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Civil Defence and
Emergency Management Committee
06 June 2023
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Appointment of Group Controllers and
Group Recovery Managers
File No.: CP2023/06954
Te take mō te
pūrongo
Purpose of the report
1. To
appoint suitably qualified and experienced personnel to the positions of Group
Controller and Group Recovery Manager, under the Civil Defence Emergency Management
Act 2002.
2. To
approve the updated list confirming the appointment of Group Controllers and
Group Recovery Managers, for publication on the Auckland Emergency Management
website (as Appendix 1 to the Auckland CDEM Group Plan).
Whakarāpopototanga matua
Executive summary
3. The
Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEM Act) requires CDEM
Groups to appoint “suitably qualified and experienced” personnel to
the positions of Group Controller and Group Recovery Manager. The CDEM
Act also requires the CDEM Group to appoint “suitably qualified and
experienced” personnel who can perform the functions and duties and
exercise powers in the absence or vacancy in office of the Group Controller and
Group Recovery Manager.
4. Given
the changes in personnel since the 14 Jun 2022, this report recommends the
appointment of personnel to the positions of Group Controller and Group
Recovery Manager (and the appointment of personnel who can perform the
functions and duties and exercise powers in the absence or vacancy in office of
the Group Controller and Group Recovery Manager).
5. An
updated list of Group Controllers and Group Recovery Managers will be published
on the Auckland Emergency Management website, as Appendix 1 to the Auckland
CDEM Group Plan. The Auckland CDEM Group Committee previously approved a
list of various individuals to these positions in June 2022. An updated list of
positions and appointees for publication is attached to this report.
Ngā tūtohunga
Recommendation/s
That the Civil Defence and
Emergency Management Committee:
a) kopou / appoint Adam Maggs as the Group Controller for the Auckland
Civil Defence and Emergency Management Region under section 26(1) of the CDEM
Act
b) kopou / appoint the following persons (and confirm existing
appointments) under section 26(2) of the CDEM Act to be the persons who may
perform the functions and duties and exercise the powers of the Group
Controller if there is a vacancy in the office or an absence from duty of the
Group Controller:
i) Anna
Bray;
ii) Andrew
Clark;
iii) Fleur
Aldridge;
iv) Jennifer
Rose;
v) Parul
Sood;
vi) Rachel
Kelleher
c) whakaū
/ confirm the appointment of Mat Tucker as the Group Recovery Manager for the
Auckland Civil Defence and Emergency Management Region under
section 29(1) of the CDEM Act
d) kopou / appoint the following persons (and confirm existing
appointments) under section 29(2) of the CDEM Act to be the persons who may
perform the functions and duties and exercise the powers of the Group Recovery
Manager if there is a vacancy in the office or an absence from duty of the
Group Recovery Manager:
i) Phil Wilson;
ii) Mace
Ward;
iii) Jennifer Rose;
iv) John Cranfield;
v) Wayne Brown (AEM)
e) tautapa / delegate authority to the Mayor to replace the Group
Recovery Manager during a transition period with one of the persons appointed
under section 29(2) of the CDEM Act listed in resolution (d) above
f) whakaae / approve the list in the attachment to this report for
publication on the Auckland Emergency Management website.
Horopaki
Context
Requirements under the Civil
Defence Emergency Management Act 2002
6. Under
Section 26(1) of the CDEM Act, each CDEM Group must appoint, “either
by name or by reference to the holder of an office, a suitably qualified and
experienced person” to the position of Group Controller for its area.
7. Under
section 26(2) a CDEM Group must also appoint, either by name or by reference to
the holder of an office, at least 1 suitably qualified and experienced person
to perform the functions and duties and exercise the powers of the Group
Controller if there is a vacancy in the office of Group Controller or in the
absence from duty of the Group Controller for any reason, for the duration of
the vacancy or absence.
8. Under
section 29(1) of the CDEM Act, each CDEM Group must also appoint either by name
or by reference to the holder of an office, a suitably qualified and
experienced person to the position of Group Recovery Manager.
9. Under
section 29(2) a CDEM Group must also appoint at least 1 suitably qualified and
experienced person” to perform the functions and duties and exercise the
powers of the Group Recovery Manager if there is a vacancy in the office of the
Group Recovery Manager or in the absence from duty of the Group Recovery
Manager for any reason, for the duration of the vacancy or absence.
Reason for updating appointments
10. Changes in personnel, and the increase in the ability of key
personnel to fulfil the requirements of the CDEM Group’s statutory
appointments, mean that new appointments need to be made and Appendix 1 on the
Auckland Emergency Management website needs to be updated.
Tātaritanga me ngā
tohutohu
Analysis and advice
Appointment of Group
Controller under s26(1)
11. The
appointment of a Group Controller is a statutory requirement under section
26(1) of the Act.
12. Mace Ward,
who was appointed Group Controller by the CDEM Group Committee on 16 November
2021 has been appointed to the role of Deputy Recovery Manager for the Auckland
Anniversary Flooding and Cyclone Gabriel events. In these circumstances, to
ensure effective civil defence emergency management for the Auckland area, it
is considered appropriate to appoint a new Group Controller.
13. Adam Maggs is
the Head of Capability and Public Awareness within the Auckland Emergency
Department, has previously acted as the Group Controller in the absence of the
Group Controller and has completed training in emergency management. The Chief
Executive Auckland Council (inclusive of his position as Chair, Coordinating
Executive Group) therefore considers that Adam Maggs is a suitably qualified
and experienced person to be appointed as Group Controller for the Auckland
CDEM Group Area and recommends his appointment by the Committee.
Appointment of Alternative
Group Controllers under s26(2)
14. The
appointment of at least 1 suitably qualified and experienced person to perform
the functions and duties of the Group Controller on the occurrence of a vacancy
or absence from duty is a statutory requirement under section 26(2) of the Act.
The Auckland CDEM Group refers to persons appointed under section 26(2) as
“Alternative Group Controllers”.
15. To facilitate
efficient and effective civil defence emergency management in Auckland, Group
Controllers for the Auckland CDEM Group area operate on a roster system.
The Alternative Group Controllers perform the functions and duties of the Group
Controller during any period that they are rostered on to act as Group
Controller (ie in the absence of the Group Controller appointed under section
26(1)).
16.
The following persons have completed relevant training in emergency management
for the role and hold leadership positions within council:
Anna
Bray;
Andrew
Clark;
Fleur
Aldridge;
Jennifer
Rose;
Parul
Sood;
Rachel
Kelleher.
17. The Chief
Executive Auckland Council (inclusive of his position as Chair, Coordinating
Executive Group) therefore considers that those listed above in paragraph 5 are
suitably qualified and experienced persons to perform the functions and duties
and exercise the powers of the Group Controller if there is a vacancy in that
office or if the Group Controller is absent from duty for any reason, for the
duration of the vacancy or absence. The Chief Executive therefore recommends
their appointment by the Committee under section 26(2).
Appointment of Group
Recovery Manager
18. The
appointment of a Group Recovery Manager (Auckland Anniversary Flooding and
Cyclone Gabriel Recovery) is required to ensure Auckland Emergency Management
meets its obligations under Section 29 of the Act.
19. On 4 April
2023, Governing Body approved the appointment of Mat Tucker as Group Recovery
Manager for the January Floods and Cyclone Gabrielle (GB/2023/54).
20. It has been
determined by the Chief Executive Auckland Council (inclusive of their position
as Chair, Coordinating Executive Group) that Mat Tucker, is a suitably
qualified and experienced person to be appointed as the Group Recovery Manager
under s29(1) of the CDEM Act. The Chief Executive recommends that the Committee
confirm the appointment of Mat Tucker under s29(1) of the CDEM Act as Group
Recovery Manager.
Appointment of Alternative Recovery
Managers
21. The
appointment of at least 1 suitably qualified and experienced person to perform
the functions and duties of the Recovery Manager on the occurrence of a vacancy
in that office or absence from duty is a statutory requirement under section
29(2) of the Act.
22. The
CDEM Group appoints (and maintains a list of) suitably qualified personnel that
can perform the functions, duties and powers of the Recovery Manager on the
occurrence of a vacancy in the office or absence from duty. The Auckland
CDEM Group refers to these persons appointed under s29(2) as ‘Alternative
Recovery Managers’.
23. The
following persons have completed relevant training in
emergency management and/or have appropriate leadership and operational
experience to fulfil the duties of the Group Recovery Manager role:
Phil Wilson;
Mace
Ward;
Jennifer Rose;
John Cranfield;
Wayne Brown (AEM).
24. The Chief
Executive Auckland Council (inclusive of his position as Chair, Coordinating
Executive Group) therefore considers that those listed above in paragraph 13
are suitably qualified and experienced persons to perform the functions and
duties and exercise the powers of the Recovery Manager if there is a vacancy in
that office of if the Group Controller is absent from duty for any reason, for
the duration of the vacancy or absence. The Chief Executive therefore
recommends their appointment by the Committee under section 29(2).
Updating appointments as Appendix 1
25. The
attachment to this report shows the updated list of personnel appointed by the
CDEM Group as Group Controller (and Alternative Group Controllers), and Group
Recovery Manager (and Alternative Group Recovery Managers).
26. This
list (the attachment) is now ready for publication on the Auckland Emergency
Management website as an amendment of Appendix 1 to the Group Plan.
Delegation of authority to replace Group Recovery Manager during
transition period
27. Under
section 25(1)(b), the CDEM Group has authorised a list of persons authorised to
give notice of a transition period for the Auckland area. The hierarchy
of persons authorised to issue the notice of transition is:
Mayor
Chair
of Auckland CDEM Group Committee
Other councilors who are members of the Auckland CDEM Group
Committee
28. Under
s29(4) of the CDEM Act, the CDEM Group can delegate the authority to replace the
Group Recovery Manager during a transition period with a person appointed under
s29(2) to 1 or more of the representatives authorised under s25(1)(b) (set out
at paragraph 17 above).
29. It
is recommended that the CDEM Group delegate the authority to replace the Group
Recovery Manager during a transition period with one of the people listed at
paragraph 13 above. This would mean that a Group Recovery Manager could
be confirmed at the same time as a notice of transition period is given, which would
enable efficient and effective civil defence emergency management. This is
recommended because Mat Tucker’s appointment has been focused on the
recovery from the severe weather evets earlier this year and Cyclone Gabrielle.
If there was to be an unrelated emergency, the delegation would provide
flexibility to appoint one of the alternatives listed in paragraph 13 as the
Group Recovery Manager.
30. Delegation
of authority under section 29(4) does not prevent the CDEM Group from
exercising its power under section 29(3) to remove from office or replace a
Group Recovery Manager appointed under sections 29(1) or (2) at any time.
Tauākī whakaaweawe
āhuarangi
Climate impact statement
31. The
latest report from the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) declares
the scientific evidence is unequivocal: climate change is a grave and mounting
threat to human wellbeing and the health of our planet. People’s health,
lives and livelihoods, as well as property and critical infrastructure,
including energy and transportation systems, are being adversely affected by
hazards from heat waves, storms, drought, and flooding, as well as slow-onset
changes including sea level rise.
32. The
report states that the world faces unavoidable multiple climate hazards over
the next two decades with global warming of 1.5 degrees celsius. Even
temporarily exceeding this warming level will result in additional severe
impacts, some of which will be irreversible. Risks for society will increase,
including to infrastructure and low-lying coastal settlements.
33. Cities
are described as hotspots of impacts and risks, but also a crucial part of the
solution. The Chair of the IPCC said that our actions today will shape how
people adapt and nature responds to increasing climate risk.
34. The
occurrence of extreme weather events, for example can require Auckland
Emergency Management being activated to coordinate an emergency management
response and recovery under the direction of a Group Controller or Group
Recovery Manager, respectively. Maintaining a cadre of suitably qualified Group
Controllers and Group Recovery Managers is an essential part of
Auckland’s preparedness for emergencies.
Ngā whakaaweawe me
ngā tirohanga a te rōpū Kaunihera
Council group impacts and views
35. The position
of Group Controller and Group Recovery Manager are statutory roles under the
Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002. There are no impacts for the
Council group arising from the appointment of individuals to perform the role
of Group Controller or Group Recovery Manager.
Ngā whakaaweawe
ā-rohe me ngā tirohanga a te poari ā-rohe
Local impacts and local board views
36. The position
of Group Controller and Group Recovery Manager are statutory roles under the
CDEM Act. There are no local impacts arising from the appointment of
individuals to perform these roles.
Tauākī whakaaweawe
Māori
Māori impact statement
37. The position of Group Controller and Group Recovery Manager are
statutory roles under the CDEM Act. Those appointed to the Group Controller and
Group Recovery Manager roles, and alternatives, are committed to
honouring Te Tiriti o Waitangi by ensuring the views and knowledge of Iwi and Māori
are considered and incorporated in response or recovery mahi.
Ngā ritenga
ā-pūtea
Financial implications
38. There are no financial implications arising from this report.
Ngā raru tūpono me
ngā whakamaurutanga
Risks and mitigations
39. The Auckland Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group is
required to appoint suitably qualified and experienced personnel to perform the
functions and duties and exercise the powers of the Group Controller and the
Group Recovery Manager.
40. Approving the appointment of the Group Controller and Group Recovery
Manager, and approving the publication of the update to Appendix 1 on the
Auckland Emergency Management website, ensures that Auckland Civil Defence and
Emergency Management Group has met its obligations under the Act.
Ngā koringa ā-muri
Next steps
41. Appendix 1 to
be published to the Auckland Emergency Management website.
Ngā tāpirihanga
Attachments
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No.
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Title
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Page
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a⇩
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Appendix 1: Group Controller, Group Recovery Manager,
and alternatives
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17
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Ngā kaihaina
Signatories
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Author
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Adam Maggs - Head of Competency and Public Readiness
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Authoriser
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Paul Amaral - General Manager Auckland Emergency
Management
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Civil Defence
and Emergency Management Committee
06 June 2023
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Overview and Options Analysis of Operational
Issues with the Tsunami Alerting Network
File No.: CP2023/06963
Te take mō te
pūrongo
Purpose of the report
1. To
consider a recommendation to decommission part of the Auckland tsunami siren
network.
Whakarāpopototanga matua
Executive summary
2. Auckland
Emergency Management currently manage 44 tsunami siren sites across 2 different
networks. 42 of the 44 sirens were installed prior to amalgamation of the
Unitary Council and use proprietary technology that is nearing the end of its
design life. The other 2 sirens are installed in Orewa in 2022 as part of a
technology pilot and are not part of this decision.
3. A
Public Alerting Strategy will be developed (due Q4 2024) as part of the Tsunami
Work Programme, which will assess the best options for alerting and reducing
tsunami risk in the region’s coastal communities. Following this, the
sirens that are part of this decision are likely to be decommissioned or
replaced with more modern technology. Additionally, preliminary results of the
new tsunami inundation modelling and evacuation maps indicate the area required
to evacuate in a tsunami emergency is greatly reduced across the region,
including in areas that currently have the older tsunami sirens.
4. Ongoing
theft and vandalism has impacted approximately 41% of the older siren network.
This, coupled with aging technology means that the network is not performing at
the level intended and may be providing a false sense of security to their
communities. To replace the proprietary technology would require a bulk order
of hardware from an overseas supplier. Additionally, the contractor who owns
the technology and has maintained the older network has signalled their
intention to scale back maintenance support from 2023.
5. This
has prompted a decision on what to do with the older network ahead of the
outcomes of the Public Alerting Strategy. An options analysis has been
undertaken, outlining 4 options to either replace, consolidate, decommission
the network, or do nothing.
6. The
Coordinating Executive Group met on May 22 and considered the 4 options.
Following a discussion, they recommended “Option C: Decommission the
Network”, accompanied by a robust communications plan to minimise
community anxiety or confusion and to increase community awareness of the range
of alternative alerting methods.
Ngā tūtohunga
Recommendation/s
That the Civil Defence and
Emergency Management Committee:
a) whakaae
/ approve the decommissioning of the Meerkat Alerting Systems tsunami siren
network ahead of the outcome of the Public Alerting Strategy, following
appropriate communications with impacted communities.
Horopaki
Context
Background to tsunami siren
locations in Auckland
7. Auckland
Emergency Management currently manage 44 tsunami siren locations across the
region. Each siren comprises a control box with multiple components including
batteries and 2-6 siren horns. The siren locations are in the Rodney,
Waitākere and Albany Wards (refer Attachment A).
8. 42
of the 44 siren locations were installed prior to amalgamation by the former
Waitākere City Council and Rodney District Council approximately 13 years
ago. These sirens were installed and maintained using proprietary technology by
Meerkat Alerting Systems (hereafter referred to as “Meerkat”). The
remaining two siren locations were installed in Orewa in 2021. They use
American Signal Corporation technology and are maintained by Barton Sound
Systems.
9. The
former North Shore City Council, Auckland City Council, Manukau City Council,
Papakura District Council and Franklin District Council did not install tsunami
sirens, meaning many coastal communities across Auckland including the isthmus,
south Auckland, east Auckland and the Hauraki Gulf Islands do not have tsunami
sirens as an additional level of alerting support.
10. Auckland
Emergency Management is in the early stages of delivering the Tsunami Work
Programme, which aims to better understand the region’s tsunami risk and
help communities make decisions to better protect themselves in tsunami
emergencies. Key aspects of the work programme include:
a) Updated
tsunami inundation modelling and revised evacuation
maps for the region.
b) A
Tsunami Public Alerting Strategy for the region.
11. The results
of the updated tsunami inundation modelling are currently being developed into
a new set of evacuation maps for the region. Draft maps indicating the size of
the areas that will need to evacuate during a land-threat tsunami emergency
have reduced across much of Auckland. This includes many of the areas that are
covered by the tsunami sirens, particularly in the west coast beach areas,
meaning the risk profile of these communities will change significantly,
generally reducing the tsunami risk.
12. The
completion of a Public Alerting Strategy for Auckland will outline what the
various alerting options are and what is the recommended approach across the
Auckland region. The Strategy will guide any future investment into the use
sirens as an alerting option. The estimated time for completion of the strategy
is quarter 4 of FY2023/24 (June 2024).
13. As outlined
by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in the National Tsunami
Stocktake 2022, the use of tsunami sirens is inconsistent across the country.
Some regions have councils and communities who actively maintain their siren
networks and others are working to de-commission their siren networks entirely.
Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups who do use sirens also
educate their communities to look to other information channels, and most
importantly natural warning signs. Only one group (Northland) use them across
the entire region.
Current operational issues
14. All systems
have been maintained by Auckland Emergency Management via the respective
contractors that installed the sirens, meaning the contractor Meerkat has
provided the maintenance for all but two of the tsunami siren locations.
15. The Meerkat
system has a design life of approximately 15 years from installation, with the
most recent investment including a battery and sound card upgrade in early 2022
to extend the design life and bring them in line with the National Emergency
Management Agency (NEMA) Tsunami Warning Siren Technical Standard [TS03/14],
moving from a tone-based alert to one capable of providing voice instruction.
This was meant to provide a buffer of time to extend the lifespan of the aged
network until the Public Alerting Strategy was completed, which will guide
future investment in sirens.
16. Since
mid-2022, vandalism and theft of the horn apparatus has become an ongoing issue
and has now affected approximately 41% of the tsunami siren network (note
impacts have been limited to the Meerkat hardware).
17. The following
steps have been taken in response to the issues:
a) Reporting
all thefts / vandalism to Police.
b) Communications
with local community stakeholders in affected areas (including Local
Surf-Lifesaving Clubs and Fire and Emergency New Zealand) and broader media
coverage (Our Auckland, radio interviews etc.).
c) The
recent installation of security hardware on sirens not mounted on Vector power
poles.
18. Meerkat have
advised the siren hardware (the horns) have been discontinued by the
manufacturer (based offshore) and can only be purchased at bulk quantities
which are more than the quantity required in Auckland, impacting both cost and
timeframes for the supply of horns. Only one other emergency management group
in New Zealand uses Meerkat and they do not hold spares.
19. The severe
weather experienced in January and February 2023 resulted in prolonged power
cuts in many of the Waitākere ward sites, whereby the solar panels and
battery system in each siren site were not sufficient in keeping the sites
operational. This compounded the impact to the network over a short period of
time.
20. Meerkat, has
recently signalled to Auckland Emergency Management that it will be scaling
down its maintenance services from 2023, meaning an alternative contractor is
required should system maintenance continue.
21. This has
forced a decision on the next steps for the Meerkat tsunami siren network,
ahead of the outcomes of the Public Alerting Strategy.
Tātaritanga me ngā
tohutohu
Analysis and advice
Factors to consider
22. The
replacement of siren apparatus is not straight forward and there are a range of
factors to consider including:
a) Impact
on public safety
b) The
current system’s design life and contractor availability for the
provision of ongoing maintenance
c) Ongoing
theft and vandalism
d) The
availability and financial costs of replacement horn apparatus
e) The
timing of the Tsunami work programme and the development of a Public Alerting
Strategy for Auckland
f) Alternative
public alerting methods
Options Analysis
23. In
late 2022, Auckland Emergency Management commissioned Meerkat to undertake an
options analysis, resulting in a report ‘Auckland Council Tsunami Siren
System Status Report and Follow-on Options’. The report put forward four
options for consideration:
a) Restoration/repair
of the current system.
b) Consolidation of working units and available
equipment to improve coverage.
c) Decommission the system.
d) Do
nothing.
24. Option
A: Restoration/repair of the current system
This option would involve ordering and
importing new horns, noting these are only supplied by an offshore based
manufacturer with a minimum order quantity of one hundred units.
25. Option
B: Consolidation of working units and available equipment to improve coverage
This option would involve consolidating the
network by removing sirens in certain locations with a lower tsunami risk
profile and consolidating these to fewer locations with a higher tsunami risk
profile on larger poles, less prone to vandalism. This option would require
further analysis on the consolidation method.
26. Option
C: Decommission the system
This option involves fully decommissioning
the system and relying on alternative public alerting methods. The
effectiveness of sirens as an alerting tool would be considered as part of the
Public Alerting Strategy for Auckland. Importantly, should sirens comprise part
of any future alerting strategy, they would not be Meerkat technology given the
age of the technology.
27. Option
D: Do nothing
Continue to use the existing Meerkat
system, acknowledging the limitations posed by theft and vandalism. This option
would require Auckland Emergency Management find a suitable alternative
contractor to undertake ongoing maintenance, until the outcomes of the Public
Alerting Strategy and any associated physical works are completed.
28. All
of the options would require an appropriate level of public education and
awareness measures be implemented with impacted communities and key
stakeholders.
Other Considerations
29. An
assessment of the options against the factors outlined above is included in the
Attachment B.
30. On
22 May, 2023, the Coordinating Executive Group (CEG) considered the information
provided and after discussion, recommended Option C be put to the CDEM
Committee subject to the delivery of a robust communications plan to minimise
community anxiety or confusion and to increase community awareness of the range
of alternative alerting methods.
Tauākī whakaaweawe
āhuarangi
Climate impact statement
31. This project
doesn’t have an impact on greenhouse gas emissions and doesn’t
affect any system’s ability to adapt to the impacts of climate change.
The impacts of climate change on sea level rise will continue to be assessed in
terms of tsunami risk at the coast and worked into future planning.
Ngā whakaaweawe me
ngā tirohanga a te rōpū Kaunihera
Council group impacts and views
32. It is
envisaged that the impacts will be on the local communities and not the wider
Council group. However, Auckland Council departments that may be impacted by
the decision (e.g. Customer and Community Services) will be advised of the
decision made by the Committee.
Ngā whakaaweawe
ā-rohe me ngā tirohanga a te poari ā-rohe
Local impacts and local board views
33. Impacted
local boards are aware of the theft and vandalism.
34. To date,
local board views have not been sought regarding the future of the Meerkat
system.
35. Should the
Committee support the recommendation, communications with impacted local boards
will comprise part of the communications plan.
Tauākī whakaaweawe
Māori
Māori impact statement
36. Auckland
Council is committed to meeting its responsibilities under Te Tiriti o Waitangi
and its broader obligations to Māori. These commitments are articulated in
the council’s key strategic planning documents, the Auckland Plan, the
Long-term Plan 2012-2022, the Unitary Plan, Whiria Te Muka Tangata Māori
Responsiveness Framework, Kia Ora Tāmaki Makaurau - Māori Outcomes
Performance Measurement Framework and Local Board Plans.
37. The current
siren locations are not in the vicinity of any marae and would not have
implications beyond those of the general public.
38. AEM is
committed to including Māori views and needs in the development of the
Tsunami Work Programme and the wider department work programme.
Ngā ritenga
ā-pūtea
Financial implications
39. The theft of
the tsunami sirens are not covered by Auckland Council’s insurance as the
asset damage does not exceed the $100,000 minimum claim amount. Each physical
siren station is recognised as an individual asset and the cost of replacement
is to come from the business unit. Refer to Auckland Council self-insurance fund
effective Friday 1st July 2022.
40. Although not
the key consideration, the option endorsed by the CEGis the least costly to
ratepayers of the three ‘change’ options. It would also eliminate
ongoing OPEX and maintenance costs.
Ngā raru tūpono me
ngā whakamaurutanga
Risks and mitigations
41. Sirens
are not the only way the public may be alerted of a tsunami emergency and as
noted earlier in the report, many coastal areas of New Zealand do not utilise
sirens as an alerting platform. Other alerting methods include:
a) Emergency
Mobile Alert: introduced in New Zealand in 2017 and has been used on several
occasions in recent times for alerting the public to other hazard alerts
including the COVID-19 pandemic, fire and severe weather.
b) Radio,
television news broadcasts and social media.
c) Natural
warnings including feeling a strong earthquake that makes it hard to stand up,
or a weak rolling earthquake that lasts a minute or more; a sudden rise or fall
in sea level; hearing loud and unusual noises from the sea. NEMA describe these
as the best and most reliable warning system for local source tsunami in New
Zealand.
42. The
National Emergency Management Agency do not recommend the use of tsunami sirens
for public alerting for local source tsunami (those with less than one hour
before impact). In these circumstance, natural warning signs should be relied
on and used in public education programmes (e.g., If you feel an earthquake
which is LONG or STRONG, GET GONE). But if they are used, suggest they are part
of a multi-hazard alerting network that encourages people to seek more
information from official sources, like the detail provided by Emergency Mobile
Alerts or Auckland Emergency Management and the media.
43. Research into alerting networks has indicated that if official
warnings reach at least two thirds of the population, they can be considered to
have highly effective coverage (Mileti and Sorenson 1990, Mileti and Kuligowski
2008, in the GNS Science Report evaluating the alerting systems of the Bay of
Plenty). NEMA note on their website that “The 2021 Annual Disaster
Preparedness Survey showed nine out of ten people received an alert or had been
with someone who received an alert.” This indicates that the Emergency
Mobile Alert already provides highly effective emergency alerting coverage.
44. Cell
phone coverage is not comprehensive at some of the west coast locations, most
notably at the Te Henga / Bethells and Karekare, with limited coverage
dependent on the network. The potential sources for damaging tsunami to impact
these areas are regional (1-3) hours, or, more likely, distant (3 hours +). The
inundation modelling shows reduced risk at these sites and in any case, each of
these locations have been impacted by theft.
45. Recent tsunami events have also shown the effectiveness of the role
the media play in relaying official tsunami warnings and messages. This
suggests that tsunami sirens would only play a role in providing additional
alerting support to other official channels.
46. Changes to
the current siren network is likely to result in heightened public and
political interest or anxiety. Preliminary results from the Tsunami Work
Programme indicate the inundation (tsunami flood) risk is much reduced at the
locations covered by sirens where telecommunications coverage is less reliable.
Any decision to change the current network configuration will be paired with an
engagement strategy and the release of the revised tsunami evacuation maps to
reduce community anxiety, and reinforce preparedness messaging.
47. During the
development of the Public Alerting Strategy, all tsunami alerting options will
be reassessed, including the use of sirens. Additionally, opportunities to
partner with telecommunications companies, or other more novel alerting or risk
reduction strategies will also be considered.
Ngā koringa ā-muri
Next steps
48. Based on the
decision of the CDEM Committee, an execution timeline and public communication
strategy will be developed. Any changes to the network will not be progressed
until the appropriate communication plan is developed.
Ngā tāpirihanga
Attachments
|
No.
|
Title
|
Page
|
|
a⇩
|
Siren locations
|
27
|
|
b⇩
|
Assessment of Options for Meerkat Tsunami Alerting
System
|
29
|
Ngā kaihaina
Signatories
|
Authors
|
Josie Beswick - Senior Response Advisor
Angela Doherty - Principal Science Advisor
John Cranfield - Head of Response & Recovery
|
|
Authoriser
|
Paul Amaral - General Manager Auckland Emergency
Management
|
