Agenda of Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee

No.	Title	Page
a ⇨	Toa Consulting - Auckland Emergency Management debrief report - August 2023 final

Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee

05 September 2023

Update of Group Controllers and Group Recovery Managers list

File No.: CP2023/11825

Te take mō te pūrongo

Purpose of the report

1. To approve the amendment and update of the list of Group Controllers and Group Recovery Managers to reinstate Mace Ward, as a “suitably qualified and experienced” Group Controller.

Whakarāpopototanga matua

Executive summary

2. The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEM Act) requires CDEM Groups to appoint “suitably qualified and experienced” personnel to the positions of Group Controller and Group Recovery Manager. The CDEM Act also requires the CDEM Group to appoint “suitably qualified and experienced” personnel who can perform the functions and duties and exercise powers in the absence or vacancy in office of the Group Controller and Group Recovery Manager.

3. An updated list of Group Controllers and Group Recovery Managers was published on 06 Jun 2023 on the Auckland Emergency Management website, as Appendix 1 to the Auckland CDEM Group Plan. The Auckland CDEM Group Committee approved this list of various individuals to these positions. It was noted that Mace Ward had been removed from the Group Controller list, in error. An updated list of positions and appointees for publication, with the reinstatement of Mace Ward, is attached to this report.

Ngā tūtohunga

Recommendation/s

That the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee:

a) whakaae /approve the amendment and update of the list of Group Controllers and Group Recovery Managers to reinstate Mace Ward, a “suitably qualified and experienced” Group Controller

b) whakaae / approve the list in the attachment to this report for publication on the Auckland Emergency Management website.

Horopaki

Context

Requirements under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002

4. Under Section 26(1) of the CDEM Act, each CDEM Group must appoint, “either by name or by reference to the holder of an office, a suitably qualified and experienced person” to the position of Group Controller for its area.

5. Under section 26(2) a CDEM Group must also appoint, either by name or by reference to the holder of an office, at least 1 suitably qualified and experienced person to perform the functions and duties and exercise the powers of the Group Controller if there is a vacancy in the office of Group Controller or in the absence from duty of the Group Controller for any reason, for the duration of the vacancy or absence.

6. Under section 29(1) of the CDEM Act, each CDEM Group must also appoint either by name or by reference to the holder of an office, a suitably qualified and experienced person to the position of Group Recovery Manager.

7. Under section 29(2) a CDEM Group must also appoint at least 1 suitably qualified and experienced person” to perform the functions and duties and exercise the powers of the Group Recovery Manager if there is a vacancy in the office of the Group Recovery Manager or in the absence from duty of the Group Recovery Manager for any reason, for the duration of the vacancy or absence.

Reason for updating appointments

8. An updated list of Group Controllers and Group Recovery Managers was published on 06 Jun 2023 on the Auckland Emergency Management website, as Appendix 1 to the Auckland CDEM Group Plan. The Auckland CDEM Group Committee approved this list of various individuals to these positions. It was noted that Mace Ward had been removed from the Group Controller list, in error. An updated list of positions and appointees for publication, with the reinstatement of Mace Ward, is attached to this report.

Tātaritanga me ngā tohutohu

Analysis and advice

Appointment of Group Controller under s26(1)

9. The appointment of a Group Controller is a statutory requirement under section 26(1) of the Act.

Appointment of Alternative Group Controllers under s26(2)

10. The appointment of at least 1 suitably qualified and experienced person to perform the functions and duties of the Group Controller on the occurrence of a vacancy or absence from duty is a statutory requirement under section 26(2) of the Act. The Auckland CDEM Group refers to persons appointed under section 26(2) as “Alternative Group Controllers”.

11. To facilitate efficient and effective civil defence emergency management in Auckland, Group Controllers for the Auckland CDEM Group area operate on a roster system. The Alternative Group Controllers perform the functions and duties of the Group Controller during any period that they are rostered on to act as Group Controller (ie in the absence of the Group Controller appointed under section 26(1)).

12. The following persons have completed relevant training in emergency management for the role and hold leadership positions within council:

Anna Bray;

Andrew Clark;

Fleur Aldridge;

Jennifer Rose;

Parul Sood;

Rachel Kelleher;

Mace Ward.

13. The Chief Executive Auckland Council (inclusive of his position as Chair, Coordinating Executive Group) therefore considers that those listed above in paragraph 5 are suitably qualified and experienced persons to perform the functions and duties and exercise the powers of the Group Controller if there is a vacancy in that office or if the Group Controller is absent from duty for any reason, for the duration of the vacancy or absence. The Chief Executive therefore recommends their appointment by the Committee under section 26(2).

Tauākī whakaaweawe āhuarangi

Climate impact statement

14. The latest report from the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) declares the scientific evidence is unequivocal: climate change is a grave and mounting threat to human wellbeing and the health of our planet. People’s health, lives and livelihoods, as well as property and critical infrastructure, including energy and transportation systems, are being adversely affected by hazards from heat waves, storms, drought, and flooding, as well as slow-onset changes including sea level rise.

15. The report states that the world faces unavoidable multiple climate hazards over the next two decades with global warming of 1.5 degrees celsius. Even temporarily exceeding this warming level will result in additional severe impacts, some of which will be irreversible. Risks for society will increase, including to infrastructure and low-lying coastal settlements.

16. Cities are described as hotspots of impacts and risks, but also a crucial part of the solution. The Chair of the IPCC said that our actions today will shape how people adapt and nature responds to increasing climate risk.

17. The occurrence of extreme weather events, for example can require Auckland Emergency Management being activated to coordinate an emergency management response and recovery under the direction of a Group Controller or Group Recovery Manager, respectively. Maintaining a cadre of suitably qualified Group Controllers and Group Recovery Managers is an essential part of Auckland’s preparedness for emergencies.

Ngā whakaaweawe me ngā tirohanga a te rōpū Kaunihera

Council group impacts and views

18. The position of Group Controller and Group Recovery Manager are statutory roles under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002. There are no impacts for the Council group arising from the appointment of individuals to perform the role of Group Controller or Group Recovery Manager.

Ngā whakaaweawe ā-rohe me ngā tirohanga a te poari ā-rohe

Local impacts and local board views

19. The position of Group Controller and Group Recovery Manager are statutory roles under the CDEM Act. There are no local impacts arising from the appointment of individuals to perform these roles.

Tauākī whakaaweawe Māori

Māori impact statement

20. The position of Group Controller and Group Recovery Manager are statutory roles under the CDEM Act. Those appointed to the Group Controller and Group Recovery Manager roles, and alternatives, are committed to honouring Te Tiriti o Waitangi by ensuring the views and knowledge of Iwi and Māori are considered and incorporated in response or recovery mahi.

Ngā ritenga ā-pūtea

Financial implications

21. There are no financial implications arising from this report.

Ngā raru tūpono me ngā whakamaurutanga

Risks and mitigations

22. The Auckland Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group is required to appoint suitably qualified and experienced personnel to perform the functions and duties and exercise the powers of the Group Controller and the Group Recovery Manager.

23. Approving the amendment to reinstate Mace Ward to the Group Controller list and approving the publication of the update to Appendix 1 on the Auckland Emergency Management website, ensures that Auckland Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group has met its obligations under the Act.

Ngā koringa ā-muri

Next steps

24. Appendix 1 to be published to the Auckland Emergency Management website.

Ngā tāpirihanga

Attachments

No.	Title	Page
a ⇨	Group Controller and Group Recovery Manager list

Ngā kaihaina

Signatories

Author	Adam Maggs - Head of Competency and Public Readiness
Authoriser	Paul Amaral - General Manager Auckland Emergency Management

Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee

05 September 2023

Tsunami Evacuation Zone Maps

File No.: CP2023/12524

Te take mō te pūrongo

Purpose of the report

1. To inform the Committee about the options for changing the look of the tsunami evacuation zone maps based on updated computer modelling.

2. To seek endorsement of the recommended option of two zones, comprising a land evacuation zone (coloured yellow) and a beach and marine evacuation zone (coloured red).

Whakarāpopototanga matua

Executive summary

3. Updated computer models of the areas of Auckland expected to flood during damaging tsunami have been delivered as part of the Tsunami Work Programme.

4. These models have been transformed into evacuation maps, which will replace the maps created in 2013 and 2014 based on older, more conservative modelling.

5. There is an opportunity to update the look and feel of the maps to reflect our updated understanding of how the public interprets warning information.

6. Auckland Emergency Management (AEM) and GNS Science have developed 3 options based on international best practice and revised guidance under development by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA):

· One zone encompassing all possible areas that would need to be evacuated, coloured blue.

· Two zones splitting the evacuation zones into land and beach evacuation areas, coloured yellow and red (respectively).

· Three zones representing different sized tsunami and beach evacuation areas coloured yellow, orange and red (similar to those currently in use).

7. The Coordinating Executive Group met on 21 August 2023 and recommended the two-zone option, based on the changes to national guidance currently in development by the NEMA, alignment to the National Warning System messaging, and advice provided by GNS Science. The information in this report supports the information presented in the Workshop held on 23 August 2023 with the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee.

Ngā tūtohunga

Recommendation/s

That the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee:

a) whakaae / approve the option of two tsunami evacuation zones, comprising a land evacuation zone (coloured yellow) and a beach and marine evacuation zone (coloured red).

Horopaki

Context

8. Tsunami are a series of potentially damaging waves that are most commonly caused by earthquakes, but can also be caused by other disturbances such as volcanic eruptions, landslides or even (more rarely) impacts of objects from space. While most tsunami events may affect multiple regions of the country, the impact of the tsunami will differ based on the distance from the source of the event, the geography, population and even the amount of coastal infrastructure and modification in the area.

9. Aotearoa New Zealand is at risk from tsunami generated from anywhere around the Pacific Ocean and even further afield. As tsunami can impact multiple regions and require technical knowledge of the hazard to understand their impact, they are one of the only hazards where alerting and warning is led from the top down. This means that while CDEM Groups must develop the understanding of the tsunami risk and evacuation needed, they generally must wait for guidance from national bodies to trigger “official” warnings and alerts. However, the public may and should act on their own regardless based on natural warning signs^{^[1]}.

10. Tsunami are one of Tāmaki Makaurau’s key hazards and AEM has invested in modelling and mapping to better understand our communities tsunami risk for more than 20 years.

11. The National Geohazards Monitoring Centre managed by GNS Science, and the Monitoring, Alerting and Reporting Centre managed by NEMA work closely together to provide warnings and alerts regarding tsunami to all CDEM Groups and the public. They have access to the combined resources of the countries around the Pacific Ocean that form the basis of a tsunami Early Warning Network and monitor earthquake and tsunami threats via live feeds of information 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

12. If an event that could cause a tsunami is detected, the New Zealand Tsunami Experts Panel (TEP) is convened to assess whether the event has the potential to create a tsunami that could impact Aotearoa / New Zealand. The technology and timeframes the monitoring entities and TEP use is evolving and updating all the time, with advancements in automation and AI being incorporated to ensure information provided is accurate and rapid.

13. If a detected tsunami is predicted to be big enough to impact the land in Aotearoa / New Zealand, under the current National Tsunami Advisory and Warning Plan^{^[2]} a national Emergency Mobile Alert (EMA) will be sent by NEMA to all compatible mobile phones in impacted areas. This will be accompanied by a National Warning System email to local CDEM Groups and other key emergency response stakeholders. Local CDEM Groups may then provide additional region-specific information or alerts in the form of additional EMA or warnings or activate any other warning systems they manage locally.

14. If the detected tsunami is predicted to only impact the marine and immediate coastal environment, no national EMA will be issued by NEMA. However, a warning of “Strong and unusual currents and dangerous surges at the shore” will be sent via the National Warning System email network. Local CDEM Groups may choose to then create local EMAs or provide additional information to their communities.

15. AEM currently uses a 3-colour web-based map to communicate with the public about tsunami risk and evacuation in and outside of emergencies. This map was developed in 2013/14 by GNS Science. It is based on their own computer modelling of tsunami flooding using guidance provided by NEMA in a Director’s Guideline^{^[3]}.

16. The Guideline was published in 2016 and is currently being revised. NEMA does not expect the revised guideline to be published until at least mid-2024 and if it contains any major changes, there will be an implementation timeline of many years.

17. The computer modelling that was available in 2013 allowed a very simple wave model to be used. The Civil Defence Group at the time understood that as computer modelling improved and became more affordable, the simplistic modelling would be revised to incorporate more technical detail, including real earthquake scenarios and a greater understanding of wave behaviour and interaction with the environment.

18. In 2022, revised computer models were developed by the contractor eCoast following a thorough procurement process. eCoast is a very well-respected coastal science consultancy that has worked with Auckland Council before on other projects and has undertaken similar work for other CDEM Groups, ports and key maritime facilities around the country.

19. eCoast generated tsunami inundation (flood) models that incorporated earthquake scenarios from around the Pacific Rim, ensuring the impact from tsunami arriving from all possible angles was included.

20. These models were then transformed into a series of evacuation maps by GNS Science, based on their experience, social science research into evacuation maps, and guidance from NEMA.

21. With the introduction of the refined maps, there is also an opportunity to take what has been learned nationally over the last 10 years, combine it with international best practice and advances in the field of social science and human behaviour, and change the way we talk to communities about tsunami risk.

Tātaritanga me ngā tohutohu

Analysis and advice

22. The current maps (Figure 1) use a 3-colour system representing the different areas of risk. The Red Zone is the area most at risk in any tsunami and represents the beach and marine area. The Orange Zone represents medium-sized tsunami and is strongly tied to the impacts of distant source tsunami that are generated around the far edges of the Pacific Ocean in South America and Alaska. The Yellow Zone represents what was considered to be most credible large tsunami that are generated by local or regional sources (0-3 hrs to impact the nearest coastline).

A map of a forest fire

Description automatically generated

Figure 1 – a screen shot of the current evacuation mapping, based on older, more simplistic models of tsunami impact in the area of the Omaha Peninsula and Point Wells. Note the use of 3 colours and how far the current mapping of the Yellow Zone extends inland.

23. The revised tsunami inundation (flood) modelling indicates a much smaller area of land is expected to be impacted during damaging tsunami in Tāmaki Makaurau than previously modelled (Figure 2). This is particularly visible in the estuaries, tidal rivers, the inner Waitematā Harbour and West Coast communities where flooding is now expected to be largely confined to beach and marine area, with much less impact expected on land in built-up areas. However, large areas of land-based flooding are still modelled in communities that are more exposed to tsunami generated from the Pacific Ocean, such as Aotea / Great Barrier Island and the north-eastern coastal communities like Omaha, Point Wells and Orewa.

A map of a forest fire

Description automatically generated

Figure 2 – a screen shot of the Omaha Peninsula and Point Wells areas, similar to Figure 1 showing revised evacuation areas based on modern, more technical tsunami impact models. Note there are still areas of significant impact, but the impact and evacuation zones do not extend as far inland as the older, more simplistic maps and models. The same 3 colour system is used here to show how much the area impacted has been refined from previous modelling.

24. AEM staff and GNS Science developed different mapping options based on the revised modelling. The options are based strongly on the developing national guidance from NEMA, which is informed by international best practice and social science research.

25. The options were presented to the Coordinating Executive Group on 21 August 2023, which recommended the two-zone option.

26. The options and their respective pros and cons (attached as Appendix 1) are based on the presentation provided to the Committee in a workshop held on 23 August, 2023.

27. The recommended option is Option 2: Two Zones. The reasons for this are:

· It aligns with the current National Warning System messaging, allowing users to see the areas relating to the two types of warning that may be issued nationally.

· Tāmaki Makaurau has a large population that lives at, works at, or uses the coast and sea, including significant numbers of ferry users and boaties. This has led to a large amount of coastal modification that makes defining the areas ‘at or near the coast’ more difficult than they might be in other parts of the country that might be considering or using the One Zone option.

· It combines the land-based threat into a single zone, simplifying the decision for users as to whether the tsunami will come far enough on land to put them at risk.

· It clearly shows the beach, marine, and coastal environments to be the highest risk in any tsunami event and will help communicate tsunami risk to boaties and coastal users, discouraging dangerous behaviour.

Tauākī whakaaweawe āhuarangi

Climate impact statement

28. This project doesn’t have an impact on greenhouse gas emissions and doesn’t affect any system’s ability to adapt to the impacts of climate change.

29. The risk of tsunami is not currently used to make land-use planning decisions and is outside of the scope of this project. These maps are designed to be used by the public to assess their personal level of tsunami risk if an event was triggered today, not in the future. The modelling uses the mean high tide levels as a basis for planning and so will change as sea level changes during future remodelling.

30. The potential changes in sea level as a result of climate change also fall generally within the model’s uncertainty and the conservatism built into the modelling approach.

Ngā whakaaweawe me ngā tirohanga a te rōpū Kaunihera

Council group impacts and views

31. It is envisaged that the impacts will be on the local communities and not the wider Council group.

32. As with all coastal users, the wider Council group is expected to maintain business continuity and safety plans to minimise the risk to their staff and operations from a range of hazards. They will have the opportunity to assess the changes in the evacuation zones and update their plans accordingly.

Ngā whakaaweawe ā-rohe me ngā tirohanga a te poari ā-rohe

Local impacts and local board views

33. This decision is based on exposure modelling that does not include societal components. There will be an opportunity in future projects of the Tsunami Work Programme to engage with local boards and wider coastal stakeholders on alerting options and preferences.

34. The Local Board Response Plans currently in development will incorporate the new maps.

Tauākī whakaaweawe Māori

Māori impact statement

35. Auckland Council is committed to meeting its responsibilities under Te Tiriti o Waitangi and its broader obligations to Māori. These commitments are articulated in the council’s key strategic planning documents, the Auckland Plan, the Long-term Plan 2012-2022, the Unitary Plan, Whiria Te Muka Tangata Māori Responsiveness Framework, Kia Ora Tāmaki Makaurau - Māori Outcomes Performance Measurement Framework and Local Board Plans.

36. This decision is based on exposure modelling that does not include societal components. There will be an opportunity in future projects of the Tsunami Work Programme to engage with mana whenua on alerting options and preferences.

Ngā ritenga ā-pūtea

Financial implications

37. The Tsunami Work Programme has a budget of $60,000 OPEX for FY23/24 and $3,067,125 CAPEX from FY24/25.

Ngā raru tūpono me ngā whakamaurutanga

Risks and mitigations

38. Tsunami evacuations are stressful, but rare events. Recent Auckland Emergency Management Preparedness Surveys indicate that approximately 75% of respondents know if they live in an evacuation zone. However, the sharp increase in engagement with AEM Hazards Viewer during recent tsunami events indicate large numbers of people still check their risk and location in relation to evacuation zones during emergency events. This means any changes to the evacuation zones should also be made with suitable community engagement and education. Once the maps have been approved by the committee, appropriate engagement plans will be developed to support their release.

39. Currently, the 3-zone tsunami maps allow for different types of alerts to be made for different types of tsunami. Reducing or combining the number of evacuation zones may reduce the ability to tailor evacuations based on the size of the tsunami, leading to over-evacuation. However, the new inundation modelling shows a reduced land-risk of tsunami inundation across most of the region, and very little difference between what was previously the Orange Zone and the Yellow Zone. The current Yellow Zone is considered to be our worst-case scenario, the largest tsunamis that originate from the closest locations to the region and incorporates the Orange Zone evacuation areas. Focussing on this zone in public messaging means communities will be prepared for the most dangerous tsunami land-threat that may impact the region before an official warning has the time to be issued.

40. AEM will also retain the current Orange Zone maps in our files for planning purposes and when there is time to communicate the risk of a smaller tsunami. This may occur from a tsunami generated from across the Pacific, and where there is 12 or more hours before impact in Aotearoa / New Zealand.

41. Any option that removes the visibility of what is currently the Red Zone, outlining the areas of risk from strong and unusual currents and dangerous surges at the shore (essentially a beach and marine threat) may minimise the risk of these events to the public. For most of Tāmaki Makaurau, the beach and marine threats (i.e. tsunami that do not impact the land) are our greatest threat, particularly in the most densely populated and used sections of coast and in our marinas. The large amount of coastal modification and infrastructure means that, unlike many other parts of the country, the differentiation between “beach” and “land” is not as clear. If an option is chosen that removes the current Red Zone, significantly more public education and engagement will need to be developed to ensure the risk to our boating and coastal users is clear in what is the majority of our tsunami emergencies.

42. The national evacuation map guidance is currently being redeveloped by NEMA. AEM is engaged with national working groups and advocating for the needs of the 1.6 million residents most of whom work, live or play at or near the coast. Our contractors have delivered multiple mapping options allowing us to pivot our public engagement tools if national guidance conflicts with our chosen options.

43. The timing of release of the updated maps (regardless of the option selected by the Committee), will be determined by the level of support Auckland Council ICT can provide to load the maps to Auckland Council Hazards Viewer. AEM has engaged early with ICT as a mitigation to this risk.

Ngā koringa ā-muri

Next steps

44. An engagement plan will be developed to support any change to the evacuation maps.

45. The updating of geospatial layers relating to tsunami evacuation zones will be managed by Auckland Council ICT. AEM has already engaged with Auckland Council ICT on this process.

46. The revised evacuation maps will be used to inform the future projects of the Tsunami Work Programme.

Ngā tāpirihanga

Attachments

No.	Title	Page
a ⇨	Options for revised evacuation zones

Ngā kaihaina

Signatories

Authors

Angela Doherty - Principal Science Advisor

John Cranfield - Head of Response & Recovery

Authoriser

Paul Amaral - General Manager Auckland Emergency Management

Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee

05 September 2023

Meerkat Tsunami Siren Network - Options Analysis

File No.: CP2023/12520

Te take mō te pūrongo

Purpose of the report

1. To outline the operational issues with the Meerkat tsunami siren network to the Committee.

2. To provide an overview of options to address the operational issues.

3. To recommend the preferred option, to decommission the Meerkat tsunami siren network.

Whakarāpopototanga matua

Executive summary

4. Auckland Emergency Management (hereafter referred to as AEM) operate forty-four (44) fixed array tsunami siren sites.

5. The sirens are a secondary alerting tool (alongside the mainstream media, social media, local radio, and television) to the Emergency Mobile Alert (EMA), which was introduced in New Zealand in 2017 and enables the sending of customised messages directly to every compatible cell phone in the target area. They incur no OPEX or CAPEX cost to AEM and contain more information than siren alerts.

6. Forty-two (42) of the forty-four (44) siren sites are Meerkat technology (a private company) and were installed in approximately 2008 by the Waitākere City Council and Rodney District Council. Other legacy Council’s did not install sirens, meaning most of Auckland’s coastal communities do not have sirens as a tsunami alerting tool.

7. The Meerkat sirens are nearing the end of their design life and theft and vandalism of the horn apparatus since mid-2022 has impacted approximately 41% of the network, meaning they are not performing at the level intended and may be providing a false sense of security to their communities.

8. The horn model used by Meerkat has been discontinued and can only be purchased through a custom, bulk order from an offshore supplier with a 6–8-month timeframe to install. Furthermore, Meerkat (who maintains the network since installation) has signalled their intention to scale back maintenance support from 2023.

9. AEM has a programme of work including revised evacuation maps (nearing completion) and a Tsunami Public Alerting Strategy, which will guide any future investment into the use of sirens as an alerting option and will involve public and mana whenua consultation (due June 2024). Should sirens be a recommended outcome of this strategy, they would not be Meerkat technology.

10. Results of the revised evacuation maps indicate the area required to evacuate in a tsunami emergency is greatly reduced across the region, including in many areas that have the Meerkat sirens.

11. An options analysis has been undertaken, outlining four (4) options to either replace, consolidate, decommission, or do nothing.

12. The Coordinating Executive Group met on 22 May 2023 and recommended decommissioning, accompanied by a robust communications plan to minimise community anxiety or confusion and to increase community awareness of the range of alternative alerting methods.

Ngā tūtohunga

Recommendation/s

That the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee:

a) whakaae / approve the decommissioning of the Meerkat tsunami siren network ahead of the outcome of the Tsunami Public Alerting Strategy, following appropriate communications with impacted communities.

Horopaki

Context

Background to tsunami siren locations in Auckland

13. AEM operate forty-four (44) fixed array tsunami siren sites to alert low-lying coastal residents of a tsunami threat. Each siren comprises a control box with multiple components including batteries and 2-6 siren horns. The sirens are located on a combination of power poles, free-standing posts, and buildings.

14. The sirens are located across the Waitākere, Albany and Rodney Wards. Forty-two (42) of the forty-four (44) siren sites were installed in approximately 2008 by Waitākere City Council and Rodney District Council using Meerkat Alerting Systems, a small family-owned business, that has maintained the system ever since. Other legacy Council’s did not install sirens so there are no fixed siren sites for the rest of the region. Refer Attachment A for a map of siren sites.

15. The remaining two (2) siren sites are at Orewa and are a different provider. There are no operational issues with this system, and they are not part of the options report.

16. Since 2008, there has been a significant change to early warning technology, with the EMA being introduced in 2017.

Operational Issues with the Meerkat Network

17. The Meerkat network of siren sites are nearing the end of their design life condition due to age, theft and vandalism.

18. The most recent investment occurred in early-2022 to upgrade sound cards to bring them in line with the Tsunami Warning Siren Technical Standard [TS03/14], moving from a tone-based alert to one capable of providing voice instruction.

19. Since mid-2022, there has been extensive theft and vandalism of the horn apparatus, which has affected approximately 41% of the Meerkat network and exhausted the supply of spare horns. All vandalism has been reported to Police with steps taken to notify the public of the issue and where possible, security hardware has been installed.

20. The horn model used for the Meerkat network has been discontinued and can only be purchased through a custom, bulk order from an offshore supplier. High-level indicative costs^{^[4]} from Meerkat to reinstate all horns and the network to full functionality are approximately $215,000 with a 6–8-month timeframe.

21. Meerkat has signalled to Auckland Emergency Management that it will be scaling down its maintenance services from December 2023. Should the network remain in place, an alternative contractor to maintain it is required.

Tsunami Work Programme

22. AEM is currently delivering the Tsunami Work Programme, which aims to better understand the region’s tsunami risk and help communities make decisions to better protect themselves in tsunami emergencies. Key stages of the programme include:

· Revised tsunami inundation modelling (complete).

· Updated tsunami evacuation maps (October 2023).

· A holistic vulnerability assessment to better understand who and what is at risk from the tsunami hazard (April 2024).

· A Tsunami Public Alerting Strategy on the various alerting options and the recommended approach for the Auckland region. The strategy will guide any future investment into the use of sirens as an alerting option, will involve public and mana whenua consultation and require a decision from the Committee (June 2024). Importantly, should sirens comprise part of any future alerting strategy, they would not be Meerkat technology.

· Delivery of the approved strategy.

23. The updated tsunami evacuation maps cover the entire coastline of Auckland and indicate the extent of the evacuation zone for a land-threat tsunami has reduced considerably across much of Auckland. This includes many areas that have Meerkat tsunami sirens.

The tsunami alerting framework.

24. Tsunami are most commonly caused by earthquakes and their sources are characterised as either local, regional or distant.

25. A local-source tsunami is generated close to New Zealand’s coastline, meaning there may not be enough time for an official warning before the wave impacts. This is where if people experience natural warning signs they need to act immediately - “Long or Strong, Get Gone”.

26. A regional or distant source tsunami is one that is generated at least one (1) hour’s travel time from the New Zealand coastline. In these cases, depending on where the community is relative to the source of the tsunami, communities may not have experienced the effects of an earthquake, and there may be some time to warn people before the first tsunami waves arrive. These are the most likely source of tsunami waves for the Auckland region.

27. The tsunami alerting framework is nationally driven with GNS Science’s National Geohazards Monitoring Centre, who examine and review earthquake and tsunami related data, determining what it means for New Zealand. Scientists from other organisations assist GNS Science by participating in the Tsunami Experts’ Panel.

28. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) is the official agency for providing tsunami advisories warnings (using the information from GNS Science). The advisories and warnings are issued to Civil Defence and Emergency Management Groups (like AEM), government, the media, the public and other agencies.

29. If there is a land and marine threat, NEMA will send an EMA to all capable mobile phones in the areas under threat. CDEM Groups will also send supporting EMAs providing local evacuation information.^{^[5]} These primary sources of notification are supported by secondary sources including the mainstream media, social media, local radio, television, and sirens.

30. The EMA was introduced as an alerting tool to New Zealand in 2017 and enables the sending of customised messaging directly to every compatible cell phone in the target area. They incur no OPEX or CAPEX cost to the local authority and contain more information than siren alerts.

31. Research into alerting networks has indicated that if official warnings reach at least two thirds of the population, they can be considered to have highly effective coverage^{^[6]}. NEMA note on their website that “The 2021 Annual Disaster Preparedness Survey showed nine out of ten people received an alert or had been with someone who received an alert.” This indicates that EMA already provides highly effective emergency alerting coverage.

32. The use of tsunami sirens is inconsistent across the country and like Auckland, most coastal communities do not have tsunami sirens.^{^[7]}

33. Findings from a number of international events, such as the Japan tsunami of March 2011, have revealed deficiencies with a reliance on sirens including:

· Technological failures as a result of power cuts or earthquake damage (in the case of a local source tsunami).

· That sirens may create a false sense of comfort in a community in whereby people expect to be warned by the siren, rather than making a decision to evacuate in response to natural warnings.^{^[8]} This risk is now exaggerated in Auckland, with many of the tsunami siren sites not in an operable condition due to theft and vandalism.

· Sirens may also not be audible to all potentially impacted people in windy conditions.^{^[9]}

34. In terms of resilience, the trigger mechanisms for sirens rely on a similar threshold of engineering resilience (although they are radio repeaters) as cell towers, so would not be any more resilient, and likely to be less resilient, than the EMA and mobile network, as they rely on single radio repeater sites for triggering alerts.

Tātaritanga me ngā tohutohu

Analysis and advice

35. In late 2022, in response to the ongoing theft and vandalism and with horn supplies exhausted, AEM commissioned Meerkat to undertake an options analysis. Meerkat put forward four options:

a) Restoration/repair of the current system.

b) Consolidation of working units and available equipment to improve coverage.

c) Decommission the system.

d) Do nothing.

36. The options report has been considered alongside the tsunami work programme and tsunami alerting framework, with the pros and cons of each option outlined below.

37. Restoration/repair of the current system

Pros

· The Meerkat network would be fully reinstated.

· Compliments other tsunami alerting platforms.

Cons

· Minimum $215,000 financial investment into an ageing technology that is under assessment as part of the Tsunami Public Alerting Strategy. Should sirens comprise part of any future alerting strategy, they would not be Meerkat technology.

· Does not account for the now reduced risk (following the revised evacuation maps) of many of the locations currently served by the Meerkat sirens.

· Ongoing theft and vandalism probable.

· Alternative contractor required to maintain the Meerkat network.

· Uneven investment of this alerting tool across the region.

· Six (6) to eight (8) month timeframe to implement. Completion of repairs would be close to the expected completion of the public alerting strategy, which is likely to have recommendations that differ from the current use of tsunami sirens and their locations.

38. Consolidation of working units and available equipment to improve coverage - removing sirens in locations with a lower tsunami risk profile and consolidating these to fewer locations with a higher tsunami risk profile on larger poles, less prone to vandalism.

Pros

· Compliments alternative alerting platforms.

· Would not need to order more horns in the short term.

· Once implemented, may reduce vandalism and theft.

Cons

· Most expensive option and requires investment into an ageing technology that is under assessment as part of the Tsunami Public Alerting Strategy. Should sirens comprise part of any future alerting strategy, they would not be Meerkat technology.

· Alternative contractor required to maintain the Meerkat network.

· Uneven investment of this alerting tool across the region.

· High level of uncertainty regarding both financial costs, timeframe, and ability to deliver.

39. Decommission the system

Pros

· Lowest financial cost of the “change” options. High-level indicative costs from Meerkat are $155,500 as at December 2022.

· Addresses vandalism and theft issue.

· Removes any confusion should sirens not be operable in advent of a tsunami.

· Allows a ‘clean slate’ for the Tsunami Public Alerting Strategy outcomes.

· Consistency across all communities that have Meerkat sirens installed.

Cons

· One of the secondary alerting tools removed from communities.

· Would require a high level of public education with impacted communities (this can also be viewed positively in terms of increased public awareness of the tsunami hazard and the timing aligns with the revised evacuation maps).

40. Option D: Do nothing - continue to use the existing Meerkat system, acknowledging the limitations posed by theft and vandalism.

Pros

· No initial cost outlay.

Cons

· Ongoing theft and vandalism probable.

· Alternative contractor required to maintain the Meerkat network.

· Potential for public confusion with many sirens not operable in advent of a tsunami.

41. Any of the options would require an appropriate level of public education and awareness measures be implemented with impacted communities and key stakeholders.

42. On the 22^nd of May 2023, the Coordinating Executive Group (CEG) considered the options and recommended that the option to decommission the Meerkat system be put to the CDEM Committee subject to the delivery of a robust communications plan to minimise community anxiety or confusion and to increase community awareness of the range of alternative alerting methods.

Tauākī whakaaweawe āhuarangi

Climate impact statement

43. This project doesn’t have an impact on greenhouse gas emissions and doesn’t affect any system’s ability to adapt to the impacts of climate change. The impacts of climate change on sea level rise will continue to be assessed in terms of tsunami risk at the coast and worked into future planning.

Ngā whakaaweawe me ngā tirohanga a te rōpū Kaunihera

Council group impacts and views

44. It is envisaged that the impacts will be on the local communities and not the wider Council group. However, Auckland Council departments that may be impacted by the decision (e.g. Customer and Community Services) will be advised of the decision made by the Committee.

45. The Committee was presented with a report on this issue on 6 June 2023 and deferred a decision, requesting a workshop, which took place on 23 August 2023.

Ngā whakaaweawe ā-rohe me ngā tirohanga a te poari ā-rohe

Local impacts and local board views

46. This issue has been communicated to those local boards impacted.

47. To date, local board views have not been sought regarding the future of the Meerkat system.

48. Should the Committee support the recommendation, communications with impacted local boards will comprise part of a communications plan.

Tauākī whakaaweawe Māori

Māori impact statement

49. Auckland Council is committed to meeting its responsibilities under Te Tiriti o Waitangi and its broader obligations to Māori. These commitments are articulated in the council’s key strategic planning documents, the Auckland Plan, the Long-term Plan 2012-2022, the Unitary Plan, Whiria Te Muka Tangata Māori Responsiveness Framework, Kia Ora Tāmaki Makaurau - Māori Outcomes Performance Measurement Framework and Local Board Plans.

50. The current siren locations are not in the vicinity of any marae and would not have implications beyond those of the public.

51. AEM is committed to including Māori views and needs in the development of the Tsunami Work Programme and the wider department work programme.

Ngā ritenga ā-pūtea

Financial implications

52. The theft of the tsunami siren horns is not covered by Auckland Council’s insurance as the asset damage does not exceed the $100,000 minimum claim amount. Each physical siren station is recognised as an individual asset and the cost of replacement is to come from the business unit.^{^[10]}

53. The annual OPEX costs to maintain the Meerkat system is approximately $25,000 excluding unscheduled repairs. Based on the age of the network, unscheduled repairs are highly likely to increase should the sirens be reinstated.

54. The tsunami work programme has a budget of 60,000 OPEX for FY23/24 and $3,067,125 CAPEX from FY24/25.

Ngā raru tūpono me ngā whakamaurutanga

Risks and mitigations

55. Cell phone coverage is not comprehensive at some of the Meerkat siren sites on the west coast (in particular Te Henga / Bethells and Karekare), with limited coverage dependent on the network. This may impact the receipt of an EMA.

56. The updated tsunami evacuation maps for both these locations show a reduction in the evacuation zone. Importantly, residential households in these communities are no longer in the tsunami evacuation zone.

57. Each of these locations have a local surf life-saving patrol that utilise radio communication and operate over the summer period, affording an added layer of alerting for communicating beach and marine threats in peak-use periods.

58. Any decision to change the current network configuration will be paired with a communications plan supported by the revised tsunami evacuation maps to reduce community anxiety and reinforce preparedness messaging.

59. During the development of the Tsunami Public Alerting Strategy, all tsunami alerting options will be reassessed, including the use of sirens. Additionally, other more novel alerting or risk reduction strategies will also be considered.

Ngā koringa ā-muri

Next steps

60. Based on the decision of the Committee, an execution timeline and public communication strategy will be developed. Any changes to the network will not be progressed until the appropriate communication plan is developed.

Ngā tāpirihanga

Attachments

No.	Title	Page
a ⇨	Siren Locations in Auckland

Ngā kaihaina

Signatories

Authors

Josie Beswick-Ngawaka - Senior Response Advisor

Angela Doherty - Principal Science Advisor

John Cranfield - Head of Response & Recovery

Authoriser

Paul Amaral - General Manager Auckland Emergency Management

Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee

05 September 2023

Emergency Management Bill

File No.: CP2023/10287

Te take mō te pūrongo

Purpose of the report

1. To provide information on the Emergency Management Bill and approve the process for the development and approval of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee’s submission.

Whakarāpopototanga matua

Executive summary

2. After the commencement of a review in 2017, advice, recommendations, the government’s response and subsequent policy development has resulted in the Emergency Management Bill (the Bill). The Bill intended to replace the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (the CDEM Act), is open for submission until 3 November 2023.

3. This report provides a high-level summary of the Bill (from the Memo to the Governing Body and local board members and the Independent Māori Statutory Board) for information and identifies some changes of particular relevance for Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland. These and additional matters identified in the detail of the Bill will be addressed in a committee workshop on 18 October 2023.

4. Auckland Emergency Management is developing a submission on behalf of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee. On the basis of the process outlined for the development of the submission, the Committees’ approval of delegations for the approval of the submission, is sought for:

· the Chair of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee

· the General Manager of Auckland Emergency Management.

Ngā tūtohunga

Recommendation/s

That the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee:

a) whakaae / approve delegations to the Chair of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee and the General Manager of Auckland Emergency Management to approve the Committee’s submission to the Emergency Management Bill, developed through the following process:

i) a Memo to Governing Body and local board members and the Independent Māori Statutory Board introducing the Emergency Management Bill

ii) a presentation to the Coordinating Executive Committee on 21 August 2023

iii) a local board report in September 2023 seeking comment on the Emergency Management Bill

iv) a letter to Tāmaki Makaurau’s iwi and Māori introducing the Emergency Management Bill and seeking to understand the level of interest

v) a Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee workshop on 18 October 2023 to discuss the draft submission to the Emergency Management Bill

vi) the circulation of the final draft submission following the workshop.

Horopaki

Context

5. The Emergency Management Bill (the Bill) to replace the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (the CDEM Act) is open for submission until 3 November 2023. (The Bill can be accessed via the link here.)

6. The Bill is a part of the programme of policy work known as the Trifecta Work programme that arose out of the Government’s response to the 2017 report of the Technical Advisory Group on Better Reponses to Natural Disasters and other Emergencies.

7. The Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee received updates on the Emergency Management Regulatory Framework (Trifecta programme) in March 2022, in the General Manager’s update in June 2022 and a presentation on 30 August 2022.

8. Governing Body and local board members and the Independent Mori Statutory Board received a Memo introducing the Bill on 17 August 2023.

9. While comment is sought on the Bill as if it were enacted as currently presented, it is noted that decisions on the progress of the Bill will be made by the government formed after the General election in October 2023.

Tātaritanga me ngā tohutohu

Analysis and advice

Emergency Management Bill

10. The following paragraphs provide a high-level summary of the Bill from the Memo to Governing Body and local board members and Independent Māori Statutory Board.

11. The Bill updates the emergency management system to improve performance, modernise the current legislative and regulatory framework and acknowledge the importance of community resilience and preparedness. The Bill builds on the CDEM Act and:

· restructures the Bill to a more modern approach

· includes current provisions with minor amendment

· introduces new language and terminology, as a consequence of the shift from ‘Civil Defence Emergency Management’ to ‘Emergency Management’

· introduces more significant change consistent with the Technical Advisory Group’s recommendations and the government’s response.

A more modern Bill

12. The Bill is structured with parts and sub-parts (some accompanied with outlines of their contents) and makes extensive use of headings. Some sections of the CDEM Act are moved to the Schedules of the Emergency Management Bill.

Current provisions minorly amended

13. Much of the current CDEM Act is carried over with minor amendment. The placement of these clauses within the Bill’s structure means provisions carried over may be placed in a different order than they appeared in the CDEM Act.

Language and terminology

14. Changes to language and terminology appear throughout the Bill. Some of the more significant examples include:

Emergency Management	*for*	Civil Defence Emergency Management
Emergency Management Committee	“	Civil Defence Emergency Management Committee
Emergency Management Committee Plan	“	Civil Defence Emergency Management Committee Group Plan
Coordinating Executive		Coordinating Executive Group
Area Controller	“	Group Controller
Area Recovery Manager	“	Group Recovery Manager
emergency designation	means	a state of emergency or a transition period

15. Further to the above, the more significant changes introduced by the Bill of particular relevance in Tāmaki Makaurau, include:

· Greater recognition of the role of Māori and enhancing Māori participation

(clauses 3, 4, 20, 25, 26, 29, 33, 67, 73, 76, 144, 147 and 149)

· Changes to the requirements regarding the Emergency Management Committee Plan (currently the Group Plan)

(clauses 72, 73, 74, 76 and 77)

· Critical infrastructure

(clauses 2, 3, 5, 10, 12, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 143 and Schedule 1 and Schedule 2)

· The role of Emergency Management Committees compared to the functions and duties of local authority members of Emergency Management Committees

(clauses 29 and 37)

· Changes regarding emergency designation - State of Emergency and Notice of Transition Period

(clauses 4, 40)

· Regulations and Director’s rule-making powers

(clauses 143 to 148

· Infringements

(clauses 125 to 142)

16. These matters and those identified through further analysis of the Bill will be addressed in at the Committee workshop on 18 October 2023.

Development of the submission to the Emergency Management Bill

17. The table below sets out the key steps in the development of the submission to the Bill, including local board input:

Date	Action
August 2023	Memo to all elected members providing information on the Emergency Management Bill and development of the CDEM Committee’s submission.
August 2023	A report for local board business meetings in September seeking comment for input into the CDEM submission.
August 2023	Letters to Tāmaki Makaurau’s iwi and Māori advising of the Emergency Management Bill, an overview of its contents and seeking opportunities for engagement as part of the submission’s development.
21 August 2023	Presentation to the Coordinating Executive Committee meeting, setting out this process for the development of the CDEM Committee’s submission to the Bill, and seeking nomination of member agency representatives to liaise with and involve in workshops.
5 September 2023	Report to the CDEM Committee outlining the Bill and this process for the development and approval of the submission, recommending delegation to the Committee Chair and GM of Auckland Emergency Management to sign-off the approved submission. NB – the closing date for submission’s falls between the CDEM Committee’s scheduled quarterly meetings.
September 2023	Workshops with representatives of CEG and partner agencies, Controllers and Recovery Managers, Auckland Emergency Management and representatives of Auckland Transport, Watercare Services and Healthy Waters.
September 2023	Comment from local boards received.
October 2023	Drafting of submission.
18 October 2023	Workshop of the CDEM Committee to consider recommended submissions to the Emergency Management Bill (to be confirmed).
October 2023	Circulation of the draft CDEM Committee submission to members of the CDEM Committee.
October / November 2023	Approval of the CDEM Committee submission on the Emergency Management Bill under delegation to the Chair of the Committee and the General manager of Auckland Emergency Management.
3 November 2023	Closing date for submission to the Emergency Management Bill.

Tauākī whakaaweawe āhuarangi

Climate impact statement

18. The definition of emergencies in the CDEM Act and the Bill includes naturally occurring emergencies such as severe weather and drought. It is widely anticipated that these types of emergencies will become more frequent and severe as a consequence of climate change.

19. The Bill updates the regulatory framework under the CDEM Act. Under the framework emergency management comprises the four R’s - Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery. Emergency management practice seeks to:

· reduce the risk from emergencies

· raise awareness of and preparedness for emergencies

· provide a platform for effective response to and recovery from emergencies.

20. The changes signalled by the Bill will be complemented by the review of the National Emergency Management Plan, the roadmap for the implementation of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy and the wider policy work related to infrastructure.

Ngā whakaaweawe me ngā tirohanga a te rōpū Kaunihera

Council group impacts and views

21. The Bill and proposed changes to the framework for emergency management holds implications across the Auckland Council group, due to obligations as managers of critical infrastructure, the provision of information and surge capacity with potential operational impacts.

22. Auckland Emergency Management is working with various parts of Auckland Council and CCOs including Auckland Plan Strategy and Research, Healthy Waters, Local Board Services, Ngā Matarae, Auckland Transport and Watercare on the development of the submission to the Bill.

Ngā whakaaweawe ā-rohe me ngā tirohanga a te poari ā-rohe

Local impacts and local board views

23. Local board members were introduced to the Bill by the Memo of 17 August 2023. A report for September local board business meetings seeks comment on the Bill.

Tauākī whakaaweawe Māori

Māori impact statement

24. There is a high level of interest amongst iwi and Māori. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) has held several national hui. Engagement with marae and related discussions similar indicate an awareness and interest.

25. Iwi and Māori have been written to encourage their making a submission, seeking comment or feedback that can be reflected in the development of the submission and to see if there is interest for a hui, if that is possible.

Ngā ritenga ā-pūtea

Financial implications

26. While the changes signalled in the Bill will require amended or additional processes and practices and introduce additional cost across the emergency management system, it is uncertain when they will arise.

27. It is also unclear how such costs will fall between participating Emergency Management Committees, local authorities, ratepayers, critical infrastructure entities and sectors, their shareholders and consumers. There may also be implications for the capacity amongst participants across the emergency management system, critical infrastructure entities and sectors.

28. The full financial and resource implications may not be known until the Bill is enacted, the National Emergency Management Plan reviewed, the roadmap for the implementation of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy completed and critical infrastructure policy confirmed. These programmes will be subject to the decision-making of the government to be formed after the General Election in October 2023.

Ngā raru tūpono me ngā whakamaurutanga

Risks and mitigations

29. The general direction of policy on which the Bill is based has been signalled for some time. The submission process is the most effective means of managing risk of unfavourable change.

Ngā koringa ā-muri

Next steps

30. A workshop of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Committee to consider the recommendations of the draft submission is scheduled for 18 October 2023. Materials will be circulated to Committee members in preparation of the workshop.

Ngā tāpirihanga

Attachments

There are no attachments for this report.

Ngā kaihaina

Signatories

Author	Wayne Brown - Principal Recovery Advisor
Authoriser	Paul Amaral - General Manager Auckland Emergency Management

[1] Information on natural and official warnings can be found on www.aucklandemergencymanagement.org.nz

[2] National Tsunami Advisory and Warning Plan NEMA Supporting Plan [01/20].

[3] Tsunami Evacuation Zones Directors Guideline for CDEM Groups [DGL 08/16].

[4] Based on the December 2022 report by Meerkat.

[5] Tsunami Warnings and Advisories – A Public Information Guide January 2022. National Emergency Management Agency.

[6] Mileti and Sorenson 1990, Mileti and Kuligowski 2008, in the GNS Science Report evaluating the alerting systems of the Bay of Plenty.

[7] National Tsunami Stock take 2022. National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).

[8] Technical Standard [TS03/14] Tsunami Warning Sirens.

[9] https://wremo.nz/hazards/tsunami/wremos-position-on-tsunami-sirens/

[10] Refer to Auckland Council self-insurance fund effective Friday 1st July 2022.

Chairperson	Cr Sharon Stewart, QSM
Deputy Chairperson	Cr Andrew Baker
Members	Cr Julie Fairey	Cr Greg Sayers
	Cr Alf Filipaina	IMSB Chair David Taipari
	Cr Mike Lee	Cr Ken Turner
	IMSB Member Pongarauhine Renata
Ex-officio	Mayor Wayne Brown
	Deputy Mayor Desley Simpson, JP

Author	Casey Hart - Business Operations Lead AEM
Authoriser	Paul Amaral - General Manager Auckland Emergency Management