents who elect them. There may be times when it is a
challenge for governing body members to vote against local interests in the
interests of the region.
104. Governing
body members are also inevitably approached about local issues, including
constituent queries or complaints that relate to local board activities. This
can lead to them being drawn into issues that are local board responsibilities.
It may also make it harder for the public to understand the respective roles of
their ward governing body members and local board members.
105. The
GFR report recommended that council consider amending the number and size of
wards, such as moving to a mix of ward and at-large councillors, and / or
reducing the number of wards from which councillors are elected, to address the
misalignment of accountabilities and responsibilities.
106. Four
options were developed and presented to the PWP:
· Option 1: status quo. Governing body members continue to be elected
from the current ward structure.
· Option 2: all governing body members would be elected at-large
across the Auckland region.
· Option 3: governing body members would be elected from a mixture of
at-large (10 members) and ward-based (10 members) representation.
· Option 4: governing body members would be elected from a ward-based
system, but the number of wards would be reduced (and hence the size of wards
increased).
107. Some
other governing body representational issues were also considered. These
included developing protocols or role statements around governing body
members’ and local board members’ roles to clarify
responsibilities, the possibility of introducing a Māori ward for the governing
body, and changing the voting system to Single Transferable Vote.
108. The
PWP’s draft position is that the issues raised in the GFR are not in
themselves sufficient reason to change electoral arrangements for governing
body members. Moving to an at large or combination of larger ward-based and at
large wards would, in its view, make representing Aucklanders at a regional
level significantly more difficult. The PWP has also noted that a full
statutory review of representation arrangements will be carried out in 2018.
The Governing Body will also consider electoral methods, such as changing to
STV, at its August meeting this year.
109. It
also noted that council has a current advocacy position for legislative change
that would allow the number of governing body members to change in line with
population growth, and that the process for changing the numbers and boundaries
of local boards should also be made easier than the current statutory process.
110. In
line with this position, recommendations xxxii - xxxiv have been drafted. Local
board feedback is sought on this position and the recommendations.
111. More
details on the analysis, options considered and rationale is available in the
working paper ‘Representation options’ (Appendix M).
Next
steps
112. There
are no specific next steps for implementation if this recommendation is
accepted. The council will continue to advocate for the changes outlined above
where appropriate, and staff will begin the statutory review of representation
arrangements later this year.
Naming
conventions for elected members
113. The
GFR found that one of the contributing factors to role overlap and role
confusion between governing body members and local board members is Auckland
Council’s naming conventions, where governing body members are generally
referred to as ‘councillors’ and members of local boards are
referred to as ‘local board members’. It recommended that council
consider these naming conventions and, either confirm and reinforce the naming
conventions, or change them for consistency, preferring that all elected
members be accorded the title of either ‘councillor’ or
‘member’ (either local or regional). This would reinforce and
clarify the complementary and specific nature of the roles, making it easier for
staff and the public to understand.
114. The
titles currently in use are conventions; they are not formal legal titles that
are bestowed or required to be used under any statute, nor are they legally
protected in a way that restricts their use. This is also true for other
potential titles that were identified (see below). If council did change the
naming conventions to call local board members ‘councillors’ then the application of some provisions in LGACA which refer to both
councillors and local board members together may become confusing and
problematic. Legislative amendment may become necessary to resolve this.
115. If
a decision is to be made on naming conventions then this would be made by the
governing body. No decision-making responsibility for naming conventions has
been allocated to local boards under the allocation table. Such a decision
would fall under the catch-all ‘All other non-regulatory activities of
Auckland Council’ that is allocated to the governing body. In making such
a decision the governing body would be required to consider the views of local
boards.
116. Three
options were assessed and presented to the PWP:
· Option 1:
Status quo. A member of the governing body is generally referred to as
‘councillor’ and a member of a local board as ‘local board
member’.
· Option 2:
Change the naming conventions so that all elected members have some permutation
of the title ‘councillor’ (e.g. ‘Governing body
Councillor’, ‘Local Councillor’)
· Option 3:
Change the naming conventions so that all elected members have some permutation
of the title ‘member’ (e.g. ‘Governing body Member’,
‘Local Board Member’)
117. Any
decision to confirm the current conventions or to change to a new convention
would need to be applied consistently across the Auckland region, and would
affect all council publications and materials.
118. The
PWP did not adopt a position on whether the naming conventions should be
retained or changed, preferring to hear the views of local boards and governing
body members before adopting a recommendation. It did however agree with the
need for regional consistency. A key aspect of the use of the title
‘councillor’ is its meaning to members of the community.
119. In
line with the PWP’s position to hear views prior to making a
recommendation, local board feedback is sought on preferred naming conventions
for elected members (summarised as recommendation (b)).
120. More
details on the analysis, options considered and rationale is available in the
working paper ‘Naming conventions’ (Appendix N).
Next
steps
121. If
conventions are changed, staff throughout the organisation will need to be
informed of the updated conventions; Auckland Council’s style guide uses
the current naming conventions so would need to be updated, as would other
formal council publications (such as reports and documents for consultation).
Business cards, name plates and other collateral can be updated to include the
new conventions when new materials are required (in line with normal business
practice) to ensure that costs associated with any change are minimal.
Ongoing oversight of Governance Framework
Review implementation
122. Consideration
needs to be given to future oversight of the governance framework review past
September 2017, particularly implementation of any decisions.
123. The
Terms of Reference of the PWP state that one of its purposes is to
‘provide oversight and direction for the governance framework review
implementation project’. They also state that the working party
‘may act as a sounding board for changes the organisation is considering
to the way that elected members are supported in their governance role.
However, decisions on the way the organisation configures itself are the
responsibility of the Chief Executive.’
124. The
working party has discussed the desirability and usefulness of continuing the
working party, or establishing a similar group, with broader terms of
reference, comprising both governing body and local board members.
125. The
broad role of such a group could be to consider governance issues that impact
on both local boards and the governing body, for example the upcoming
representation review, the oversight of the implementation of the governance
framework review and any ongoing policy work arising from the review etc.
126. Current
local board members of the PWP have signalled that they would need a fresh
mandate to continue being on such a group. The size of the working party,
membership, leadership, Terms of Reference, frequency of meetings and secretariat
support would all need to be confirmed.
127. At
this point we are seeking feedback from the local boards on the following
possible recommendations for the governing body in September:
· Option 1: recommend that the governing body thanks the political working
party for its work on the governance framework review and notes that any
further decision making arising from the implementation of the review will be
considered by the governing body; or
· Option 2: recommend that the governing body thanks the political
working party for its work and agrees that an ongoing political working party,
comprising governing body and local board members, would provide a valuable
vehicle for considering matters that impact on both governance arms and making
recommendations to the governing body on these matters.
128.
This request for feedback is summarised in recommendation (c).
Next steps
129. If
this recommendation to extend the PWP is confirmed, staff will redraft the
terms of reference of the PWP to reflect these directions, and report them to
the governing body for adoption.
Consideration
Local board views and implications
130. This
report seeks local board views on issues and options that may have wide-ranging
implications for local boards. These views will be provided to the governing
body for its consideration in decision-making.
131. Significant
consultation has been undertaken with local boards throughout the Governance
Framework Review and the response to the GFR report. This included a series of
workshops with each local board, as well as various cluster meetings, to
discuss key issues in this report.
Māori impact statement
132. The
Governance Framework Review did not specifically consider the governance or
representation of Maori in Auckland. The relationship between the two
governance arms of Auckland Council and the Independent Maori Statutory Board
(IMSB) was also out of scope.
133. The
IMSB and Te Waka Angamua were consulted through this process. In response to
the final GFR report the IMSB secretariat provided a memorandum setting out its
views on a number of the report’s recommendations. These views largely
focused on ensuring that Auckland Council meets its existing statutory
requirements for:
· enabling Maori to participate in decision-making
in Auckland local government are met;
· engaging and consulting Maori and considering
the needs and views of Maori communities when making decisions;
· recognising the need for greater involvement of
Maori in local government employment.
134. These
statutory requirements should be met as a matter of course and have been noted.
No specific actions are recommended.
135. The
secretariat also identified that there is:
· a lack of definition of the relationship between
the governing body, local boards and the IMSB
· the lack of acknowledgement of the IMSB as
promoting issues for Maori
· the lack of awareness of the governing body and
local boards of their obligation to consult the IMSB on matters affecting mana
whenua and mataawaka, the need to take into account the IMSB’s advice on
ensuring that input of mana whenua groups and mataawaka is reflected in council
strategies, policies, plans and other matters.
136. As
stated above, the council-IMSB relationship was out of scope of the GFR report,
so these issues are not being addressed through this work.
137. No
specific Maori impacts have been identified.
Implementation
138. Implementation of changes will begin after the governing body has
made final decisions in September. An implementation plan will be developed.
Attachments
|
No.
|
Title
|
Page
|
|
a⇩
|
Attachment A: Summary table of GFR report
recommendations
|
51
|
|
b⇩
|
Attachment B: Regional decision-making and policy
processes
|
61
|
|
c⇩
|
Attachment C: Allocations and delegations
|
75
|
|
d⇩
|
Attachment D: Reserve Act Land ex changes
|
105
|
|
e⇩
|
Attachment E: Local Boards and Auckland Transport
|
111
|
|
f⇩
|
Attachment F: Confirmation of draft recommendations
|
139
|
|
g⇩
|
Attachment G: Waiheke local Board pilot project cover
paper
|
143
|
|
h⇩
|
Attachment H: Waiheke pilot project outline
|
147
|
|
i⇩
|
Attachment I: Funding and finance workstream paper 1
|
167
|
|
j⇩
|
Attachment J: Funding and finance cover paper July
|
185
|
|
k⇩
|
Attachment K: Funding finance description of 2 models
(including two spreadsheet attachments)
|
193
|
|
l⇩
|
Attachment L: Number of Local Boards
|
209
|
|
m⇩
|
Attachment M: Representation options
|
231
|
|
n⇩
|
Attachment N: Naming conventions
|
251
|
Signatories
|
Authors
|
Linda Taylor - Manager Mayoral Programmes
|
|
Authorisers
|
Phil Wilson - Governance Director
Karen Lyons - General Manager Local Board Services
Carol McKenzie-Rex - Relationship Manager
|
