

Governance framework review discussion document: Representation options

Introduction

This document is designed to assist the political working party (PWP) and the executive steering group overseeing the implementation of the governance framework review.

It sets out the work of the project team on specific issues in a structured way to facilitate discussion of the options and the development of recommendations for the governing body. It is one of a series of papers that will be presented to the working party as part of the process of considering the governance framework review's recommendations.

The first part of the paper gives a brief outline of the purpose of this paper and the problem definition, it also provides context and outlines any previous relevant decisions.

The second part of the paper outlines potential options or proposed responses to specific issues.

Each paper will be considered by the political working party at one of its workshops in May and June and will be supported by a presentation by workstream leads and other relevant staff e.g. finance, legal, local board services.

Purpose and problem definition

1. The purpose of this paper is to provide analysis of alternative options for electing governing body members of Auckland Council.

Background

2. The Governance Framework Review (GFR) report identified issues with governing body members being elected on a ward basis in terms of the respective roles of governing body members and local boards. The Auckland Council is required to conduct a statutory review of its representation arrangements during 2018 and this will be the appropriate opportunity to make any changes considered desirable. This report seeks early consideration and direction on some of these issues.
3. During its representation review, the council can review:
 - whether governing body members are elected at-large or by ward or by a combination
 - if they are to be elected by ward, names and boundaries of wards and number of members per ward.
 - names of local boards
 - number of members of local boards
 - whether members of each local board are elected at-large or by subdivision.
4. The council cannot review:
 - the total number of governing body members – this is set in legislation at 20 plus the mayor
 - the number, or boundaries, of local boards – this must be done through a reorganisation process. Legislation is going through the House that will simplify this.
5. The timetable for the review is as follows:
 - a resolution setting out proposals no earlier than 1 March 2018
 - public notice inviting submissions – within 14 days and no later than 8 September 2018
 - consider submissions and make a final proposal
 - public notice inviting objections and appeals which must be received no later than 20 December 2018
 - these must be forwarded to the Local Government Commission, which makes a final decision by 11 April 2019.
6. The issue of ward-based versus at-large elections for councillors was discussed at a governing body workshop on 30 May. Governing body members present were

generally not supportive of changing from the current ward-based system and First Past the Post voting system.

Problem definition

7. Governing body members are elected by and represent their local ward constituents, but their primary responsibility as a governing body member is to make regional decisions. This responsibility is outlined in schedule 7, clause 14 of the Local Government Act, which includes a declaration that each local authority elected member must make before they can act as a member. For the governing body this declaration requires that members act "...in the best interests of the region..."
8. As a consequence, there is an in-built tension in the governing body roles between local electoral accountabilities and regional strategic responsibilities. There may be times where it is a challenge to vote against local interests in the interests of the region.
9. Governing body members are also inevitably approached about local issues including constituent queries or complaints that relate to local board activities. This in turn can lead to them being drawn into, or trying to address, local issues that are local board responsibilities and potentially distracted from the core strategic roles they were elected to fulfil.
10. In addition, it makes it harder for the public to understand the respective roles of their ward governing body members and local board members.
11. The GFR report recommended that council consider amending the number and size of wards, such as moving to a mix of ward and at-large councillors, and / or reducing the number of wards from which councillors are elected, to address the misalignment of accountabilities and responsibilities. Whether a change in representation is sufficient or proportional to addressing these problems is a key consideration.

Analysis

12. This section considers various issues and options to improve the misalignment of accountabilities and responsibilities by changing ward size and boundaries for Governing Body elections. It also looks at the following associated issues that should be considered at the same time:
 - the potential to create a Māori ward
 - whether the voting system for governing body elections should be changed (e.g. from FPP to STV)

Possible changes to the ward structure to better align responsibilities and accountabilities

13. One approach to improve the alignment of governing body members' responsibilities and accountabilities would be to change the underlying ward structure from which they are elected. There are various options that could be considered including:

- electing governing body members at-large
- having fewer wards with more members elected per ward
- having some members elected at large and some elected from local wards
- retaining the status quo of twenty members elected from thirteen wards

14. These options are set out in more detail below

Detail	Pros	Cons
Option 1: all governing body members elected at-large		
<p>Electing at-large is the process of electing representatives from the entire region rather than smaller wards.</p> <p>The Mayor of Auckland is currently elected on an at-large basis. This system could be extended to elect all 21 governing body members at-large.</p>	<p>Electing governing body members at-large incentivises them to act regionally since they are elected from the whole region and their responsibilities and accountabilities therefore align.</p>	<p>An at-large system is less accessible than a ward based system, as</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • it can favour those with regional name recognition • campaigning across the whole region can be prohibitively expensive and discourage candidates from running. <p>This system can also make it more difficult for minority groups to be elected, and can therefore reduce the representativeness of the governing body.</p>
Option 2: Fewer, but larger wards		
<p>Reducing the number of wards with multiple governing body members representing each ward.</p> <p>For example, the legacy Auckland Regional Council had 13 elected</p>	<p>Boundaries would need to align as much as possible with local boards (LGACA) but would encompass more than one board</p> <p>Relative to the at-large model,</p>	<p>Accountabilities and responsibilities are still mis-aligned, but to a smaller extent.</p> <p>Many of the issues related to at-large systems would still</p>

Detail	Pros	Cons
members from six constituencies: Central (four councillors), Manukau (three), Rodney (one), Waitākere (two), North Shore (two) and Franklin/Papakura (one).	<p>accessibility and representation issues are likely to be less pronounced.</p> <p>Larger wards would provide a better alignment with the governing body members' regional responsibilities.</p>	be present, though they would be less significant.
Option 3 Combination of at-large members and members from (larger) wards		
<p>This option essentially combines the previous two, with a mix of councillors elected from across the region, and others elected from wards. This is the approach advocated by the Royal Commission.¹</p> <p>Under Auckland Council's 21-member governing body the logical split would be:</p> <p>The mayor and:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ten councillors elected at large ten councillors elected from ten wards. <p>This is the model that was proposed by the Royal Commission (10:10) and by the government (8:12) but was rejected at the select committee stage for an entirely ward based system.</p>	<p>In addition to the pros of Option 2, governing body members elected from wards could be enabled to consider regional issues, speak and vote as representatives of their wards.</p> <p>These more local voices would be balanced by the regional views brought by the majority of members.</p> <p>This would provide a more formal avenue for local views to be represented in regional decision-making, and support the development of stronger relationships between locally elected governing body members and local boards.</p>	<p>Many of the issues related to at-large systems would still be present, though they would be less significant.</p> <p>May create a two tier system of councillors – at large and ward-based – and incentivise ward-based councillors to act more locally</p>

15. Examples of how these arrangements might look and consequent effect on population ratios are set out in Appendix A, which describes the following scenarios:

- status quo (20 councillors elected from 13 wards)
- 20 councillors elected from 10 larger wards
- 20 councillors elected from 6 larger wards

¹ Royal Commission on Auckland Governance, 2010, Volume 1, page 341

- 10 councillors elected at large, 10 councillors elected from 10 wards
- 10 councillors elected at large, 10 councillors elected from 6 wards

16. For comparison, Appendix B contains a sample of some larger-sized western local government entities.

Status quo

17. Councillors are currently elected from one of 13 wards. Six of these wards are the same area as their corresponding local board area (including Howick which has two councillors for one local board area), six incorporate two local board areas and one incorporates three.

18. The existing ward boundaries were determined by the LGC. In arriving at their decisions, the LGC considered a range of factors, including:

- The need to ensure fair representation, i.e. a similar number of elected members per capita within each ward. There is a statutory requirement of no greater than +/- 10% variation from average population per Governing Body member.
- There is a statutory requirement that wards reflect communities of interest.
- Concerns that very large wards may mean that:
 - elected members become too remote from their local communities
 - the cost of campaigning over such a large area can become prohibitive.

19. In the context of trying to ensure better regional decision-making, the LGC focused its decisions on ensuring there was a reasonably strong nexus between the ward councillors and the communities of that ward. In other words their decisions actually imply an expectation that governing body members will and should act on behalf of their wards. This reinforces the sometimes confusing expectations for governing body members in terms of their role with respect to their wards.

Alternatives to changing the ward structure

20. An alternative to addressing alignment of governing body members and local board roles by changing the ward structure is to recognise that although governing body members and local board members are accountable to the same electorates, they are accountable for different things.

21. Protocols that define the difference between governing body and local board roles in regard to the same electorate could be established (as noted elsewhere in the GFR report). They could be based on sections 15 and 16 of LGACA that set out what the governing body and local boards are democratically accountable for:

- The governing body is responsible and democratically accountable for the decision-making of the Auckland Council in relation to:
 - regulatory decisions
 - transport networks and infrastructure

- non-regulatory allocated activities
 - capacity to provide services
 - governance of CCOs
 - financial management
 - agreements with local boards
- Each local board is responsible and democratically accountable for:
 - the decision-making of the Auckland Council in relation to non-regulatory allocated activities
 - identifying and communicating the interests and preferences of the people in its local board area in relation to the content of the strategies, policies, plans, and bylaws of the Auckland Council
 - identifying and developing bylaws specifically for its local board area, and proposing them to the governing body
 - agreements with the governing body

22. The respective roles of the governing body and local boards are described in various places and in various forms by Auckland Council (such as in the Governance Manual and the Code of Conduct), but these could be adapted to cover issues such as respective roles of local board members and governing body members in dealing with local constituent queries, if the political working party wishes to pursue this.

23. In addition to all the options identified above the GFR report canvassed two further options: a mixed member model in which governing body members are also members of local boards, and a party based proportional representation model. Both of these models would require legislative (and political) change, would cause significant disruption and are therefore not being considered in more detail at this stage. Should the political working party want to pursue these issues, it is recommended that it direct officers to do so, noting the legislative and political constraints.

Feedback from governing body members

24. A workshop was held with governing body members on 30 May 2017 to discuss ward-based and at-large elections. Of the seventeen members present, most were not supportive of changing the current ward-based electoral system. There was general consensus at the meeting that governing members supported the retention of the current electoral arrangements, being twenty members elected from 13 wards by the First Past the Post voting system. The most prevalent reason given was that six years after amalgamation was too soon to make further change.

25. Other reasons given were that:

- the problem of role confusion between local boards and ward councillors was not of sufficient magnitude to warrant this level of change
- that the issues were largely about relationships and communication and could be resolved through other means

- that it was possible to be elected on a local basis and still act in the regional interest, using local members of parliament as an example

26. There were a number of concerns about a fully at large model including:

- candidates and those elected would lack diversity due to the costs of campaigning and the voter turnout in different parts of the region
- it would risk creating a very hierarchical governance model with too much distance between the governing body and local boards
- it would lean more towards candidates aligning themselves along party lines
- it was noted that costs of campaigning are likely to diminish with new technology

27. It was also noted that governing body members are contacted by constituents to deal with a range of issues, some local and some regional. It is reasonable for governing body members to receive these issues and work on them. Involving and informing the local board is a relationship management issue and sometimes works well and sometimes not well.

Māori ward

28. There is the ability for Auckland Council to create a Māori ward. Based on the most recent population figures supplied, Auckland Council would be eligible for one member to be elected by Māori ward. Because the total number of governing body members is fixed at 20, this would mean a reduction to 19 general ward councillors. Detailed work has not been done on this option, but clearly this would affect current ward boundaries and representation issues identified in this paper and the GFR report.

29. If the council wishes to create a Māori ward it may pass a resolution to do so by 23 November 2017. That would be subject to a petition of five per cent of electors demanding a poll. The cost of a poll would be in the order of \$1 million. Alternatively the council itself may conduct a poll, for example in conjunction with the next elections.

30. There is a private members bill before Parliament that would make it possible to deal with Māori wards in the same way as other wards.

Voting systems

31. Currently Auckland Council is elected using a first past the post (FPP) voting system. The voting system is relevant to discussions about representation, with FPP and Single Transferable Vote (STV) having different strengths and weaknesses when employed in ward-based or at-large elections.

32. Any resolution to change the voting system needs to be made by 12 September 2017 by the governing body.

First Past the Post

33. FPP is a winner takes all or plurality voting system. It has the benefit of being easy to understand, quicker to count votes, and allows voters to clearly specify their preference for their representative. It is well suited to single-member constituencies / wards, and can also be used effectively in multi-member wards where electors have the same number of votes as the number of vacancies.
34. FPP has historically been criticised for not being a representative voting system, with representation of women and minorities suffering. Representatives can also be elected with small amounts of public support as the winning margin is a simple plurality.

Single Transferable Vote

35. STV is a system of proportional representation that uses preferential voting. It is usually used in multi-member constituencies and works better in larger wards. Candidates do not require a majority of votes to be elected, but rather a known quota – determined by dividing the number of valid votes cast by the number of positions to be filled, plus one.
36. STV is useful if a community is considered to be made up of different groups and proponents argue that it generally leads to more representative and inclusive electoral outcomes that are more reflective of the electorate's views than FPP. This is particularly true in parliamentary elections where different electors belong to different political parties and voters only vote for candidates in their own party.
37. An issue with STV is understanding how votes are counted. After the first iteration, surplus votes are re-distributed in terms of second and other preferences in line with a mathematical formula which ensures fairness, but requires votes to be counted by computer. Election results may be delayed because counting cannot happen until all votes are collected, and in large electorates it may lead to large and potentially confusing ballot papers.
38. We do not have data on the extent to which, in a local government election, people in different groups (ethnic, age, gender, political party) vote for their own kind.
39. Appendix C provides a simple example of how FPP and STV might affect different election outcomes. It is important to note that there is no compelling evidence about whether FPP or STV results in better turnout in New Zealand local elections.
40. In the examples of other jurisdictions provided in Appendix B, most use single-member districts for election purposes though there are some that use the at-large system such as Vancouver and Dunedin.

Summary

41. This paper describes different options for how governing body members are elected and some associated issues. It focuses on approaches that will improve the alignment

of the responsibilities and accountabilities of governing body members and that will support a sharper delineation between the regional role of governing body members and the local role of local boards.


42. Broadly speaking, it finds that increasing the size of wards would support better alignment, and also help clarify roles. However, as wards get larger in size, there are risks that the hurdles for potential candidates become higher, and an elected body that reflects the diversity of the community becomes more unlikely.
43. On balance, a full at-large system for electing governing body members is not supported. However, each of the other options could potentially strike a balance between representation, role clarity and alignment of incentives and accountabilities, if there is desire to amend representation arrangements.
44. It is recommended that the political working party provide direction on whether council should:
 - retain the current model of ward based representation and first past the post voting
 - further consider a move to a mixed ward-based and elected-at large representational system for governing body members (which will feed into the 2018 representation review for decision-making by the governing body)
 - establish protocols on the respective roles of local board members and governing body members.

APPENDIX A

Status quo

20 councillors, elected by 13 wards

Map ID	Ward	2016 Pop Est	Number of councillors	Pop per councillor	Difference from regional average	% Difference from average
1	Rodney	62,200	1	62,200	-18,520	-23%
2	Albany	164,400	2	82,200	1,480	2%
3	North Shore	153,200	2	76,600	-4,120	-5%
4	Waitakere	173,300	2	86,650	5,930	7%
7	Waitemata and Gulf	111,900	1	111,900	31,180	39%
5	Whau	82,900	1	82,900	2,180	3%
6	Albert-Eden-Roskill	168,000	2	84,000	3,280	4%
8	Orakei	89,200	1	89,200	8,480	11%
9	Maungakiekie-Tamaki	78,300	1	78,300	-2,420	-3%
10	Howick	146,500	2	73,250	-7,470	-9%
11	Manukau	166,100	2	83,050	2,330	3%
12	Manurewa-Papakura	145,600	2	72,800	-7,920	-10%
13	Franklin	72,800	1	72,800	-7,920	-10%
Total	Auckland	1,614,400	20	80,720	0	0%




Notes:

Rodney and Waitemata & Gulf fall well outside the +/-10% requirement

Larger wards – 10 wards

10 wards from aggregations of existing wards, 20 councillors elected by 10 wards


Map ID	Ward	2016 Pop Est	Number of Councillors	Pop per councillor	Difference from regional average	% Difference from average
1	Rodney	62,200	1	62,200	-18520	-23%
2	Albany	164,400	2	82,200	1480	2%
3	North Shore	153,200	2	76,600	-4120	-5%
4	Waitakere	173,300	2	86,650	5930	7%
6	Waitemata and Gulf PLUS Orakei	201,100	2	100,550	19830	25%
5	Whau PLUS Albert-Eden-Roskill	250,900	3	83,633	2913	4%
7	Maungakiekie-Tamaki PLUS Howick	224,800	3	74,933	-5787	-7%
8	Manukau	166,100	2	83,050	2330	3%
9	Manurewa-Papakura	145,600	2	72,800	-7920	-10%
10	Franklin	72,800	1	72,800	-7920	-10%
	Auckland	1,614,400	20	80,720	0	0%



Larger wards – 6 wards

6 wards from aggregations of existing wards, 20 councillors elected by 6 wards


Map ID	Ward	2016 Pop Est	Number of Councillors	Pop per councillor	Difference from regional average	% Difference from average
1	Rodney	62,200	1	62,200	-18,520	-23%
2	Albany PLUS North Shore	317,600	4	79,400	-1,320	-2%
3	Waitakere PLUS Whau	256,200	3	85,400	4,680	6%
4	Waitemata and Gulf PLUS Albert-Eden-Roskill PLUS Orakei PLUS Maungakiekie-Tamaki	447,400	5	89,480	8,760	11%
5	Howick PLUS Manukau PLUS Manurewa-Papakura	458,200	6	76,367	-4,353	-5%
6	Franklin	72,800	1	72,800	-7,920	-10%
	Auckland	1,614,400	20	80,720	-	0%



10 at-large + 10 wards

10 wards from aggregations of existing, 10 councillors elected by 10 wards

Map ID	Ward	2016 Pop Est	Number of Councillors	Pop per councillor	Difference from regional average	% Difference from average
1	Rodney	62,200	1	62,200	-99,240	-61%
2	Albany	164,400	1	164,400	2,960	2%
3	North Shore	153,200	1	153,200	-8,240	-5%
4	Waitakere	173,300	1	173,300	11,860	7%
6	Waitemata and Gulf PLUS Orakei	201,100	1	201,100	39,660	25%
5	Whau PLUS Albert-Eden-Roskill	250,900	1	250,900	89,460	55%
7	Maungakiekie-Tamaki PLUS Howick	224,800	1	224,800	63,360	39%
8	Manukau	166,100	1	166,100	4,660	3%
9	Manurewa-Papakura	145,600	1	145,600	-15,840	-10%
10	Franklin	72,800	1	72,800	-88,640	-55%
Total	Auckland	1,614,400	10	161,440	0	0%




Note:

Rodney and Franklin not sustainable because variance too high

10 at-large + 6 wards

6 wards from aggregations of existing, 10 councillors elected by 6 wards

Map ID	Ward	2016 Pop Est	Number of Councillors	Pop per councillor	Difference from regional average	% Difference from average
1	Rodney	62,200	1	62,200	-99,240	-61%
2	Albany PLUS North Shore	317,600	2	158,800	-2,640	-2%
3	Waitakere PLUS Whau	256,200	2	128,100	-33,340	-21%
4	Waitemata and Gulf PLUS Albert-Eden-Roskill PLUS Orakei PLUS Maungakiekie-Tamaki	447,400	2	223,700	62,260	39%
5	Howick PLUS Manukau PLUS Manurewa-Papakura	458,200	2	229,100	67,660	42%
6	Franklin	72,800	1	72,800	-88,640	-55%
Total	Auckland	1,614,400	10	161,440	-	0%



Note:

This is conceptual and a number of population variances would require the model to be tweaked

APPENDIX B

International comparison of ward and at-large

Canada

City	Population	At-large / wards
Toronto ⁱ	2.8 million	1 mayor 44 single-member ward councillors
Montreal ⁱⁱ	1.7 million	1 mayor 18 borough mayors 46 city councillors
Calgary ⁱⁱⁱ	1.2 million	1 mayor 14 single-member ward councillors
Ottawa ^{iv}	934,243	1 mayor 23 single-member ward councillors
Edmonton ^v	932,546	1 mayor 12 single-member ward councillors
Vancouver ^{vi}	603,502	1 mayor 10 at-large councillors

United Kingdom

Greater London Assembly ^{vii}	8 million	1 executive mayor 11 at-large members 14 single-member constituency Assembly Members
Birmingham ^{viii}	1.1 million	118 multi-member ward councillors (1 acting as Lord Mayor) Each parliamentary constituency is divided into 4 wards, which each elect 3 councillors.
Leeds ^{ix}	751,500	99 multi-member ward councillors (1 acting as Lord Mayor) Each of 33 wards elects 3 councillors
Glasgow ^x	606,300	79 multi-member ward members Each of 21 wards elects 3 or 4 councillors

New Zealand

Auckland Council	1.4 million ^{xi}	1 mayor 20 ward members from 13 wards (21 local boards)
Wellington City Council ^{xii}	190,959	1 mayor 14 members from 5 wards
Christchurch City Council	341,469	1 mayor 16 single-member ward councillors
Dunedin City Council	120,249	1 mayor 14 at-large councillors

United States

New York City Council ^{xiii}	8.5 million	1 executive mayor 51 single- member district Council Members ^{xiv}
Los Angeles City Council ^{xv}	3.9 million	1 executive mayor 15 single- member district Council Members
Chicago ^{xvi}	2.7 million	1 executive mayor 50 single- member district aldermen
Houston ^{xvii}	2.3 million	1 executive mayor 11 single- member district Council Members 5 at-large councillors
Philadelphia ^{xviii}	1.6 million	1 executive mayor 10 single- member district Council Members 7 at-large Council Members
Phoenix ^{xix}	1.6 million	1 mayor 8 single- member district Council Members
San Antonio ^{xx}	1.5 million	1 mayor 10 single- member district Council Members
San Diego ^{xxi}	1.4 million	1 executive mayor 9 single-member district Council Members
Dallas ^{xxii}	1.3 million	1 mayor 14 single-member district Council Members

San Jose ^{xxiii}	1.0 million	1 mayor 10 single-member district Council Members
Austin ^{xxiv}	931,830	1 mayor 10 single-member district Council Members
Jacksonville ^{xxv}	868,031	1 executive mayor 14 single- member district Council Members 5 at-large Council Members
San Francisco ^{xxvi}	864,816	1 executive mayor 11 single-member districts for Board of Supervisors

Comment about San Francisco:

How the Board of Supervisors should be elected has been a matter of contention in recent San Francisco history. Throughout the United States, almost all cities and counties with populations in excess of 200,000 divide the jurisdiction into electoral districts (in cities, often called "wards") to achieve a geographical spread of members from across the whole community and to evenly distribute the community interaction workload among the members of the governing body (city council, county board of supervisors, etc.).^[6] But San Francisco, notwithstanding a population of over 700,000, was often an exception.

Prior to 1977 and again from 1980 through 2000, the Board of Supervisors was chosen in 'at-large' elections, with all candidates appearing together on the ballot. The person who received the most votes was elected President of the Board of Supervisors, and the next four or five (depending on how many seats were up for election) were elected to seats on the board. District elections were enacted by Proposition T in November 1976.^[6] The first district-based elections in 1977 resulted in a radical change to the composition of the Board, including the election of [Harvey Milk](#), only the third openly gay or lesbian individual (and the first gay man) elected to public office in the United States. Following the assassinations of Supervisor Milk and Mayor [George Moscone](#) a year later by former Supervisor [Dan White](#), district elections were deemed divisive and San Francisco returned to at-large elections until the current system was implemented in 2000. District elections were repealed by Proposition A in August 1980 by a vote of 50.58% Yes to 49.42% No.^[7] An attempt was made to reinstate district elections in November 1980 with Proposition N but it failed by a vote of 48.42% Yes to 51.58% No.^[8] District elections were reinstated by Proposition G in November 1996 with a November runoff.^[9] Runoffs were eliminated and replaced with [instant-runoff voting](#) with Proposition A in March 2002.^[10]

ⁱ <http://www1.toronto.ca>

ⁱⁱ <http://ville.montreal.qc.ca>

ⁱⁱⁱ <http://www.calgary.ca/CityCouncil/Pages/Councillors-and-Wards.aspx>

^{iv} <http://ottawa.ca/en/city-hall/mayor-and-city-councillors>

^v https://www.edmonton.ca/city_government/mayor-city-councillors.aspx

^{vi} <http://vancouver.ca/your-government/city-councillors.aspx>

^{vii} <https://www.london.gov.uk/>

^{viii} https://www.birmingham.gov.uk/downloads/file/775/volume_a_the_constitution

^{ix} <http://www.leeds.gov.uk/council/Pages/Democracy.aspx>

^x www.glasgow.gov.uk

^{xi} All NZ population stats taken from 2013 census: <http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census/profile-and-summary-reports/quickstats-about-a-place.aspx>

^{xii} <http://wellington.govt.nz/>

^{xiii} <http://council.nyc.gov/>

xiv In some councils, council members are referred to individually as councilman and councilwoman and in others just as councilmember

xv <https://www.lacity.org/your-government>

xvi <https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/about/council.html>

xvii <http://www.houstontx.gov/council/>

xviii <http://phlcouncil.com/council-members/>

xix <https://www.phoenix.gov/mayorcouncil>

xx <http://www.sanantonio.gov/Council>

xxi <https://www.sandiego.gov/citycouncil>

xxii <http://dallascityhall.com/government/Pages/default.aspx>

xxiii <http://www.sanjoseca.gov/index.aspx?NID=146>

xxiv <http://www.austintexas.gov/government>

xxv <http://www.coj.net/city-council.aspx>

xxvi <http://sfbos.org/> , https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/San_Francisco_Board_of_Supervisors

APPENDIX C

Example of the effect of FPP and STV on voting groups

A voting population of 1,000 voters is used in both examples below. The population is made up of 600 voters belonging to group A and 400 voters belonging to group B.

FPP example

- 10 positions to fill by FPP election
- 1000 voters
- 600 belong to group A which puts up 10 candidates
- 400 belong to group B which puts up 10 candidates
- Each of group A's candidates will receive 600 votes and each of group B's candidates will receive 400 votes. No group B candidate will get elected.

STV example

- 10 positions to fill by STV election
- 1000 voters
- 600 belong to group A which puts up 10 candidates
- 400 belong to group B which puts up 10 candidates
- Each voter has only one vote, but, following a counting of votes (an iteration) a proportion of it can be transferred to second or third preferences if all of it is not needed to elect a candidate.
- Because each voter has only one vote, the total votes are 1000 and, for 10 positions, a candidate only needs to get $1000/11$ (91) votes to be successful. (This is called the 'quota').
- It now becomes possible for group B candidates to be elected since there are 400 group B electors. In fact, the likely end result will be that 6 successful candidates will represent group A and 4 will represent group B – in proportion to the makeup of the voting population.